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Abstract 
The main objective of this thesis is to contribute to the existing literature by investigating 
the effect of corporate governance on firm's information environment. The study explores 
a number. of governance mechanisms and examines the,ir. implication on the extent· to 
which information is impounded into stock prices. The empirical analyses are developed 
from the existing theoretical and empirical literatures that build from the agency theory. 
Further, institutional structure of countries covered in the sample provide unique 
background that build foundation for the analysis. 
The first empirical analysis studies the impact of firm-level and country-level governance 
on firm's information environment proxy by stock price synchronicity. Using broad based , 
firm-level corporate governance score which derive its foundation from' the national 
corporate governance codes, the analysis investigate whether firms investment in better 
governance.enhance information content of stock prices. Further, proportion of outsiders 
and board size are used to test for different governance mechanisms. In the analysi~, a 
number of empirical tests are undertaken and reasonable changes in methodology are 
provided. The primary findings of this study are th~t better governed firms and proportion 
. of outsiders enhance production of firm specific information. The latter is more 
pronounced with better country-level g~vernance. On the other hand, firms with large 
boards reduce firm-speCific information. 
The second empirical analysis examines the effect of different ownership categories on 
synchronicity. First, it looks at the impact of the ownership by largest shareholder within 
firm. Second, examines the implication of largest shareholder's relation with the firm. 
Third, impact of block ownership and forth, the implication of multiple blockholders by 
examining the number of block owners. The analysis employ holding of true owner of 
iii 
shares in investigating the relations. Panel regression analysis is employed to examine 
these relations. The study finds that ownership has significant implication on the 
aggregation of firm-specific information. The negative relation between largest 
shareholder and synchronicity is significant in countries with better institutional structure. 
The study also show that when the largest institution is independent, firm-specific 
information become more publicly available. Further, the study finds blockholders to have 
significant effect in the production of firm-specific information. 
The third empirical analysis explores the role of corporate governance on the amount of 
information incorporated into stock prices and how that is reflected in firm value. As 
such, the third empirical provides first attempt to provide direct empirical link between 
firm-specific information and valuation. The analysis of corporate governance and firm 
value is also examined. 1he study provides three main empirical findings. First, firms 
with informative stock prices as measured by logarithmic transformation of the R2 statistic 
of the market model have higher market valuation. Second, the study show· that better 
governed firms receives higher market valuation. Third, the relationship between firm-
specific information and valuation stronger for firms with better firm-level governance 
and large proportion of independent non-executive directors. In addition, the relation 
.. 
between stock prices informativeness and firm value is stronger for firms with higher 
concentration of block ownership . 
... 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 discusses the motivation, objective, issues investigated and contribution of the 
thesis. The chapter introduces key issues and provide the setting for the chapters that 
fo 1I0w. The main purpose of this ~hesis is to unveil understanding of impact of corporate 
governance both country-level and firm-level on informational role of stock prices. The 
objective of the chapter is to provide factors that motivate undertaking of this subject 
matter and how it adds to the existing literature. 
To meet the objective of the chapter, several sections are discussed and proceed as 
~ ~ . 
follows. Section 1.2 provides motivation of the thesis and empirical chapters. Section 1.3 
set the objectives of the thesis and main issues that are investigated. Section 1.4 provides 
summary of the implications of major finding and recommendation. Section' 1.5 
discusses the contributions of the thesis. Section 1.6 outlines the structure of the thesis. 
1.2 Motivation of the Study 
The main objective of this thesis is to ,contribute to the existing literature by 
investigating the effect of corporate governance on firm's information environment. The 
study explores a number of governance mechanisms and examines their implication on 
the extent to which information is impounded into stock prices. Specifically, this study 
investigates the impact of both firm-level and country-lev~1 governance; ownership of 
large shareholders using their identity, shareholdings a~d number of block owners; and 
. . how market value informative firms with different governance structures. I 
. I 
, 
I 
This study is grounded on the role of financial market in production and aggregation of 
information. In an efficient market, stock prices incorporate all public and private 
information about the firm;s current position and future prospects. However, financial 
markets are far from efficient as attaining this informational efficient price without 
eliminating profits associated wit~ the effort of collecting such information is nearly 
impossible (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)). The cost of collecting information makes it 
difficult to attain such level of efficiency. In essence, collecting and trading on private 
information form key component in determining profits for market participants and 
incorporating firm-specific information into stock prices in an environment where both 
informed and uninformed traders participate. 
To determine the extent of information about the firm, Roll (1988) propose that degree 
to which private information,.is impounded into stock prices is reflected by R-squared 
statistic measure from the market model. He argues that public information explains 
little about movement of stock prices, suggesting either noise or private information 
could explain the variation. Extending further, Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) suggest 
higher R2 indicate that stock returns move together with the industry and market returns 
indicating that less firm-specific information is available. 
The use of R2 as a measure of the information content of stock prices has drawn 
empirical attention in several papers. Among the first study to introduce this concept in 
relation to corporate governance is Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000),which investigate the 
how the property right explain the movement of stock prices. They show that strong 
property rights promote informed arbitrage which encourages collection of and trading 
on private information. Using US. firm-level data, Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) 
provide evidence of the main informed market participants and suggest that their 
,', . 
influence vary from one another. They find that while insiders and institutional investors 
2 
I 
increase firm-specific information impounded into stock prices, financial analyst reduces 
that amount. In emerging market, Chan and Hameed (2006) show consistent results that 
security analyst produce more market-wide information than firm-specific. 
In this thesis, I study how corporate governance influences the extent to which 
information, is incorporated into stock prices. Because incentive for collection of and' 
trading on private information depends on the quality of information production and how. 
it flows from the producer(s) to the user(s), corporate governance mechanisms have 
important implication on the degree to which such information is impounded into stock 
prices. Little has been uncovered in this area and the literature is still developing. As 
such, this thesis intends to bring to light the relevance of firm-level and country-level 
governance in affecting firms' information environment. 
• ,I t 
To date, few studies have explored the relation between information content of stock 
prices and corporate governance. Nevertheless, majority have confi'ned themselves to 
industry-level and narrow definition of corporate governance. This study extends further 
by incorporating extensive measures of corporate governance in a cross-country setting 
than narrower antitakeover provisions that have been used in previous studies 1. Given 
that the latter .~re not applicable in the set of thesample covered in this study, it makes it 
interesting to explore how firm-level governance influence information impounded into 
stock prices. 
In addition, there are limited studies that provide extensive examination of other 
governance mechanisms and how they interact with country-level governance provide 
additional motivation to undertake this study. Because firm-level governance and 
.. ' 
Such as Ferreira and Laux (2007) 
3 
country characteristics are interdependent in promoting ef(ective governance2 empirical 
research in this area is warranted. As such, this thesis provides a more extensive analysis 
of implication governance mechanisms. 
1.3 Objectives and Issues Investigated 
As outlined earlier, the principal objective of the thesis is to examine how corporate 
. governance influences the information content of stock prices. In this study, the focus is 
on the use of R2 as a measure of the information efficiency to determine the extent in 
which private information is incorporated into stock prices within the agency 
framework. The thesis builds on the premise that insiders have information advantage 
over other market participants and use of firm resources is within their discretion. As 
I 
such existing information' ~symmetry incentivises insiders to misallocation resources3• 
Taking this into account, this ,thesis investigates how effective corporate governance 
mechanisms can mitigate these problems. 
In order to assess the implication of corporate governance in enhancing degree to which 
the level of information about the firm is revealed in stock prices, the thesis investigates 
three main research areas as follows: 
1. Does corporate governance affects stock price synchronicity? 
2. The effect of ownership on stock price synchronicity 
3. Corporate governance and value of informative firm 
To address these research agendas, next section attempt to provide synopsis of issues 
that are covered. Empirical results for each research question are also highlighted briefly 
in this section and in depth discussion provided in the respective chapters. 
2 Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007) and Aggarwal, et aI., (2009) provide extensive review of country-level 
and firm-level governance. 
3 Misallocation of resources can be in the form of over- or underinvestment, consumption of perquisites 
and other decisions that intend to destroy value of the firm (shareholders' return). See Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), Jensen (1986) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for detailed discussions. 
4 
1 ~3.1 Does corporate governance affects stock price synchronicity? 
This study provides first attempt to explain the relevance of corporate governance. Here 
the st~dy examines both country-level and firm-level governance. To investigate this, 
two corporate governance measures are constructed. First, the study captures the level of 
country institutional set up by looking at legal infrastructures and level of financial 
development. The aim here is to capture country-level differences and how they explain 
firm-level features. Second, the study constructs a firm-level corporate governance score 
which intends to rate firm on how best they are governed. The foundation of this 
governance score is provisions that are found in the national corporate governance 
codes. To make it much broader, additional corporate governance variables that have 
been found to have influence on firms are also included4• 
To facilitate empirical analysits several steps are carried out. First, the sample is 
constructed from the top firms by market capitalisation from national indexes in eleven 
(11) countries namely Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. To avoid sample selection bias, 
several criteria have been taken into account. First, firms must be listed for at least a 
year. Second, firms that were dropped from any of the indexes but remained publicly 
traded, remain in the sample. I further require that each firm have at least two years of 
observations over the sample period. 
To ~nsure conclusive findings are drawn from the analysis, several empirical tests are 
carried out. The mairi dependant variable is the stock price synchronicity which proxy 
for level of firm's specific information. The main empirical specifications are derived 
from the ordinary least squares (OLS) panel regressions. In addition, regressions control 
4 
Detailed explanation on how both· country-level and firm-level governance are constructed and 
provisions covered are provided in Chapter Three: Data and Sample Description. 
5 
for industry, country and year dummies. To account for possible serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity, standard errors are corrected for country-level clustering. Additional· 
robustness tests are provided and discussed further in the respective ·chapter. 
, The primary findings of this study are that· better governed firms and proportion of 
outsiders enhance production of firm specific information. The latter is more pronounced 
with better country-level governance. On the other hand, firms with large boards reduce 
firm-specific information, suggesting the information flow constraints associated with 
firms comprising large number of members. 
1.3.2 The effect of ownership on stock price synchronicity 
The second study in this thesis examines the 'effect of different ownership particularly by 
large owners' categories on synchronicity. The extent to which institutions are effective 
rl ~ 
as governance mechanism is still inconclusive. Literature suggest. different outcomes; 
first, because of size of their investment institutional investors have incentive to ensure 
return to their investment (Shleifer and Vishny (l98~)). Second, opposing argument 
suggest that incentive derived from monitoring vanish as a result of free-riding problem, 
on extreme expropriation of minority can be the outcome (Hwang and Hu (2009)). This 
study provides extensive investigation on different levels of ownership. First, it looks at 
the behaviour o{ the largest shareholder within a firm. ~econd, examines the largest 
shareholder's business relation with the firm. Third, investigates impact of block 
Ownership and forth, examines the implication of multiple blockholders by examining 
the number of block owners. 
In fUlfilling the objective of the study, unique hand collected dataset is employed. This 
dataset allows identifying the true owner of shares by adding direct and indirect 
". 
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ownership from the list of shareholders available5• Further, the data allow to identify the 
relation that largest shareholder has with the firm and categorise whether is independent 
of the firm in which she invest or otherwise. To test the effect of block ownership, two 
types of data set are employed. First, the percentage of shares held by blockholder 
defined as shareholder~ with at least 5% of firm's equity. Second, the number of 
blockholders that hold firm's equity. Financial data is obtained from WorldS cope' and 
DataStream. 
A comprehensive analysis is undertaken to determine the effect of ownership. Further 
tests on the implication of country's characteristics are also provided. Main regression 
analyses employ panel regression technique using stock price synchronicity as the main 
dependent variable. The explanatory variables of interest are ownership by largest 
shareholders and blockholders" identity of largest shareholder and number of 
b.lockholders. The regression tests also include country, industry and year fixed effects 
and standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and within-firm autocorrelation 
using method suggested by Petersen (2009). Additional test are also undertaken to 
ensure that results are robust to different changes in methodology. 
The study findsJhat ownership has significant implication on the aggregation of firm-
specific information. The negative relation between largest shareholder and, 
synchronicity is significant in countries with better institutional structure. The study also 
show that when the largest institution is independent, firm-specific information become 
more publicly available. Further, the study finds blockholders to have significant effect 
in the production of firm~specific information. 
--~----------------------
5 T~is approach is closely related with Faccio and Lang (2002) and Dlugosz" et aI., (2006). 
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1.3.3 Corporate governance and value of informative firm 
The impact of corporate governance on firm valuation is well documented in the 
literature. A large strand of literature support that there is significant evidence that better 
governance en.hances corporate value. However, the question of whether better 
governance is reflected into stock ,prices remains ambiguous. In contrast to previous 
studies, the chapter attempts to provide a better understanding of how information 
content of stock prices affects firm value measured by Tobin's Q. To add to this, the 
chapter explore the role of corporate governance on the amount of information 
incorporated into stock prices and how that is reflected in firm value. As such, the 
chapter provides first attempt to empirically investigate this relation. 
d ~ 
The sample consists of 1065 firm-year between 2003 and 2007 from across eleven (II) 
countries in Western Europe. Financial and utility companies are excluded from the 
. sample because they are subjected to. additional regulations. Financial variables are 
obtained from the WoridScope. Corporate governance data is hand collected from the 
mandatory documents and companies' websites. Similar to Chapter 5, firm-level 
governance is measure using a constructed corporate governance score. Other corporate 
governance variables such as ownership are also used in this study. 
The study provides three main empirical findings. First, firms with informative stock 
prices as measured by logarithmic transformation of the R2 statistic of the market model 
have higher market valuation. Second, the study show that better governed firms 
receives higher market valuation. Third, the relationship between firm-specific 
:~nformation and valuation stronger for firms with be~ter firm-level governance and large 
. proportion of in·dependent non-executive directors. In addition, the relation between 
8 
stock prices 'informativeness and firm value is stronger for firms with higher 
concentration of block ownership. 
1.4 Contribution of the Study 
Having discussed the issues that this thesis investigates, this section extends to document 
the main contributions it has in the existing literature. The issues highlighted here 
provide overall picture of the importance of undertaking this study. 
First, few studies have attempted to provide evidence on the extent to which corporate 
governance influences information content of stock prices. Of these, the, attempt is 
limited to fewer corporate governance provisions that capture anti takeover aspects that 
are limited in the US firms. Further, little has been covered beyond industry-level as 
such no evidence is provided in the international setting. To add to this, implication of 
rl t 
both firm-level and country-level governance on the firm's information environment is 
yet to be empirically investigated. This thesis addresses these limitations that exist in the 
literature by investigating how both country-level and firm-level corporate governance 
affects firm informativeness. 
Second, from a broader perspective ownership have significant impact on firms. 
However, the direction in which the outcome, is expected in inconclusive. To date, little 
evidence is available on the effects of different forms of ownership on synchronicity . 
• 
This thesis provid~s extensive investigation to uncover a number of unanswered research 
questions. Nature of ownership structures across Europe provide appropriate avenue to 
investigate this relationship. As such provide strong contribution to the understanding of 
the influence of ownership structure in large firms. 
Third, the thesis inv~stigates the implication of corporate governance on valuation of 
informative firms. This study provides direct evidence on. outcome of how firm 
9 
informativeness promotes efficient allocation of resources that create value to the 
shareholders. Here attempt is made to examine th~ implication of different corporate 
governance mechanisms. Therefore, this thesis 'fills the gap that exists in the literature. 
1.5 Implication of the Thesis Findings and Recommendations' 
The main findings in this thesis have a number of implications to policy makers, firms, 
investors and public in general. First, the findings indicate the essence of firms having 
better governance. As such promoting better governance ensures that quality and timing 
of disclosure is appropriate to enhance informed trading. In addition, it ensures that cost 
of information is minimised encouraging production of firm-specific information. This 
is essential ingredient for well-functioning financial markets. Second, the findings 
suggest that further emphasis on the development of corporate governance principles is 
It 
encouraged. Further investment in promoting more independent elements within 
corporate boards and regular training for new and existing directors should be all!ong 
the focal point for policy makers and financial market regulators. 
Third, another interesting finding that has major implication is on the role of 
institutional ownership. The role of institutions as governance mechanism is threatened 
by free-riding problem. The implication of these results to policy makers is that apart 
from internal governance, encouraging shareholders to build a certain threshold of 
shares could be important. Further, it can also be important to set requirement that bind 
shareholders especially those with a certain level to vote and/or get involved with firm 
affairs. 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
",The remainder of the thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 provides a summary of 
,general literatur~ reviews. Chapter.3 discusses brief overview of institutional structures 
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that exist in the Continental European countries, the United Kingdom (UK) and the 
United States. Chapter 4 presents detailed description of data and sample, and 
construction of corporat'e governance scores. Chapter 5 presents the first empirical study 
and assess how corporate governance affects stock price synchronicity. Chapter 6 which 
, . 
is the second chapter examines the effect of ownership on stock price synchronicity. 
Chapter 7 is the third and final empirical s,tudy investigates the effect of corporate 
governance on the value of informative firms. Chapter 8 concludes the thesis and 
provides summary of the research findings and their implications, offer policy 
recommendations, highlight the limitations of the study and scope for future research. 
It 
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The main purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of main empirical and 
theoretical literature that bases their foundation upon the agency theory. Agency theory 
attempts to, highlight the relationship in modem corporations where ownership and 
Control are separated. FoJlowing seminal work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) which 
• 
propose the theory of the firm, this chapter provide thorough discussion' available in the 
literature on how the contractual incompleteness develop into conflict between various 
parties. Attempt is made to pr~vide discussion on prevailing conflicts of interest between 
rl • 
managers, shareholders and debt holders. The chapter also highlights how corporate 
governance addresses some' of these conflicting problems that exist in modem 
corporation. In addition, the chapter highlights how corporate governance mechanisms 
have an impact on the firm information environment. 
. To' attempt this task, the remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 
attempts to define agency theory. Sections 2.3 t~ 2.6 take a close look at a number of 
corporate governance mechanisms that attempt to provide solution to agency problems. 
The link between corporate governance mechanisms and objective of the firm from 
( shareholders' perspective is provided in an attempt to address the agency issues. Section 
2.7 concludes 
12 
2.2 Agency Theory 
If managers were left to control corporate resources on their own, the returns to the 
owners of those resources are likely to suffer. Early indication of managers' ability in 
wasting corporate resources was first articulated by Adam Smith'in 1776. He suggested 
that companies' prosperity would suffer in the hands of managers due to separation of 
ownership and control. He argues that "negligence and profusion, therefore, must always 
prevail, more or less, in the management of affairs of such companies,,6. Studies that 
followed such as Berle and Means (1932) highlighted that managers pursue their own 
interest at the expense of shareholders particularly when shares are widely held .. 
In attempt to provide environment in which these issue prevail, Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) propose a theory of the firm that looks at the contractual environment between 
II 
parties associated. with the firm. They outline conflicting parties in contractual 
env.ironment namely shareholders, debt holders and managers. Modern corporations are 
characterised by separation of ownership from control, therefore it is of paramount 
importance that owner employ another person with experience and expertise to 
undertake corporate affairs on his behalf. Jensen and Meckling (1976) term this as 
"agency relationship". Jensen and Meckling (1976) define the latter as a contract under 
which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making 
authority to the agent. 
The contractual obligation of the agent is to maximise princip~1 's wealth, which in turn 
should result in higher performance and value of the firm. However, drawing up a 
~ '6'~-----------------
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, volume 2, 1776 extracted from Morek, R. and Yeung, B., 'Agency 
Problems in Large Hlmily Business Groups', Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 27, No.4, 2003, 
PP.367-382. . 
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contract that addresses every eventuality that might occur within a firm is nearly 
impossible. Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1988) suggest that when' 
contracts are incomplete 'economic ,relation between parties is distorted. As such, 
because of the nature of contractual environment between principal ,and agent, distortion 
from the main obligation of maximising firm value is a likely outcome. 
Given the nature of modem corporations as proposed by Berle and Means (1932), 
owners are highly dispersed and shareholding is characterised by inactive commitment 
towards intervening firm affairs. As a result, controls in the hands of managers e,nhance 
their power and desire to pursue self-interested efforts at the expense of shareholders; 
this creates agency problems (Jensen and Meckling (1976». Agency problems are 
characterised by uncertainty tha~ agent(s) will work towards satisfying their contractual 
obligation. This is manifested by theltfact that agent(s) possesses information unavailable 
to the principal which may result in divergence of interest between these parties. 
Therefore, agency problems arise as the outcome of incomplete contract and costs 
associated with enforcing them (Fama and Jensen (1983». Adding to this, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) argue that be'cause of incomplete contracting situations, managers have 
incentive to expropriate' and misallocate firm's resources. Managers can undertake 
several ways to benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders. First, Jensen (1986) 
point out that managers may have investment preference regardless of the value created 
by their choice. As such, the choice may be driven by the resources available to them 
and their level of expertise. Second, managers may pass potential value enhancing 
projects in order to maintain resources under their control. This give power to managers 
for perk consumption on the other hand reduces firm efficiency that hurt returns'to 
'. shareholders (Jensen (1986». 
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2.3 Governance Mechanisms: Role of Internal Governance 
When contracting manager to work on their behalf, principal expects the main objective 
of creating value will be achieved. However, agency problems· that develop betwe~n 
these two parties make attaining contractual objective difficult. Corporate· governance 
provides mechanisms that ensure shareholder's objectives are satisfied. This section 
reviews the main internal governance mechanisms that address agency problems by 
linking them with the key objective of enhancing firm performance. 
2.3.1 Board of Directors 
The effect of corporate governance mechanisms in mitigating agency issues by linking 
the principal's objective with that of agent entrusted to work on his behalf is well 
pronounced in empirical and theoretical literatures.. Corporate boards provide the first 
II 
line of internal corporate governance mechanism that is viewed as key elements in 
monitoring the actions of management. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) assert that 
company boards have evolved as part of the market solution to the problem of· 
contracting within organisations. Further, Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) 
argue that effective corporate boards would be composed largely of outside independent 
directors holding m.anagerial positions in other companies. They view outside directors 
as professional referees whose task is to stimulate and over-see the competition among 
the firm's top managers. Therefore, Fama and Jensen (1983) and Jensen (1993) highlight 
that if the board perform the main function of hiring competent managers and fir!ng poor 
performers and setting rewards based on meeting firm strategy, efficiency within firms 
will be enhanced. Other studies such as Adams and Ferreira (2007) and Raheja (2005) 
,., su~gest that boards provide monitoring and advisory roles. 
". 
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. In theory, board represents the opinion of the shareholders as such provide first hand 
oversight of managerial activities to ensure shareholders' interest are well saved (Muth 
and Donaldson (1998». However, the main argument on what kind of board structure 
that can fulfil stewa.rdship role is far from conclusive. The comple~ity of this argument 
arises from th~ fact that board structures vary depending on the legal systems and 
corporate governance models. The single tier boards which are prominent in the UK and 
US provide for both executive and non-executive to share boardroom which contrast the 
continental European boards which comprises of two tiers. Under the two tier system, 
. separate boards comprising of management (management board) and non-executive 
(supervisory board) are formed with no overlap (Conyon and Peck (1998». In some 
countries such as Germany, the supervisory boards comprise employee representatives. 
Recent studies have provided the lirtk between boards' role, size and composition with 
firm performance. However, several studies have found mixed results on the effect of 
board on performance. Focusing on board composition, Klein (2002) documents that 
boards structured to be more independent of the CEO are more effective in monitoring 
the corporate financial accounting process.' Similarly, Weisbach (1988) proposes that 
firms with outsider dominated boards are significantly more likely than firms with 
insider dominated boards to remove the CEO on th~ basis of performance. This suggests 
that the composition of the board contribute towards effective monitoring which enhance 
firm performance .. In addition, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) suggest a positive stock 
price reaction ,at the announcem~nt of the appointment of an additional outside director. 
Cotter, Shivdasani and Zenner (1997) find that boards with a majority of independent 
"' directors are more likely to use resistance strategies during takeover attempts by tender 
offer to enhance shareholder wealth . 
..,0 
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Krivogorsky (2006) documents strong positive relation between the portion of 
independent directors on the board and profitability ratios from the sample of companies 
in nine European countries. Dehaene," De Vuyst and Ooghe (2001) find similar results 
for Belgian companies. They indicate that p~sitive relationship between the number of 
external directors and return on' equity. However, both studies failed to address 
endogeneity problem in their methodology. Investigating the composition of semi-two 
tier boards in which executive directors' sit in a supervisory boards, Rose (2005) fails to 
find impact of insiders on performance and argue that such board structure is important 
under extreme conditions. Therefore, the board that is composed of outsiders provide 
effective ways in addressing agency problems. 
Conversely, some studies cast doubt over the impact of board composition likeliness of 
adding value and mitigate agency" issues within firms. Byrd and Hickman (1992) 
findings do not support the claim that shareholders are necessarily better off with a board 
comprised entirely of independent outside directors. Further, Bhagat and Black (2002) 
outline that firms with more independent boards do not perform better than other firms, 
consistent with Hermalin and Weisbach (1991). Further studies such as MacAvoy, et aI., 
(1983), Mehran (1995) and Klein (1998) fail to find a significant relation between the 
proportion of outside directors and accounting perfQrmance measures while Bhagat and 
Black (2002) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) observe no relationship between board 
composition and measure of firm value, Tobin's Q. In addition, Bhagat and Black (2002) 
report no significant relation between the percent of outside directors on a board and 
long-term stock market and accounting performance. Fairchild and Li (2005) find no 
.,relation between the stock-market performance of firms that appoint directors of 
acquired firms and wh~ther the appointing firm's board has a majority of outside 
Ii' 
.. directors. Further, Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) and Fich and Shivdasani (2006) 
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find that firms with a greater fraction of outside directors serving on three or more other 
boards experience inferior future performance and lower firm values. 
Several literatures have also examined the effect of board size on performance, however 
evidence is inconclusive. Jensen (1993) suggests that when boards get bigger they are 
less likely to function effectively and are easier for the CEO to control. Jensen (1993), 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Yermack (1996) argue that large boards can make 
coordination, communication, and decision making more cumbersome than in smaller 
groups. Empirically, Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (1998) 
support the argument and found that small boards of directors are more effective. The 
results suggest a negative relation between the board size and firm performance. 
Further, empirical results in the European studies show similar findings consistent with 
the UK and US studies. Staikouras, Staikouras and Agoraki (2007) and Conyon and 
Peck (1998) show a negative relationship between board size and performance. These 
studies present interesting findings as the nature of European boards tend to differ from 
the well documented Anglo-American boards. The influence of large blockholders on 
the board size and composition should have an impact on -performance (lsakov and 
Weisskopf (2009» .. Further, Kim, Kitsabunnarat-Chatjuthamard and Nofsinger (2007) 
document that weaker legal environment reduce minority shareholders' influence on the 
role of boards and their composition. 
However, recent studies have suggested that there is no optimal board size rather. 
complexity of the firm and advising requirements detects the ~dditional value from 
boards size. Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008) challenge restrictions on board size and 
propose that complex firms, such as those that are diversified, those that are large, and 
.. those that rely mor~· on debt financing, have greater advising requirements therefore 
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should have larger boards. They find Tobin's Q increases (decreases) in board size for 
complex (simple) firms. Similarly, Dalton; et aI., (1999) document a positive and 
significant relation between board size and financial performance. 
In addition, Boone,' et aI., (2007) document that boards have evofve over a period of 
time. They argue that as the firms grow so do boards to address firm-specific benefits 
and costs of monitoring. Linck, Netter and Yang (2008) show that smali and large firms 
have dramatically different board structures which change following a number of 
reforms during the 1990 to 2004 period. Using theoretical model, Raheja (2005) 
suggests an optimal board as the functions of the directors' and the firm's characteristics. 
On the other hand, Beiiler, et aI., (2006) find that firms with a controlling shareholder 
tend to have larger boards and a smaller fraction of outside directors, indicating private 
benefits from sitting on the board.' The~e studies suggest a number of permutations in 
determining appropriate board size. 
To add to this, recent empirical and theoretical literatures have highlighted the role of 
corporate boards in influencing the information environment of firms. Focusing on the 
extent of public release of information, Ahmed, Hossain and Adams (2006) suggest that 
earnings informativeness is negatively related to board size, consistent with Vafeas 
(2000) who show that smallest boards in his' sample (with a minimum of 
five board members) are perceived as being more informative by market participants. On 
the other hand,Firth, Fung and Rui (2007) propose that independent directors affect the 
earnings response coefficients and discretionary accruals for the sample of Chinese 
firms. Vafeas (2000) and Ahmed, Hossain and Adams (2006) show that informativeness 
"'is not related to the fraction of outside directors serving on the board. However, Ferreira, 
. . 
Ferreira and Raposo (2011) propose a positive relation between price informativeness 
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and board independence. They suggest compatibility of their results with substitution 
hypothesis on monitoring role of both board and' market. 
2.3.2 Institutional Ownership 
Another way that c~m ensure that the objective sets are met is through intervention by 
shareholders with large stake in the company. Institutional shareholders' power to force 
changes and to engage their resources in enhancing corporate governance within firms 
well documented in a number of studies. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) propose that because of the size of the resources invested, institutional 
investors have all, the interest and the power to monitor and promote corporate 
governance of companies. Hence, it is in their best interest to play their role as major 
shareholder on behalf of smaller shareholders. In addition, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
~ , ~ 
survey agency theory and assert that legal prote,ction on its own is not s~fficient to, 
ensure investor protection and that other corporate governance mechanisms, such as 
ownership concentration and institutional involvement, could mitigate agency problems. 
Therefore, the presence of institution shareholders is likely to be value creating within 
,firms. Further, the role of institutions in enhancing firm performance is outlined in a 
n~mber of national corporate governance codes which encourages mutual 
communication between management and institutional shareholders. However, 
institutional ownership above certain level may encourage expropriation of wealth to 
minority shareholders which creates "agency problem type II". Hence, the relationship 
between institutional shareholders' ownership and level of corporate governance and 
performance within firms is far from complete. 
The' relation~hip is also more complex in the continental European firms where the 
fl' 
.. presence of controlling shareholders is common. Dyck and Zingales (2004) document 
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that controlling shareholders can either enhance firm value or expropriate minority 
shareholders depending on the level of legal protection. Therefore, the extent in which, 
large shareholders play their role is inconsistent. For instance, Adams and Ferreira' 
(2008) argue that large shareholder or family control may be detrim~ntal in a pyramidal 
group, but beneficial in a freestanding firm. In these cases, the cost and benefit of control 
may depend on the institutional setting within a particular jurisdiction (Kim, 
Kitsabunnarat-Chatjuthamard and Nofsinger (2007» 
Empirical evidence on the role of institution in enhancing firm performance show ~ather 
mixed results. Dahya, Lonie and Power (1998) propose that the probability of a CEO's 
forced departure following poor performance is positively related to institutional share 
ow~ership in the UK firms. F~rther, Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) document that 
turnover is more sensitive to performance when the firm has outside blockholder than 
when it does not. John and Klein (1995) assert that a firm was more likely to be the 
target of one or more corporate governance proposals if they had negative net income. 
Bethel, Liebeskind and Opler (1998) report that company performance improves after an 
activist investor purchases a block of shares. Moreover, McConnell and Servaes (1995) 
found the percentage of shares owned by institutions to ?e positively related to Tobin's 
Q and that institutional ownership acted to reinforce the positive effect of directors' 
shareholding on firm performance. Cornett, et aI., (2007) assert significant positive 
relation between the percent of institutional stock ownership and operating, cash flow 
returns. 
. 
Using sample from 15 countries in Europe, Maury (2006) finds family controlled firms 
"Outperform nonfamily by having higher profitability. However, he argues that while 
family ownership minimises the conflict of interest between owners and managers other 
c~~flict with minority shareholders ~rise when protection is low and control is high. 
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Similarly, Andres (2008) show founding-family ownership to be superior to widely-held 
firms and other blockholders in Germany firms. The results suggest family firms 
outperform others only when founding family is active in the management or 
supervisory board. Sraer and Thesmar (2007) show similar results fo,r French companies. 
Further, Iannotta, Nocera and Sironi (2007) suggest that higher ownership concentration 
is associated with better loan quality, lower asset risk and lower insolvency risk. " 
On the other hand, some empirical results suggest that institutional shareholder do riot 
have positive impact on firm performance. For instance, Beiner, et aI., (2006) finding 
that large outside blockho"lders do not have a significant impact on firm value. This is 
consistent with early findings by Dherment-Ferere, K5ke and Renneboog (2001) who 
also indicate that blockholders do not play an active role in disciplining underperforming 
managers. Faccio and Lasfer (2000) document that the value added by UK pension funds 
is negligible and their holdings do not lead companies to comply with the Code of Best 
Practice or outperform their industry counterparts. Similarly, Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996) show that the relationship between large institutional shareholding or" 
blockholding and corporate performance as measured by Tobins Q is insignificant for 
US firms. Other studies such as Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find no cross-sectional 
relationship between the concentration of shareho.Jdings and the accounting rates of 
return. Therefore, the results suggest that institutions do not increase performance hence 
ineffective in their monitoring role. Wahal (1996) and Karpoff, Malatesta and Walkling 
(1996) find little evidence that operating performance of companies that are the target of 
pension funds proposals improves. 
"The results are consistent with other findings in continental Europe. Thomsen, Pedersen 
and K vist (2006) find a negative association between blockholder ownership and firm 
value or accounting returns in the next period. They propose that expropriation of 
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minority shareholders may be the driver of their findings. The results are consistent with 
Iannotta, Nocera and Sironi (2007) findings which show ownership concentration does 
not significantly affect a bank's profitability. Edwards, et aI., (2000) show that bankers' 
sitting on the supervisory boards have no influence of governance of firms in their 
sample. Faccio, Lang and Young (2001) document higher dividend rates in firms with by 
mUltiple blockholders suggesting higher levels of expropriation in Europe than Asian 
companies. 
Institutional shareholders are also said to have significant impact in the production of 
firm specific information through their activities. However, their impact depends on the 
level of ownership they have in the firm. For instance, Fan and Wong (2002) find that 
concentrated ownership is associated with low earnings informativeness as ownership 
concentration prevents leakage of pr6prietary information about the firms' rent-seeking 
activities. Gul, Kim and Qiu (2010) propose that the amount of firm-specific information 
as a concave function of ownership by largest shareholder with its maximum at an 
approximate' 50% level. 
Further, focusing on institutions with block ownership BrocIrnlan and Yan (2009) show 
a clear advantage of this group over diffused owners. They show that increase in 
production of firm-specific information for firms with blockholders. Consistent with the 
role 'of large shareholder monitoring, Yeo, et aI., (2002) show evidence of a strong 
positive relationship between external unrelated blockholdings and earnings 
informativeness. Adding to this, Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) indicate that in their 
sample of U.S. firms, presence of large institutional shareholders has significant impact 
'in i~creasing the amount of firm-specific information incorporated into the stock prices. 
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2.3.3 Managerial Ownership 
In order to improve firm performance and mitigating agency pr<?blem arising from 
separation of ownership and control, linking managerial and shareholders interest 
through share ownership has been suggested as one of the solution to these problems. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) document that increase in managerial ownership have a 
greater effect in aligning managers and outside shareholders' interests. Ang, Cole and 
Lin (2000) suggest that agency costs increase with the number of non-manager 
shareholders, indicating that when there is ownership by managers conflict of interest are 
minimal. However, the empirical results have been inconclusive and some find the 
relation to exist at certain ~evels of ownership and argue that at some point the interest 
convergence and diverge. Therefore, ownership by manager can be beneficial to 
shareholders and harmful at a certain,Jevel. 
Used piecewise regression, Morek, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) found that positive 
relationship between directors' ownership and firm value at 0% to 5% ownership and a 
negative relationship at 5% to 25% ownership. Using cubic function and UK data, Short 
and Keasey (1999) suggested that the performance of firms is positively related to 
managers' ownership in the 0% to 15% range, negatively related in the 15% to 41 % 
.- . 
range and positively related when mana'gers' ownership exceeds 41 %. Similarly, using 
UK data and quintic function with the director ownership variables, Davies, Hillier and 
McColgan (2005) found turning points at 7%, 26%, 51 % and 76%. However, Cui and 
Mak (2002) find' that Tobin's Q initially declines with managerial ownership, then 
increases, then declines again and, finally, increases again-a W -shaped relationship 
.based on sample of R&D intensity firms. Therefore, the empirical studies suggest that 
the "results are still far from conclusive particularly on the levels of managerial 
n' 
ownership. 
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Other studies such as Palia and Lichtenberg (1999) find a higher sensitivity of changes 
in managerial ownership to changes' in productivity for firms who experience greater 
than the median change in managerial ownership. Singh and Davidson (2003) and Rose 
(2005) find managerial ownership significantly alleviates principa,l-agent conflicts by 
enhancing firm performance. Further study by Jain. and Kini (1994) confirm a positive 
relationship between ownership and performance. Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) find 
managers get entrenched at ownership levels of 1 % or greater, since these managers 
experience lower turnover. 
Using a simultaneous equation system, Loderer and Martin (1997) examine the relation 
between acquisition performance and managerial equity holdings and find that 
managerial ownership does not boost performance. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) find 
that ownership structure' has no impact on Tobin's Q, but Q negatively impacts 
ownership structure. In addition, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find no linear relationship 
between the accounting profit rates and ownership concentration for 511 large firms. 
Further study by Holderness, Kroszner and Sheehan (1999) find no any evidence that 
changes in the performance-ownership relation when performance is measured by 
Tobin's q, similar to Cho (1998) who shows that corporate value measured by Tobin's q 
affects ownership structure, but not vice versa, ~ctually, the findings question the 
assumptions about the causality underlying the usual OLS model. 
Recent extant literature has also suggested level of managerial ownership to affect 
the firm Informativeness. Yeo, et aI., (2002) find that earnings informativeness increases 
with managerial ownership at low levels but not at higher levels of managerial 
'ownership where the entrenchment effect ,sets in. On the other hand, Jung and Kwon 
(2002) show that earnings are more informative as holdings of the owner increase, 
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supporting the convergence of interest explanation for the owner-manager structure. 
Consistently, Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004) and Durnev, Morek and Yeung (2004) 
suggest that an informative stock price increases the manager incentives to engage in 
efficient allocation of firm resources because his activities can be publicly observed 
through the informative price. As ~uch, ownership and price informativeness are more 
. likely to be interrelated. 
2.4 Governance Mechanisms and Executive Compensation 
2.4.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance encompasses a broad spectrum of mechanisms intended to 
mitigate agency risk by providing motivation for managers to alig~ their interest with 
those of shareholders. Jensen and Murphy (1990)· propose linking compensation to 
performance as crucial stage in the corporate governance process by reducing agency 
costs of the separation of ownership from control. Further, Combined Code (2006) 
asserts that levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract, retain and motivate 
high quality personnel. However, Garen (1994) argues that several factors may influence 
what is said to be appropriate level of pay-performance. This has therefore created 
.. 
problem of designing pay package based on perform~nce and risk taking. 
Theoretically, Jensen and Murphy (1990) suggest that equity-based rather than cash 
compensation gives managers the correct incentive to maximize firm value. Further, 
Mehran (1995) provides evidence supporting advocates of incentive compensation, and 
also suggests that form rather than the level of compensation is what motivates managers 
to increase firm value. He finds that firm performance is positively related to the 
percentage of equity held by managers and to the percentage of their compensation that 
,', . 
is equity-based consistent with Conyon and Sadler (2001) findings. Moreover, equity-
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based compensation is used more extensively in a number of firms. In addition, Core, 
Guay and Larcker (2003) and Murphy (1999) noted a huge increase in the amount of 
stock based compensation in use. These findings are most close to Hall and Liebman 
(1998) who found that CEOs stock option have increase to 90% in 1994 from 57% in the 
1980s. Other studies such as Buck, et aI., (2003), indicates the impact on . pay-
performance relationship when Long Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) is used. Using UK 
data, they find that the presence of L TIP in the pay package result in reducing link 
between pay and performance. The r~su1ts suggest that LTIPs do not serve to align 
shareholder and executive incentives. 
This section provides a review of literature that highlights compensation as solution to 
agency' problem. Providing compensation package' does not necessarily encourage 
managers to act in the interest of shareholders. Because of the existing information 
asymmetry, allowing ~anagers to set rewards for tneir effort will enhance agency 
problem. Therefore, a number of mechanisms are set to ensure that there is an 
appropriate link between compensation and· objectives of maximising shareholders' 
return. To ensure that the objectives are met, effective internal governance system is also 
important. As such, this section provides a review that link reward for the managerial 
effort and how governance mechanisms ensure its appropriateness. 
2.4.2 Pay-performance sensitivity 
Holmstrom (1979) document that agency .theory predicts executive pay should be 
optimally based on measures of performance that are as informative as possible. The 
argument is empirically supported in a number of studies. For instance, Harvey and 
Shri~ves (2001) show that firm-specific characteristics such as firm size and board 
.. composition affect pay-performance sen.sitivity. Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Hall and 
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Liebman (1998) tind a statistically significant positive relationship between the level of 
pay and performance. Similarly, Murphy (1985) finds that execl:ltive remuneration is 
statistically associated with firm performance measured as shareholder return and sales 
growth. Moreover, Boschen and Smith (1995) propose that compensation arrangements 
have shifted towards greater performance sensitivity and long term pay over their sample 
period. Murphy (1985) also finds a positive relation between pay and performance, 
whereas Murphy (1986) finds that the pay-performance sensitivity is negatively 
influenced by CEO experience. Smith 'and Watts (1992) find evidence that firms with 
greater investment opportunities employ more skilled executives who have to be given 
both a higher level of pay and a more pronounced pay-performance relationship. 
The role of board in setting executive pay has been in spotlights due to the significant 
increase in exec'utive pay with poor performance. Therefore, '- failure to link pay for 
performance suggest boards fail to fulfil their role of monitoring managers on behalf of 
shareholders. However, the empirical literatures have found mixed results on the effect 
of board on executive compensation. Ryan and Wiggins (2004) find that firms with more 
outsiders on their boards award directors more equity-based compensation. 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2006) examine the' effect of board structure on CEO 
compensation following regulatory changes that lead. to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
which require more director independence and found a significant relative drop in the 
. compensation comes from the decrease in the 'equity-based portion of the compensation, 
particularly the decrease in option grants. The results indicate that the more independent 
the board is the likeliness of serving shareholders' interest increase: Perry (2000) finds a 
positive relation between CEO turnover following poor firm performance and incentive 
compensation to outside board members. Also, Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) conclude 
n' 
. that the firm's board creates 'manageriai incentives consistent with those of the firm's 
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owners, both by setting compensation and following management change policies which 
benefit shareholders. 
Conversely, Hallock (1997) looks at Forbes 500 firms in 1992 and finds that when the 
board has directors with interlocking relations the compensation to the CEO is 
significantly higher. Moreover, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) documented that board 
vigilance, as measured by stock ownership, is unrelated to total compensation. Hill and 
Phan (1991) found that CEOs were ~etter able to circumvent board monitoring and 
incentive mechanisms ,as CEO influence increased. Similarly, Brick, Palmon and Wald 
(2006) , report a relation between firm underperformance and "excessive" compensation 
for managers and outside directors. Grinstein and Hribar (2004) find that acquiring 
CEOs who have more power to influence board decisions receive significantly larger 
M&A bonuses particularly when the 'tEO is involved in the nomination process of new 
directors and when the CEO' is also the chairman of the board. Similar to Core, 
HoIthausen and Larcker (1999) who propose that when CEO holds two hats the 
compensation received is larger. They also find that the reward is larger when a CEO has 
more influence over the selection of the board members. 
Consistent with other studies which question the board influence, Ozkan (2007) find that 
firms with larger board size and a higher proportion' of non-executive directors on their 
boards pay their CEOs higher compensation, suggesting that non-executive directors are 
not more efficient in monitoring than executive directors. Further, Brick, Palmon and 
Wald (2006) find a significant positive relationship between CEO and outside director 
compensation. They conclude that excessive compensation is due to mutual back 
scratching or cronyism. Ezzamel and Watson (1997) question the independence of non-
executive directors and effectiveness o~ remuneration committee given their te,ndency to 
29 
be appointed on the recommendation of the CEO. Further, Conyon (1997) questioned 
the ability of the remuneration com.mittee to operate without the influence of executives. 
2.4.3 Institutional Shareholders and Executive Compensation 
Recent empirical studies have investigated the role of institutional shareholders in 
ensuring that executives are rewarded based on meeting performance targets, however 
the results are mixed. In the UK, the recent Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations 
(2002) provide avenue for shareholders to express their views on the nature and level of 
executive rewards through voting. However, the nature and size of institutional 
ownership make it difficult for institutions to exercise selling strategy when dissatisfied 
with· the management and hence institutions have the incentive to exercise voice to 
influence the level and mix of CEO compensation (David and Kochhar (1996» 
Hartzell and Starks (2003) propose that institutional ownership concentration is 
positively related to the pay-for-performance sensitivity of executive compensation and 
negatively retated to the level of compensation. Ozkan (2007) finds that institutional 
ownership and block-holder ownership have a significant and negative impact on CEO 
compensation consistent withthe existence of active monitoring by block-holders and 
institutional shareholders. Moreover, Almazan, Jay and Laura (2005) present a model 
that predicts institutions' influence on managers' pay-for-performance sensitivity and 
level of compensation is enhanced when institutions have lower implied costs of 
monitoring. Similarly, David, Kochhar and Levitas (1998) and Clay (2000) find 
. evidence of greater total institutional ownership in companies with more pay-for-
performance sensitivity and lower excess compensation, consistent with institutions 
pre~~rring to invest in those firms 
,,' 
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On the other hand, investigating the relation between the structure of CEO compensation 
and the investment horizons of a firm's institutional investors, Shin (2009) find that the 
greater long-term holdings are negatively associated with the use of stock options and 
with the sensitivity of CEO equity portfolio incentives to stock price. The results are 
consistent with theoretical finding by Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006) who argue 
that institutional shareholders have a shorter horizon and align the manager's horizon to 
theirs by weighing the CEO's compensation more heavily on short-term stock price 
performance. They predict a positive correlation between institutional shareholder 
turnover and the firm manager's short-termist behaviour. Dikolli, Kulp and Sedatole 
(2009) investigate the role of transient institutional investors in designing incentive 
structure. They propose that transient institutional investors differ from long term 
investors and are associated with a decline in the pay-for-performance sensitivity of 
" rl 
earnings. 
2.4.4 Managerial Ownership and Executive Compensation 
Focusing on the impact of managerial ownership on executive rewards, Ozkan (2007) 
shows that CEO compensation is lower when the directors' ownership is higher. 
Moreover, Khan, D~arwadkar and Brandes (2005) document that higher level of CEO 
ownership lead to a significant reduction in the level of options compensation, as well as 
higher ratios of salary to total compensation and lower ratios of options to total 
compensation. Mehran (1995) indicates fIrms in which a higher percentage of the shares 
are held by insiders use less equity-based compensation. The results suggest that 
managerial ownership is likely to mitigate the problem of excessive pay packages to 
managers. Further, Core and Guay (1"999) find that there is a positive relationship 
bet~een percentage ~EO ownership and idiosyncratic risk. Other" studies such as Datta, 
Iskandar-Datta and Raman (2001) and Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) examine CEO 
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compensation and ownership structures before M&A deals, and propose that increased 
insider ownership and equity-based compensation improve long run post-acquisition 
performance. 
2.4.5 Firm Strategy and Executive Compensation 
Several studies examine the relationship between executive rewards and strategic 
decision making within firms such as acquisition and employees layoffs on shareholders' 
value creation. Harford and Li (2007) find that bidding firm CEOs are richly rewarded 
for growth through acquisitions with substantial new stock and option grants. However, 
they find compensation changes around major capital expenditures are much smaller and 
more sensitive to performance than those following acquisitions. Datta, Iskandar-Datta 
and Raman (2001) document a strong positive relation between acquiring managers' 
. rl 
equity-based compensation and merger performance. Moreover, Bliss and Rosen (2001) 
show that CEO compensation and wealth typically increase after large bank mergers 
even if the bidder's stock price declines. 
Brookman, Chang and Rennie (2007) find that CEOs with at least one year of tenure 
who possess greater incentives from portfolios of restricted stock and stock option grants 
are more likely to announce layoffs, and that these layoffs create shareholder value. 
They therefore, argue that accumulated portfolios of restricted stock and stock option 
grants encourage CEOs to adopt operating strategies that improve operating profits and 
stock performance. Denis and Kruse (2000) propose firms that experience poor 
performance are more likely to benefit from downsizing which makes them more likely 
to announce layoffs . 
.• 
Brookman, Chang and Rennie (2007) document that CEO of firms announcing layoffs 
,,' 
.. receive 22.8% more. total pay in the subsequent year than other CEOs. They propose that 
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CEOs receive pay increases following layoffs as rewards for past decisions and to 
motivate value-enhancing decisions in the future. However, other studies indicate that 
linking pay to performance may not necessarily achieve the intended objective. For 
instance, Dow and Raposo (2005) argue that performance-related compensation creates 
an incentive to look for overly ambitious, hard to implement strategies. Further, Hallock 
(1998) fail to find an association between layoff announcem~nts and subsequent change 
in CEO compensation. 
Further, Grossman and Hart (1983) assert on encouraging managers attitude towards risk 
taking by tying their compensation to firm performance which motivate more value 
. maximising decisions. Brisley (2006) propose that when issued at-the-money, ESOs can 
provide incentives for managers to take risks. However, Lambert, Larcker and 
Verrecchia (1991) and Carpenter '(2000) expand this literature by recog~izing the 
potential risk-reducing incentives that result as options move in-the-money. Examining 
the relation between option-based executive compensation and bank risk taking, Chen, 
Steiner and Whyte (2006) show that the structure of executive compensation induces 
risk-taking and the stock of option-based wealth also induces risk-taking. Further, Coles, 
Daniel and Naveen (2006) find that riskier policy choices generally lead to 
compensation structures with higher CEO pay-performance sensitivity and lower 
sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility. 
2.S Governance Mechanisms and Corporate Investment 
Previous em~irical evidence suggests that corporate governance plays an important role 
in the allocation of firms' resources to their best possible use and enhance shareholders 
val~e. Studies such as Jensen (1986) argue that when managers have excessive resources 
" at their discretion they may choose inv~stment projects which give them more power and 
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authority by overinvesting those reso~rces to value destroying projects. Furthermore 
. , 
rent-seeking theory suggests that agency conflict hinder the firm choices on the type of 
investment which would have been·· preferable by the shareholders as manager may 
prefer those that suit their situations such as risk reduction or those that increase the 
value of their human capital (Amihud and Lev (1981) and Shleifer and Vishny (1989». ' 
However, other studies have focused on the role of corporate governance mechanisms on 
corporate restructuring such as asset sale (Hanson and Song (2000», spinoff decisions 
(Ahn and Walker (2007» or carve-~uts (Allen and McConnell (1998) and Powers 
(2003». 
2.5.1 Corporate Restructuring 
Corporate governance has emerged as an important element in the financial theory.' The 
,I ' 
Corporate decision, undertaken within firms can provide economic incentives to the 
shareholder provided that the agency costs can be/are minimised. Among the important 
decisions that managers can undertake are corporate divestiture. Boot (1992) point out 
that managers' divestiture and investment decisions are publicly observable,' but 
managers privately observe signals with respect to the future payoff distribution of 
investments they have initiated. Provided that managers have infonnation that the 
market or public lack there is a chance for them to hang onto bad decisions from the 
shareholder in order to enjoy the benefits arising from it. Lang, Poulsen and Stulz (1995) 
propose that managers prefer to sell asset to raise fund in order to avoid external capit~l 
market scrutiny. Therefore, the private benefits that accrue from the asset sale due to 
managerial discretion increa~e the cost to shareholders and hence the market discount 
"'pr~,~eeds of asset sales retained by the firm. In the presence of agency costs of 
managerial discretiqn the primary objective of increasing shareholder wealth disappear. 
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They argue that'managers value control and firm size and have incentives to use the 
proceeds of the sale in ways that do not benefit shareholders. 
Scharfstein (1998) shows the effect of man~gerial ownership on division investment 
decision. He argues management misallocation of resources is higher when they have 
small ownership in a firm and that contributes to agency cost which result in distortions 
in divisional allocation. Further, Scharfstein and Stein (2000) develop a two-tiered 
agency model to capture the rent-seeking behavior and the allocation of investment by 
the CEO. They document that in firms with multiple division, rent-seeking is more of a 
problem with managers of weaker divisions because of the opportunity cost to such 
managers ?f taking time away from productive work to engage in rent-seeking is lower. 
Similarly, Rajan, Servae~ and Zingales (2000) present a model where firm is faced with 
the increased diversity of investment"opportunities and resources among the divisions of 
the firm. They show that resources can flow toward the most inefficient division, leading 
to more inefficient investment and less valuable firms. 
A number of studies have also provided the reason for restructuring through divestiture 
decision. Among them is Hillier, McColgan and Werema (2009) which examine 
COrporate restructuring following firm poor operating performance. They report that 
asset sales normally follow a sustained period of po'or operating performance, and tend 
to occur in well-diversified firms with high levels of financial leverage. Similarly, Denis 
and Kruse (2000) find that firms experiencing a large decline in operating performance 
faced substantial amount of corporate restructuring which in turn contribute to 
. 
improvement in operating performance. Lang, Poulsen and Stulz (1995) find that firms 
divest assets if they need cash to finan·ce capital ~xpenditures in their core divisions 
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Mulherin and BOone (2000) suggest that restructuring is an outcome of economic shocks 
which affects firm business environment such as its competitiveness which provide 
market pressure as a result new strategies must be developed to counter the changes. 
Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) and Hillier, McColgan and Wen~'ma (2005) provide 
evidence that strategic change is the most common reason for many restructurings in US 
and UK firms respectively to meet new competition or market condition. These strategic 
changes could involve either expansion or contraction. Foi' instance, they argue that 
economic viability of business operations increase after restructuring process. 
In addition, Jensen (1988) point out that the goal of managers and shareholders converge 
during industry growth phase and diverge when the industry decline. As managers 
benefits are function of firm size, he argues that they will prefer to expand the firm size 
or reduce risk through diversificatio'h, whereas shareholders would rather let the firm 
shrink so that they can reinvest the capital in better opportunities. Hence, firm decision 
on asset sale becomes the subject of agency problem. Similar to Murphy (1999) views 
that manager running a larger firm can lead to greater opportunities to extract private 
benefits, more prestige for the CEO, and greater compensation. However, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1992) document that firm size can be a determinant on whether to sell assets or 
not. They suggest that during performance decline,. large firms have the flexibility to 
choose which asset to sell compared to small firm. 
However, a number of studies have found gains associated with divestitures. Hite, Owers 
and RogerS" (1987) propose that managers divest assets when the sale will increase value 
to shareholder. They find evidence that asset sales are associated with the movement of 
resol..lrces to higher valued uses rather than ~s evidence of market mispricing before the 
divestiture announcements. Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) study a sample of diversified· 
fi~s that alter their organizational str,:!cture by divesting a business segment. They find 
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that 'divestitures' have significantly positive announcement returns. Furthermore, they 
show that the segments that underinvest relative to single segment firms display 
increased 'investment levels after the divestiture, while segments that overinvest 
experience declines in investment. Hearth and Zaima (1984) find that the market 
reaction to divestitures is stronger when large and financially sound firms divest. In 
addition, they report that larger divestitures exhibit larger positive excess return. 
Some studies have found that when internal corporate governance mechanisms are 
effective, managers undertake divestiture decisions in the best interest of shareholders 
and create value. Hanson and Song (2000) show that shareholders of a firm that divests 
assets receive gains that are significantly related to stock ownership by' the firm's 
managers and to the proportion of outside directors on the firm's board. This suggests a 
convergence of interest between managers and shareholder and efficient monitoring 
associated with the presence of outsider in the corporate boards provide incentive to 
create value. In addition, Ataullah, Davidson and Le (2010) find that nonexecutive 
directors' and CEO's share-ownership and stock options are related to shareholders' 
gains from sell-offs for firms that retain proceeds. Further, Hanson and Song (2006) find 
that shareholders benefit more from the asset sale when insiders increase their stock 
holdings over the two years leading up to the sale., They argue that information about 
managers selling or buying of shares highlights the alignment of interest with 
shareholders. Moreover, Perry and Shivdasani (2005) show that firms with majority of 
outside directors on the board are more likely to initiate asset restructuring with further 
reduction in the scale of operation than firms without majority of outside directors. 
"Similarly, other studies have uncovered the importance of external governance 
mechanisms in enhancing efficiency in corporate restructuring. Focusing on lender 
m~nitoring, Datta, Iskandar-Datta an~ Raman (2003) propose that effective monitoring 
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is important for shareholders of the divesting firm because free cash flow problems are 
reduced if lack of investment opportunities increases the likelihood that managers 
~isuse idle cash. Hanson and S~ng (2006) also find that firms that divest assets are more 
involved in the market for corporate control. They document that divesting firms are 
more than'twice as likely as control firms to acquire other firm~ in the two years 
preceding the divestiture. Ataullah, Davidson and Le (2008) find that the likelihood of a 
distribution of proceeds, relative to the retention decision, is increasing in the presence 
of large institutional shareholdings. 
Contrary, other studies have questioned the benefits to shareholders arising from 
divestiture activities. Duhaime and Grant (1984) and Weston and Chung (1990> indicate 
that divested units are generally performing poorly and, a positive reaction to sell-offs 
may be rationalized in terms of the "elimination of the source "'of value destruction. In 
addition, Brown, James and Mooradian (1994) show that asset sales by firms in financial 
distress where the proceeds are paid out to bondholders benefit creditors at the expense 
of stockholders. Datta and Iskandar-Datta (1996) also find that asset sales by distressed 
firms are value enhancing to bondholders but not to stockholders, an indication that the 
proceeds from the asset sale are used to the benefit of bondholders. 
2.5.2 Investment Expenditure and Cash flow Sensitivity 
'In Modigliani and Miller (1958)'s world of perfect capital markets there would be no 
association between firm level investing activities and internally generated cash, flows. 
Firms in need of cash can easily borrow from the external market and those with excess 
can lend to the external market. However, study by Myers and Majluf (1984) which 
analyze the ~ase whereby the firm's management has information about project returns 
.,that is unavailable to' investors provide opposite evidence. They show that external 
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capital is more costly than internal capital. In addition, they document that the reality is 
far from perfect as managers know more about the firm's prospects and choices of 
projects than potential investors do which create agency costs. Similarly, extant 
empirical literature that investigates the relationship between corporate investment and 
cash flows has found mixed results. For instance, Lamont (1997) indicate the difficulties 
in finding the causal connection between the investment and cash flow, since both are 
driven by underlying shocks to profitability. 
Grossman and Hart (1982) and Jensen (1986) propose that incentive problem can be a 
major factor that influence managers when they are in charge of higher levels of free 
cash flow. Management may be tempted to invest the available cash in negative NPV 
projects which provide them with the prospects of empire building. The agency theory 
suggests that managers will prefer empire building to boost their remuneration package 
and also extract private benefit from control (Murphy (1999) and Dyck and Zingales 
(2004». Further, Pawlina and Renneboog (2005) document that high amount of 
corporate liquidity may encourage growth-maximizing management to pursue 
investment projects with an expected rate of return below the hurdle rate. However, 
Lasfer (1995) and Faccio and Lasfer (2000) propose that the costs of free cash flow may 
be reduced when shareholders particularly institutions perform an active monitoring role. 
Several studies have found direct link between corporate investment and cash flow using 
empirical and theoretical models. Using a developed model of firm growth and 
investment: Alti (2003) provides the link between investment and cash flow. He finds 
. . 
the link to strengthen for firms with higher growth. Other studies such as Kadapakkam, 
kumar and Riddick (1998) indicate that young or small firms face higher investment-
cash flow sensitivity.as a result of the limited access to the capital market which increase 
de~and for limited internal resources ... They argue that when there is a limited access, the 
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cost of raising fund is extremely high. and this extra cost may cause a firm to forgo 
certain valuable investments if internal funds are not available. In addition, Minton and 
Schrand (1999) indicate that higher cash flow volatility implies that a firm is more likely 
to have periods of internal cash flow shortfalls. They find that firms with high cash flow 
volatility have both higher costs of accessing external capital and lower investment· 
spending. Further, they also find that firms that cannot smooth their investment spending 
to cash flow fluctuations by raising external fund~ tend to forgo investment decision 
permanently because of capital market imperfections. 
On the other hand, there is much debate on investment pattern between financially 
constrained and unconstrained firms and the existing empirical evidence is mixed. 
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) argue that firms facing financing constraints 
should exhibit high investment-cash 'now sensitivities, reflecting the wedge between the 
costs of external and internal funds. Supporting this argument, Hoshi, Kashyap and 
Scharfstein (1991) find that investment by Japanese firms that belong to a keiretsu is less 
sensitive to cash flow than investment by independent firms. 
Conversely, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) find that firms that appear less financially 
constrained exhibit·· significantly greater sensitivities than firms that appear more 
financially constrained. Further, Cleary (1999) and Cleary (2006) show that firms with 
stronger financial pos'itions are more investment-cash flow sensitive than firms with 
weaker financial positions. Using theoretical models, Moyen (2004) show that the 
correlation- between fixed investment and cash flow may be positive and larger for 
financially unconstrained firms then the constrained. Similarly, using the model to detect 
-financing constraints on firm investment Caggese (2007) show that th~ correlation 
between variable capital investment and internal finance is a useful indicator of the 
in~ensity of financing constraints. Usir:tg error-correction specifications, Guariglia (2008) 
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support the arguinent and find that the investment-cash flow sensitivity to be highest for 
externally financially constrained firms th~t have relatively high level of internal funds 
in sample of unquoted UK firms. 
2.5.3 Governance Mechanisms and Corporate Diversification 
Over the past decade, a considerable number of studies have documented empirical 
researches on the impact of firm diversification with contradictory empirical results. 
Villalonga (2004) documents that in order to assess the effect of corporate 
diversification on firm value, it is crucial to measure diversification correctly. She finds 
. that diversification to be beneficial to firms. Similarly, Campa and Kedia (2002) argue 
that the documented discount on diversified firms is not per se evidence that 
diversification destroys value. They find a strong negative correlation between a firm's 
,I 
choice to diversify and firm value and suggest that diversification discount always drops, 
and sometimes turns into a premium. 
Using Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003)'s governance index, Jiraporn, et aI., (2006) 
examine the relation between propensity· to diversify and strength of shareholder rights. 
They find that firms where shareholder rights are weak are more likely to be industrially 
diversified suggesting that managers exploit the weak shareholder rights and diversify 
the firm unwisely. Similarly, Jirapom, Kim and Davidson (2008) find that firms where 
board members hold more outside board seats suffer a deeper diversification discount 
2.6 Corporate Governance and Financial Structure 
2.6.1 Capital Structure and Agency Theory 
The .. effect of governance. structures on the capital structure (Le. mix of equity and debt) 
of the company haS been documented in empirical literature for number of years. \ 
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However the role of financial structure is still debated in the literature as a result of 
conflicting theories." Jensen and Meckling (1976)' propose agency cost of debt model 
which considers a firm which is wholly owned by a single owner-manager. They argue 
that when issue debt the owner has incentive to abuse invest in high-risk projects which 
offer high returns if successful, but increase the probability of failure. On the other hand, 
as debt increases in proportion to equity, debtholders therefore demand progressively 
higher premiums to compensate for the increased probability of failure. Therefore, the 
agency cost of debt arises as debt holders' fear the risk of. asset substitution and 
probability of possible bankruptcy may increase. 
Grossman and Hart (1982) propose another theory which argues that non-owning 
managers increase the "level of debt in their firms in order to pre-commit or bond 
themselves to achieving the levels ot cash flow necessary to mteet debt repayments. As 
debt involve commitment to pay fixed interest in a given time period, it reduces 
management discretion to consume excessive perquisites. Another theory addressed by 
Jensen (1986) suggest that that managers prefer lower levels of debt in order to allow 
themselves greater discretion over the use of free cash flow and to avoid the threat of 
bankruptcy. Therefore, high levels of debt act as a disciplining mechanism. 
2.6.2 Ownership Structure and Agency Costs of Debt and Equity 
The importance of corporate governance mechanisms and its effect on the cost of debt 
financing is well recognised in the finance literature. In their recent study, Anderson, 
Mansi and Reeb (2003) examine the impact of founding family o~nership structure on 
the agency cost of debt and find a positive relation with lower cost of debt financing. 
They' argue that founding family firms have effective structure to minimise agency 
conflicts between equity and debt claimants. Brau (2002) finds no effect in small 
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business borrowing on the agency costs betw"een owners and managers. The findings are " 
similar to Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argument that managerial monitoring and pressure 
to meet interest payments can lower agency costs generated by informational asymmetry 
between lenders and owners. 
However, other studies such as Filatotchev and Mickiewicz (2003) document that 
ownership concentration is associated with a less efficient use of financial resources. 
Based on their analytical implications of a possible collusion between fixed-claim 
holders and dominant shareholders, they argue that dominant shareholder and fixed 
claim holder may collude and extract private benefit at the expense of other 
shareholders. Inderst and MUlier (1999) shows that firms with dispersed share ownership 
face comparatively lower agency cost of debt than firms with concentrated share 
ownership. Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) argue that debt and equity complement each 
other in terms of their ability to minimize agency problems. They document that debt 
holders are called in during bad times for the firm and shareholders through their 
ownership are in control du"ring good times. 
In addition, Using East Asia data, Driffield, Mahambare and Pal (2007) propose that 
effect of separation of ownership from control on capital structure depend on legal rules 
and enforc~ment defining investors' protection; Harv'ey, Lins and Roper (2004) indicate 
that the incremental benefit of debt is concentrated in firms with high expected 
managerial agency costs that are also most likely to have overinvestment problems 
resulting from high levels of assets in place or limited future growth opportunities. 
Klock, Mansi and Maxwell (2005) examine the relation between the cost of debt 
financing and governance provisions, they find that firms that are less likely to face 
takeover are associated with lower cost of debt financing unlike those most vulnerable 
for takeover. This suggests that bondholders view antitakeover provision favourably. 
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Focusing on the'role of governance in mitigating agency risk that affect firms' cost of 
equity capital, Skaife, Collins and Lafond (2004) find that firms with greater proportion 
of their shares held by activist institutions receive a lower cost of equity whereas firms 
with more block holders have a higher cost of equity. This suggests that agency problem 
between blockholders and dispersed shareholders are likely to be higher in those firms 
consistent with the finding of Dann and DeAngelo (1983) that blockholders increase 
agency risk as they have the power to extract private benefit that other shareholders 
cannot. Dyck and Zingales (2004) characterise firm with higher private benefits of 
control to be associated with more concentrated ownership among other factors. Other 
studies have shown that market do not view the firm favourable when there is less 
disclosed information as a result of agency problem. Easley and O'Hara (2004) 
investigate the role of information ill, affecting a firm's cost of capital, they show firms 
can influence their cost of capital by choosing features like accounting treatments, 
analyst coverage, and market microstructure. Guedhami and Mishra (2009) find strong, 
robust evidence that the cost of equity is increasing in excess control by controlling 
shareholder. 
2.6.3 Governance Mech'anism and Debt Maturity 
Recent empirical and theoretical research suggest that firms use debt maturity as a signal 
to the market and at the same time as a means of controlling managers from 
consumption of perquisites. Flannery (1986) argue that firms signal insiders' infon,nation 
about their quality and firm prospect by choosing short term debt which demand short 
period to repay as a means of minimizing information asymmetry. Barclay and Smith 
(1995) find there is little evidence that firms use debt maturities to signal. However, they 
.. 
find that firms with l~rger potential information asymmetries issue more short-term debt. 
On the other hand, using agency perspective, Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman (2005) 
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document that when there is weak alignment of interest between managers and 
sha~eholders, managers may prefer to make suboptimal debt maturity structure decision 
and choose long term debt over short term despite higher agency cost. 
In addition, corporate governance literature has produced contradictory result in 
explaining the rational of firms in choosing d~bt maturity. Harford, Li and Zhao (2008) 
document that short term debt have the potential to discipline managers. They find that 
stronger boards will force the firm to hold more debt and more. short term debt. 
However, they propose that out of self-interest managers would prefer less debt and/or 
debt with longer maturity. Benmelech (2006) argues that the maturity structure choice is 
driven by the agency problem. He finds that firms with lower shareholder rights increase 
I 
the proportion of debt with long term maturity. Whereas, firms that has a controlling 
shareholder decreases debt maturity'! Conversely, Berger, Ofek and yermack (1997) 
propose that entrenched CEOs seek to avoid debt completely. Cremers, Nair and Wei 
(2007) document the effect of bondholder governance through the use of bond covenant. 
They find that bond issues that are protected through leverage restricting covenants are 
least affected by the appearance of a blockholder. However, the bondhold~r concern 
about risk shifting increase when long term debt are issued. 
2.6.4 Shareholder-Bondholder Conflicts 
The role of corporate governance in solving agency problem has received mixed results 
in the literature as its effectiveness in solving shareholder-bondholder conflict has never 
been clear. Shareholders will prefer managers to take actions that maximize their wealth 
at the expense of bondholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that when issue debt, 
man~gers' have incentives to invest in high-risk projects which offer high returns if 
.. successful, but increase the probability of failure. However, the shareholders' loss is 
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limited to their equity shareholding, but all the gains accrue to them if the project is a 
success. Therefore, bondholders face the risk that firm may substitute asset and increase 
the risk of default. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) document that governance mechanisms 
can reduce default risk by mitigating agency costs and monitoring managerial 
performance and by reducing information asymmetry between the firm and the lenders. 
Effective governance enhances disclosure which provides necessary input to lenders to 
analyse the quality of firm. Sengupta (1998) propose that timely and detailed disclosures 
reduce perceived risk of default and may enable firm to reduce their cost of funding. 
On the other hand, some studies suggest that weak governance structure within firms 
may be an important factor in determining the cost of debt financing and minimize 
bondholders' risk. Klock, Mansi and Maxwell (2005) find that firms with antitakeover 
provisions which indicate lower shareholder rights lower the~· cost of ·debt financing. 
They suggest that anti takeover provisions which are not beneficial to shareholders are 
viewed as essentially important to bondholders. Warga and Welch (1993) examine the 
effect bondholder wealth changes in leverage buyouts (LBOs). They argue that during 
LBOs firms increase leverage. which can reduce the value of outstanding equity both by 
increasing the probability and the deadweight costs of a possible future bankruptcy and 
by reordering the priority of claims in bankruptcy .. They find that announcements of 
successful' leveraged buyouts cause a significantly negative return on outstanding 
publicly traded nonconvertible bonds. 
2.6.5 Institutional Shareholders and Financing Policy 
Institutional shareholders are viewed to have significant influence on the firm affairs 
incl~~ing on how they are governed. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that, because of 
.. the ownership size 'and availability of resources institutions have the incentive to 
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influence firm decision. Among key decisions involve how firms should finance 
themselves. However, the key question in the existing empirical literature is whether the 
discipline of external shareholders act as a co~plement or substitute to the disciplinary 
pressure of debt. Friend and Lang (1988) argue that external shareholders are less risk 
averse than management and want more debt. As monitoring involves cost, institutions 
will prefer to impose pressure on management to undertake more debt and enhance 
monitoring through lenders. Therefore, Friend and Lang (1988) document a positive 
, . 
relationship between debt and external shareholding and suggest that debt and external 
shareholders may complement each other. Similarly, Firth (1995) argue that the presence 
of institutional investors constrains management's discretion in setting capital structure 
and find a positive relationship between ownership by institutions and debt ratio. 
Conversely, some studies have sugge'sted that the debt and external shareholders may be 
substitutes both acts as signal of firm quality (for example Grier and Zychowicz (1994». 
Examining the effects of ownership by large external shareholders on the capital 
structure of the firm from an agency theory perspective, Short, Keasey and Duxbury 
(2002) find debt to be negatively related to ownership by large external shareholders. 
They arg~e that presence of large external shareholders may increase the agency costs of 
debt due to pressures on management to engage in asset substitution. Grier and 
Zychowicz (1994) present evidence way in which institutional ownership may affect 
corporate financing decisions, they report that when institutional ownership is more 
prevalent, firms are characterized by lower degrees of debt in their capital structures. 
2.7 Conclusion 
Agency theory suggests the contractual incompleteness as the source of prevailing 
agency problem which result in costs to the principal. The agency problems come in a 
number of forms that include cons~mption of perquisite, empire building or other 
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decisions that de'stroy shareholders' value. As such, shareholders incur costs to monitor 
managerial behaviours and ensure that contractual obligations are met. For instance, 
principal incur monitoring costs which in most cases require direct intervention or 
employing another party to evaluate agent's performance. On the other hand, principal, 
also incur bonding costs which intends improve quality of information provided to the 
principal on how the obJective sets are met. 
To ensure that the agent exercise his contractual duties with due diligence, a number of 
governance mechanisms have been proposed in the literature. For instance, effective 
corporate boards provide the first contact with the agent. Effective boards act in the 
principal's interest, as such ensure that it hire and reward good managers appropriately 
and on the other hand fire underperforming one. However, existing strand of literature 
discussed in this chapter show coni'radictory finding on the effectiveness. Similarly, 
linking rewards to firm's objective is another method that ensures that objectives are 
met. The chapter also highlight different ways in which shareholders' intervention can 
be useful and harm the outcome of the contractual obligations. 
,,' 
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Chapter Three 
An Overview of UK, US and European Governance Systems 
.3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a brief overview of institutional structures that exist in the 
Continental European countries, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States. The 
chapter outlines key issues leading to the governance and corporate laws reforms in the 
continental Europe giving emphasis on major issues such as privatisation and market 
integration. The chapter also provide an overview of issues leading to institutional 
reforms in the UK and US, by drawing special attention to corporate governance events. 
Developing further, the chapter offers brief description of how key corporate governance 
II 
structures are organised and provide insight into issues that make them unique with 
. respect to their legal structures. Finally, the chapter provide account for convergence and 
divergence of corporate governance models discussed earlier and how recent events 
bring about features that are more common than previously observed. 
3.2 Institutional Developments and Corporate Governance Reforms 
3.2.1 Evolution of Corporate Governance in Europe 
Corporate governance in European countries has seen major changes over the p,ast 30 
years. Following the establishment of the single market and the integration of European 
economies a number of countries have undergone major institutiomil reforms in order to 
promote a more competitive business environment and enhance financial market 
development. As par.!. of this there has been a significant regulatory and· governance 
reform to meet the needs and challenges of the new economic zone. Among the major 
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reforms in Europe during the 1980s period is the privatisation of state owned enterprises. 
This process required significant shift in the way markets operate and necessitate 
introduction of new legislations to 'enhance' financial market functionality. It also 
provided for changes within firms to take effect. 
However, privatisation process faced a number of different cha!lenges among countries 
in the European Union (EU). As the market became more liberalised, the need for 
regional economic integration accelerated and created demand for institutional and 
structural reforms to match increasing pace of financial development. On the other hand, 
institutional differences across Europe proved a major challenge to the reforms and 
integration of these economies. Differences in co~pany law and governance across 
countries highlighted the need to bring about institutional harmonisation for the new 
economic zone to be a reality. 
Differences in legal system and extent of shareholders' protection among European 
Union (EU) member states provide clear difficulties in convergence process. According 
to David and Brierley (1985), majority of Western European countries are characterised 
by two legal families namely common law normally found in the UK and Ireland; and 
French and Germany. civil law systems popular across continental Europe. However, 
Mahoney' (2001) indicates that the German and Scandinavia ci~il laws have distinct 
trad~tion from the French civil law even though they are grouped together. 
Existence of various legal origins made it difficult to establish a common gro~nd to 
reform the corporate laws and governance systems across member countries. La Porta, et 
aI., (1998) suggest that when law and enforcemen~ vary across countries the corporate 
governance systems within which firms operate show unique features distinct from the, 
other. Diverse in leg~i systems withi!l the Euro zone meant that achieving the required 
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reforms and hence a level playing field was a difficult task than earlier political 
commitments. Lannoo (1999) documents that failure to appreciate specificities of 
member states traditional and cultural issues made the harmonisation of corporate 
governance standards and corporate laws even harder. 
Early corporate law reforms in Europe dated back to the 1970s after publication of the 
fifth directive's draft ·on company law. The law aimed at harmonisation of company 
structures across. Europe. However, the proposal was seen as controversial as it 
mandated a number of features of German corporate structure7• The proposal required 
the obligatory formation of two-tier board and labour representation within boards and in 
corporate decision making8• Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) document that 
experimentation with Germany labour model lost its appeal to other member countries as 
a means of solving labour contracting problems and the fifth directive has never become 
law. 
Foll<?wing the integration process under the European Union umbrella, the demand for a 
new standardised European corporate law increased. The main objective of the process 
being to provide effective corponite governance system in which companies can operate 
competitively similar with the well-functioning financial systems such as the UK and 
US; as well a·s providing a foundation for a unified European single market and desire 
for economic efficiency. Bulmer (1998) document that Europe transformation is an 
outcome of globalisation, new developments in economic management and interaction 
between role of governments and policy making process. Therefore, any reforms need to . 
match development In other competitive economies and enhance the way in which 
c<?mpanies operate . 
.• 7 See Hopt, K. J., 'New W~ys in Corporate Governance: European Experiments with Labor Representation 
on Corporate Boards', Michigan Law Review, Vol. 82, No. 5/6, 1984, pp. 1338-1363. 
8 Ibid. . 
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Major European corporate reforms increased pace in early 2000 with the setup of the . 
Group of High Level Company Law Experts. The group formed by the European 
Commission in 2001 with the term of reference to initiate a discussion on the need for 
the modernisation of company law in Europe9• However, following the collapse of major 
corporations in the US and subsequent enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act the group 
expanded its mandate to include corporate' governance issues.· Particularly, issues 
concerning "the role of non-executive and supervisory directors, the remuneration of 
management, the. responsibility of management for financial statements and auditing 
practices 1110. 
3.2.2 Institutional Reform in Europe 
Reforming European institutions and corporate laws have been the key element in 
.1 
modernising Europe as the economic power. Differences in institutional structures and 
national laws provided the biggest challenge in creating a single market. For instance, 
Winter (2000) suggests that difficulties in the cross-border exercise of voting rights in 
Europe arise as a result of cross country differences in company laws, securities laws 
and trading platforms. Therefore, existence of diversity in country's institutional 
structure and legal operations hindered the success of single market. As such, the need to 
reform and harmonise corporate laws were likely to be fruitless. 
Further, a number of European countries undertook privatisation of state enterprises in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Parker (1998) notes that privatisation was on the relatively smaller 
scale for most of the European Union (EU) countries in the 198?s apart from France 
which between 1986 and 1988 privatised around 14 state owned enterprises. Slow 
------~--------------
9 See Report of the High Level Group of Company law Experts on a Modern Regulatory Framework for 
., Company Law in Europe;'November 2002 available at . 
h!.tp:llec.europa.eu/internal market/company/docs/modernlreport en.pdf 
10 ibid 
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privatisation process meant that a number of these states face sluggish development of 
their national capital markets. Therefore, the. contribution of capital market in the 
individual state's GOP was the lowest in the developed economies. 
According to Parker (2003), economic pressure associated with lib~ralisation of market 
and government budgetary difficulties force increase in privatisation process in the 
1990s. Adding to it, Bortolotti and Perotti (2007) point out that privatisation and 
institutional reforms in the EU was necessary not only for modernizing economies, but 
also for meeting EU convergence criteria. However, Lannoo (1999) indicates that the 
nature of privatisation in the EU countries and desire to keep states assets within the 
national boarders promote transfer of ownership to few local companies and investors. In 
addition, . several companies still had governments as major shareholders. This raises 
more questions on the intent and success of the privatisation policy. Cla~ssens (1997) 
suggests that by governments keeping majority ownership, the restr~cturing process 
within companies is likely to take more time and increase costs. 
The nature of restructuring and privatisation tend to affect the way in which companies 
are governed. Lannoo (1999) contends that by retaining shareholding in the hands of 
local investors and" promote ownership concentration; the EU countries prevent 
Corporate governance systems from being harmonised. This feature provides an 
opportunity for expropriation of minority shareholders. For instance, Doidge, Karolyi 
and Stulz (2004) document that companies which cross-list in the US are valued more as 
the expropriation by controlling shareholders is likely to be reduced. The extent of 
minority shareholders protection is important in determining the valuation of the 
company. Hence, significant differences in legal system within the EU countries suggest 
,'I • 
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that investor protection is very likely to have impact on shareholders' welfares (La Porta, 
et aI., (1997». 
3.2.3 Corporate Governance and Law Reforms in UK and US 
The UK and US governance systems have also seen major reforms over the years. In the 
UK, early corporate governance reforms dated back to the first publication of Cad?ury 
Report (1992) focusing of'the financial aspects of corporate governance. Subsequent to 
major corporate scandals involving accounting manipulation which led to the coJJapse of 
large UK institutions such as PoJJy Peck 11 and Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (BCCI), the UK governance system showed fragility and lack of 
accountability. The Cadbury Report (1992) provided more emphasis on the issues of 
accountability through disclosure.' Boyd (1996) documents that· establishment of 
Cadbury Committee provided real step in reforming corporate governance not only in 
the UK but also many other countries around the world. . 
FoJJowing the release of the Cadbury recommendations, the UK governance system ~as 
seen series of developments to enhance the way in which companies are managed. 
Among the key codes of conducts include the Greenbury Report (1995) which addressed 
issues concerning di;~ctors' remuneration and re-emphasise the role of non-executive 
directors within the UK governance context. However, the Cadbury and Greenbury 
Reports faced major criticism for promoting box ticking and assuming 'one size fits aJJ'. 
Short, et aI., (1998) argue that the. focus of Cadbury on control and accountabi.Jity 
severely affected the enterprise aspect within companies and I~mit their ability to 
undertake risk essential for business prosperity. 
----------------------
1.1 The company which was best perfonner in the .1980s collapsed after suspected insider dealing activities. 
Peston, R., and Thomson, R., (1990), "Polly Peck heads for receivership" The Independent, October 21, 
199~, p. 1. 
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Taking into account inabilities of earlier codes to address corporate governance in a 
broader perspective, the Combined Code (1998) which incorporated recommendations 
from the Hampel Report together with the Cadbury and Greenbury highlight the need to 
provide a more flexible approach under the 'comply or explain' ethos. The Combine 
Code (1998) and subsequent revised and updated versions (2003, 2006 and 2008) 
provide that companies should comply with the provisions and in case of non-
compliance should explain reasons for deviation. 
In the US, corporate governance issues took centre stage soon after high profile 
corporate scandals such as Enron, WorldCom and Adelphia with enactment of 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. The SOX offered stringent requirement which 
aimed at promoting corporate disclosure and governance system within companies. The 
failures in corporate governance and accounting manipulation hive been in the forefront 
of recent scandals resulting in public panic and loss in confidence with the financial 
markets. The SOX provided a new dimension by overhauling the US governance system 
which over the years faced a series of scandals and financial irregularities 12. 
The impact of US corporate scandals stimulated review of national corporate governance 
codes across Europe 'and review of. the European Commission directives on corporate 
governance. The scandals provided avenue for further reforms on the corporate' 
governance under the umbrella of High Level Group of Company Law Experts which 
was commissioned by the EC to review the harmonisation of company laws and 
governance. Soon after the Enron scandal, the EC extend the terms of reference to 
12 A number of financial scandals and mismanagement leading to public panic such as Dot-Com bubble, 
Long'Term Capital Management and fraudulent activities highlighted the need to regulate corporate 
governance. 
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incorporate "issues related to best practices in corporate governance and auditing,,13. 
I 
The emphasis on independent directors' role within corporate boards in single tier and 
supervisory structure formed the main features of the corporate governance reforms. 
In the UK, the Enron scandal resulted in company law and corporate governance 
reforms. The company law reform undertaken by independent review commissioned by 
the Department of Industry and Trade (DIT) published its recommendation which among 
other things established the mandated p':lblication the Directors' Remuneration Report in 
the annual reports l4• On the corporate governance aspects, the Higgs Report which 
reviewed the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors lS and Smith Report which 
concentrated on audit committee l6 also released their recommendations. 
3.2.4 Governance Codes 
Recent changes in the way corporate governance activities are set up is reflected in the 
development of national codes among these major economies. Across Europe a number 
of countries have adopted a UK inspired and more flexible approach to corpor~te 
governance which allows companies to comply or explain in c~se of non-compliance 17. 
Despite the existence of national corporate governance codes among member states, the 
EU established guideli'nes that are incorporated within the national codes 18. The increase 
13 See details of the extension of the mandate in 'Report of the High Level Group of Company Law 
Experts on a Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe', November 4,2002 .. Available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/internal market/company/docs/modern/report en.pdf . 
14 The Company Law Review which was commissioned" to undertake the company law reforms was s~t up 
in 1998 well before the Enron scandal happened. See Arden, J., 'Uk Corporate Governance after Enron', 
Journal o/Corporate Law Studies, Vol. 3, 2003, pp. 269-282." ; 
IS The Higgs Report (2003) recommendations met severe criticism which required revision before 
incorporated into the Combined Code (2003) see Tran, M., 'Corporate Governance Reforms Divide City', 
The Guardian April, 14, 2003. Available "at 
http://Www.guardian.co.uklbusiness/2003/apr/14/comoratefraud 
16 The Smith Report (2003) recommendations were endorsed and adopted in the Combined Code (2003). 
I.~ Andres and Theissen (2008) document that the comply-or-explain principle is widely used in Europe as 
stipulated by the European Corporate Governance Institute • 
18 M?dernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European 
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in cross boarder listing signifies the importance of harmonising company laws and 
corporate governance to simplify monitoring of companies and reduce regulatory 
arbitrages. 
3.3 Features of Corporate Boards 
3.3. I Board Structure and Different Features 
The role of board in monitoring management activities is well documented in corporate 
governance studies. Fama and Jense~ (I983) and Jensen (I993) highlight that the 
board's main function is to hire and fire competent and incompetent managers 
respectively and reward them when setting strategic decisions that enhance shareholders 
value. However, different boards have different configuration under single tier which is 
common in the Anglo-Saxon model and two-tier system popular in the continental 
It 
Europe. 
Despite the popularity of two-tier system in Continental Europe, the European 
legislation recognises the use one-tier within the member states. According to Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001, the structure of the European company shall comprise 
"either a supervisory organ and a' management organ (two-tier system) or an 
administrative organ (one-tier system) depending on the form adopted in the statutes,,19. 
Further, Kerry-Ferry (I 996) shows different type of governance' systems across Europe. 
The survey ide~tify companies in Italy as having a single tier board; Denmark and 
Netherlands follow a two tier system and France having a mixture of single and two ti~er 
system among others. 
,,, . 
'f9 Se~ article 38 (b) Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a 
Eur?peancompany (SE)" ' 
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The main feature of corporate board that is unique in the continental Europe . is 
employees' participation in the company decisions. In two-tier board model, additional 
layer of supervision (upper level) ,is formed which provide the monitoring and 
supervisory function to the lower layer (management). Under this model, popular in 
Germany, Netherland and Nordic countries executives are not entitled to seat in the 
supervisory board. However, the company law provide for the employees to appoint 
representative to seat on the board. Streeck (2001) document that employees' 
representation enables them to have rights in the management of the company and 
promote collective voice. Further, Reberioux (2002) suggests two forms of workers' 
involvement; information and consultation rights provided by labour laws20 and direct 
~nvolvement in strategic decisions by board of directors or supervisory board 
representation under co-determination provided by company laws . 
• t 
Workers' representations derive its origin in Germany. Roe (2003) states that 
'Germany's long ideological and political encounter with codetermination begun just 
, after the First World War when revolutionary leaders established workers' councils' ' (p,. 
29). Hopt and Leyens (2005) contend, that the representation of workers in the 
management of companies aim at social morality, reducing conflicts between 
, .. 
management and workers and keep down strikes. The presence of workers simplifies 
the information flow process making them well informed on companies'issues. 
The Germany corporate law in which Denmark, Austria and other Scandinavian 
countries derive their corporate laws from make the existence of labour representation in 
the board popular in these countries21 • Hans Bockler Foundation / European Trade 
.. 
Uni~~ Institute (2004) study 15 EU countries and investigate the level of employee 
-
,,' 
"20 ' 
21 Popular in Italy and Sweden ' . 
S.~e Laporta et at (1997), which highlight legal families and the evolutIon of the laws. 
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representations at the board level. The report finds that among the 15 countries only 
three Belgium, Italy and the UK which has no legislation which address employees' 
representation. Similarly, in Finland and France, the shareholders tend to determine the 
employees involvement. In general, the preference for codetermination is strong in 
countries with two tier system. 
However, the workers' representation feature which contradicts the Anglo-Saxon model 
is said to limit the functionality of ~oards and/or supervisory boards. Hopt (1984) 
indicates that labour representation creates additional layer of control on the supervisory 
and management boards. In addition, Hopt and Leyens (2005) suggest that 
codetermination has an impact on the duty of confidentiality and may promote 
information leakage. They also, suggest that it impairs the governance system to set 
adequate standards for directors sitilng in the corporate boards. Pagano and Volpin 
(2005) present a model which shows that codetermination may act as deterrent of 
takeover. 
Recent EC directives on company structure which allow the choice between unitary and 
two-tier board may have significant impact on the presence of employees' 
representation. As a result, a number of countries and firms across Europe have started 
to derail labour representative sitting in the board22• Countries such as the Netherlands 
and France, labour representation is limited at consultative level with, France 
encouraging involvement in public sectors and less in private (Goyer and Hancke 
(2005)) In "addition, the role of employees in the corporate governance have raised 
------------------'-"---
'22 See Vitols, S., 'The Evolving European System of Corporate Governance: Implications for Worker 
Pa~.icipation', Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, Vol. 14, No.1, 2008, pp. 27-43. 
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considerable doubts among member countries as a way to encourage management's 
excuse in imposing their interests23• 
Corporate board forms an important feature in the UK governance system which 
promotes accountability through disclosure and the strength of the internal governance 
(Faccio and Lasfer (2000». The disperse ownership structure in the Anglo-Saxon model 
make the role of corporate boards in protecting shareholders' interest an utmost 
responsibility. The Cadbury Report (l ?92) and Combine Code (1998, 2003 and 2008) 
have all emphasised the role of board of directors especially non-executive directors in 
providing leadership within companies and promote the strength of internal control. 
Comparing with the U.S., Dahya, McConnell and Travlos (2002) indicate that 
historically, the UK boards are heavily dominated by execut~ve directors except few 
,I • 
companies' ~oards which consisted outsiders as majority. In the US boards, outsiders 
have been dominant. However, the trend has change dramatically over the years and 
, most UK boards are now composed of non-executive. directors as part of 
recommendations to enhance corporate governance. In addition, Dennis and McConnel 
(2003) document that it is common practice for CEO and the chairperson roles in the 
board of US firms to be combined. In similar fashion, Enriques and Volpin (2007) 
highlight that in France, concentration of power in the hands of CEO has been common 
for years. Contrary, CEO-Chairperson split is one of the most important aspects of UK· 
corporate governance codes aiming as reducing the concentration of power in the hands 
of one person. 
,,23 Minutes of the fifth meeting of the European Corporate Governance Forum on 1 June 2006; available at 
http://ec.europa.eulinternal marketlcompany/docs/ecgforum/minutes 0 I 06 2006 en.pdf 
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3.3.2 Board Effectiveness 
The debate on the importance of board effectiveness in monitoring managers and setting 
strategic direction of the companies has been heavily documented in the literature. Klein 
(2002) documents that boards structured to be more independent of the CEO are more 
effective in monitoring the corporate fi~ancial accounting process. Therefore, it is 
widely acknowledged that presence of independent elements within board, knowledge 
and business diversity enhance the way in boards fulfil their important role of 
monitoring. For instance, Dalton, et aI., (1998) document that board composition 
influence how it performances. However, the differences in governance system have an 
implication on how effective the boards do operate. 
In the Continental Europe, especially in two-tier system the presence of employees' is 
said to have significant implication'· on the effectiveness of the supervisory board in 
monitoring. Hopt and Leyens (2005) document that when employees' representative sit 
on the board, the skills and qualifications necessary to monitor and provide direction is 
limited. Similarly, Fohlin (2005) argues that the dominance of bankers in boards 
influence the relation between the supervisory board, management and majority 
shareholders. She indicates that their presence weakens important role of monitoring 
management and protecting minority's interests. Therefore, the existence of these two 
significant parties indicates that the functionality of supervisory boards is far from 
effective. 
3.4 Ownership Structure: Role of Institutions and Families 
3.4.1 Nature of Corporate Ownership 
Early studies focusing on . the Anglo-Saxon corporate environment suggest that 
., . 
~ "ownership of modem corporation is dispersed and control is transferred into the hands of 
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small group of managers (see Berle and Means (1932) and Demsetz (1983)). Recent 
studies show that the widely held firms are far from universal. La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer (1999) show the diversity of corporate ownership around the world 
and suggest that it is more complex then early findings suggest. Further, La Porta, et aI., 
(1998) indicates that legal structure in which shareholders operates can help explain why 
variation in ownership exists. They argue that concentration of ownership is more 
common in less developed markets. with poor investor protection. This is also reflected 
in countries with civil law as their legal system. 
The features described by· La Porta, et aI., (1998) fits the nature of most financial 
syst~ms in the Continental Europe. The bank based financial system common in 
Continental European economies, characterised by illiquid markets, have a different 
ways of enfo~cing contracts to market based (DemirgOc-Kunt and Levine (2001) ). 
Alternative to market forces in enforcing contracts and access to external financing is the 
ownership structure whereby the presence of large shareholders has significant influence 
(Shleifer and Vishny (1986)). However, the benefits of this ownership form over 
dispersed are not quite clear. As much as it can reduce the free~riding problem, the cost 
of curbing private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders can be significant 
(Dyck and Zingales (2004)). 
Franks and Mayer (1997) document that in most of continental Europe ownership is 
much concentrated in the hands of very few groups, companies and families in 
particular. Further, Becht and Roell (1999) show that existence of large blockholders 
with voting control in Europe is a usual phenomenal which signify that agency issues 
arising from the separation of ownership and control are fundamentally different from 
that well known in the Anglo-Saxon model. Another unique feature highlighted by La . 
.. . 
. Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (! 999) is the existence of pyramid structure. They 
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contend that pyramid ownership structure is a common element in a number of European 
countries and give more controlling power to the wealthy families. Consistent with 
Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) who suggest that there is small separation between 
ownership and control in some pyramids. 
Extending further, Faccio and Lang (2002) examine the ultimate ownership and control 
of western European firms and provide a' unique insight of the prevailing structure. They 
. show that at least 44.29% of firms in their sample are family controlled. Maury and 
Pajuste (2005) also suggest that family controlled firms are more prone to private benefit 
extraction if they are not monitored by another strong blockholder. Therefore, the nature 
of continental European ownership structure make it possible for large shareholder (in 
some cases controlling shareholder) to internalise private benefit of control. 
.t 
Contrary, Black and Coffee (1994) and Short and Keasey (1999) highlight that 
regulations in the US limit the size of stock ownership by financial institutions. Short 
and Keasey (1999) show that US pension funds also hold smaller domestic equity which 
makes the presence of controlling shareholders limited. In the UK, the legal limit also 
applies in terms of ownership. City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, prevent any 
institution or individual from owning share above 29.99% without launching bid to 
acquire the rest of the shares. As a result, consistent with Faccio and Lang (2002)'s 
findings majority of firms in 'the UK are widely held. 
3.4.2 Relationship between management, major shareholders and minority 
The fundamental issue in modem public companies is how to allev"iate agency problems . 
. In advanced financial markets where small shareholders are dispersed like the UK and 
. US, separation of o~nership from con~rol has detrimental effect t6 the firms and the 
objective of maximizing shareholders' wealth may be in danger (Jensen and Meckling 
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(1976)). This type of agency problem is popular in the Anglo-American companies. In . 
continental Europe, the pre~ence of dominant shareholders forms the key feature. 
Acc~rding to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), blockholders help reduce the first proble~ but 
create another by expropriating minority shareholders. This is particularly widespread 
when legal protection and enforcement are poor. 
In the Anglo-American governance system, the widespread nature of ownership allows 
managers to undertake self-serving act~vities that create tension between the two parties 
i.e. managers and shareholders. In addition, the costs of monitoring managers' actions 
increase with the degree of dispersion as any collective efforts are most likely to be 
futile. Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) find that agency costs are significantly higher when an 
outsider rather than an insider manages the firm and increase with the number of non-
manager shareholders. 
In contrast, the effect of separation of ownership from control in continental Europe is 
far from Berle and Means (1932) description. Because of the complex pyramids and 
interlocking structures· which result in ownership concentrated in the hands of 
controlling shareholder, the self-serving behaviour of managers is likely to be reduced. 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) indicate that large 
shareholder have incentive and resources to monitor managers. The size of their 
investment and ability to influence important decisions make them powerful compared 
to minority shareholders. In addition, the identity of blockholers in Europe i.e. families, 
companies and foundations means that long term commitment has been the highlight of 
the investment objectives. For instance, Bertrand and Schoar (2006) suggest that family 
.. 
firm.~ embrace long term investment strategies unlikely in widely held firms. 
,,' 
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However, Bechtand Mayer (2001) document that when the interest of holders of blocks 
of share diverge from those of the minority consumption of private benefits may be the 
outcome. This kind of problem is 'common in the continental European corporate 
environment. As controlling shareholders have the power to appoint or influence the 
appointment of managers and in some cases supervisory and board . members, 
expropriation of minority can be extreme. In these scenario, Johnson, et aI., (2000) 
suggest tunneling can occur when controlling shareholder undertake self-dealings 
transactions and increasing share ownership. They argue that tunneling is popular in civil 
law countries, much of them in continental Europe. Empirically , Bigelli and Mengoli 
(1999) find evidence on tunneling acquisitions in Italy. 
In the UK and US, the impact of controlling shareholder in extracting private benefits is 
few and far between. As described earlier, the minority legal pr~tection and enforcement 
is much higher than in the continental Europe. However, the widely held nature of the 
ownership encourages managers and in some cases blockholders to exercise power that 
favour their interests. Myron and Sushka (1993) assess the effects of deaths of inside 
blockholder and find that shareholder wealth increases. 
Another important element in reducing agency problem is the role and influence of 
institutional shareholders. Within the UK corporate governance structure, the role of 
institution has been given special attention for a number of years (Cadbury Report, 
1992). Almazan et al. (2005) provide evidence which suggest that institutional investors 
play an important role. in monitoring management, however not all institutions are 
equally willing and able to monitor. For instance, Chen, Harford and Li (2007) and 
Ferr~ira and Matos (2008) suggest that institutions with little business interest with the 
.. firm in which they invest in are effectiv~ monitors. In addition, institutional involvement 
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can be influenced by the regulatory settings within a particular country (Roe, 1990). 
Black and Coffee (1994) point out that institutional setting in the UK which is relatively 
unregulated allows easy communication among institutional shareholders that give them 
power to intervene behind closed door than their counterparts. 
3.4.3 Related Party Regulations 
Recent event leading to collapse of major c<?rporations indicate that related party 
transaction as the .major culprit. Major~ty of these complex transactions involve f.irm's 
related parties such as managers, shareholders (majority shareholders in particular) and 
affiliates. From agency point of view, these transactions encourage transfer of firm 
resources and expropriation of other minority shareholders using other parties closely 
tied to the firm. The nature of ownership structure in the continental European 
I' 
corporations which is characterised by ownership by families, pyramids structure, 
crossholding and presence of controlling shareholders provide impetus for firms to 
undertake extensive related party transactions. To account for this, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer (1999) and La Porta, et aI., (2000) suggest that the central agency 
problem associated with nature of ownership present in continental European 
corporations is the expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders. 
Because expropriation of minority can take different forms, the most common form 
. invo Ives transferring of firm's resources for the benefit of their contro II ing shareholders 
·which Johnson, et aI., (2000) termed as 'tunnelling'. Johnson et al. (2000) propose that 
the controlling shareholders could use self-dealing transactions such as activities ranging 
from outright theft and loan guarantees to selling assets or products below market prices 
.. 
to benefit themselves at the expense of other shareholders. They argue that this is more 
.~ommon in countries with poor investor protection. 
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To account for these activities, a number of countries have established ways to regulate 
related parties transactions. Following high profile scandals leading, to the collapse of 
Enron and other firms, the US legislators debated and enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX) of 2002. Among the key elements of the SOX is the disclosure on related party 
transactions. Henry, et aI., (2007) examine SEC enforcement actions involving both 
fraud and related party transactions. Overall, they outline loans to related parties, 
payments to company officers for services that were either unapproved or non-existent, 
and sales of goods or services to related entities in which the existence of the 
relationship was not disclosed as the main types of related party transaction. They also 
suggest that misappropriation of the company's assets to be another area of concern. 
Given the dispersed ownership structure in the US, related party transactions provide 
ways for corporate insiders to exprd'priate value from sharehoiders (Chhaochharia and 
I Grinstein (2007)). Therefore, the SOX aimed at increasing oversight and monitoring of 
listed firms at curbing related party transactions that represent potential conflicts of 
interest between corporate insiders with close access to I company resources and 
shareholders (Gordon, Henryand Palia (2004)). For instance, Section 402 of Sarbanes 
Oxley prohibit for firms to extend loans to any director or executive officer. In addition, 
a number of security ~arket regulations require that ,the audit committee or' another 
committee of independent directors review and approve all related party transactions24• 
In the conti~ental European firms, where ownership is concentrated in the hands of 
controlling groups and mostly pyramidal structured provide a greater challenge in 
relation to the related party transactions. Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan (2002) 
document that expropriation of controlling shareholder against minority is more, likely to 
---------------------------"-'----
., 24 These include additional requirements beyond outlined in the SOX for firms listed in the NASDAQ and 
NYSE. '" . 
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prevail in firms that they have lesser cash-flow right to the ones in which cash-flow 
rights are greater. Lae'ven and Levine (2008) show that large owners in Western 
European firms frequently structure their shareholding so that they have large control 
rights, but comparatively small cash-flow rights. 
Following the European Union steps to harmonise of the financial statements of listed 
fi~s which require that consolidated financial statements t? be p~epared and presented 
in accordance with the IFRS, the consistency in defining related party transactions exist. 
However, countries across Europe have developed extensive definition on what 
constitute related party transaction and how to best regulate. For instance, the role of 
independent boards in monitoring and approving related party transactions is said to be 
of significant importance In curbing controlling shareholders' abuses (Enriques and 
Volpin (2007». .1 
To promote investor protection, a number of countries in continental Europe have taken 
steps to establish new corporate governance regulations that aimed at minimising 
extensive influence of controlling shareholders. A good example can be drawn from 
Italy, which following several corporate scandals such as that involving Parmalat Group, 
minority shareholders have been given more powers to appointing independent member 
to the board of directors and board of auditors to provide oversight on their behalf25• In 
addition, regulation mandating formation of board of auditors 
In Italy, reforms strengthened internal governance mechanisms by requiring that 
executive directors regularly inform the board of directors and th~ board of auditors of 
business developments and related-party transactions, and most importantly, that at least 
one,director and one board-of-auditors member be elected by minority shareholders. The 
------------------"-'----.. 2S ' '. 
Enriques and Volpin (2007) suggest that the reforms provIded more power to the board of auditors and 
e~~ance independence element in the boards._ ' , 
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reforms also entrusted the board of auditors with greater powers and somewhat tightened 
their members' independence requirements. Recent regulation issued by the Italian 
Securities and Exchange Commission (CONSOB), outlines general principles for 
procedural steps issuers must comply with in order to ensure the entire fairness of a 
related party transaction26. However, Anderson and Bizjak (2003) question the judicial 
enforcement of the legal system in cases of violation. 
In other countries, such as France the requirement is that interested parties to the 
transaction are restricted to participate in the voting on them. Further, the French 
regulations provide extensive reliance on external auditors in disclosing and monitoring 
self-dealings. On the other hand, Germany and Belgium regulations offer little on the 
related party transactions apart from the requirements to disclose. Germany corporate 
governance places special emphasis on the role of supervisory boards in the internal 
control process27. For Belgium, significant amendments were made in Company Law of 
2002 which require that special committee of three independent directors assisted by 
independent financial expert to evaluate the transactions to assess gain or loss· for the 
company28. However, recent studies have indicated that inconsistencies still prevail. 
3.5 Market for Corporate Control 
Market forces provide effective ways in reducing agency problems. This is particularly 
important in well-established market where mergers and acquisiti~n activities are active. 
Market for corporate control provide means for disciplining underperforming managers 
by attracting bidders from acquiring control (Jensen (1986». H?wever, the extent in 
.~6 See article 4 of Regulations containing provisions relating to transactions with related parties (adopted 
by Consob with Resolution no. 17221 of 12 March 2010, later amended by Resolution no. 17389 of 23 
June 20 1 0) available at www.consob.itldocumenti/english/laws/regI722Ie.pdf?lang=en 
27 See Enriques and Volpin (2007) 
.. 28 OECD (2012), Relai'ed Party Transactions and Minority Shareholder Rights, OECD Publishing. 
h!tp:lldx.doi.org/l 0.) 787/9789264) 68008-en 
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which takeovers can discipline managers depends on the takeover regulations from 
country to country. The UK and US provide active markets for takeovers to occur and 
hence offer effective ways to discipline self-'serving behaviour of managers (O'Sullivan 
and Wong (2005)). In contrast, continental Europe has long' been ncmexistence29 or place 
less emphasis on the role and importance of corporate control. Franks and Mayer (1990) 
document that the role of takeovers receives a different perception from the well-known 
function with the size of the market and ownership structure limiting the growth in 
Europe. 
3.5.1 Takeover Regulations in EU 
Takeover regulations govern the conduct of the takeover process and define means 
through which shareholders' interest can be saved. In general, the takeover regulations in 
I' . 
the UK, US and continental Europe aim at providing shareholders' protection against 
managerial entrenchment. The regulations on takeovers issues vary between these major 
economies as significant differences in corporate and securities market laws exist. 
However, despite presence of active markets the UK and US takeover regulations have 
distinct features from one another. 
The City Code on .takeovers find mergers 'The Takeover Code' governs all takeovers 
activities within' the UK. In the continental Europe, the EU Takeovers Directive 
(2004/25/EC) has bee~ adopted by national government into individual countries' law 
governing takeovers events. The directives extend to the UK, however muc~ of the 
• ' 30 
regulation borrows from the well-establIshed UK takeover code . The takeover 
regulation in the US is more complex than the UK and other EU countries. A number of 
------------------------
29 'The takeover activities in the UK have been common since 1950s; however it was unknown 
phenomenon in Europe. See Skog, R., 'The European Union's Proposed Takeover Directive: The 
"Breakthrough"Rule and the Swedish System, of Dual Class Common Stock " Scandinavian Studies in 
~aw Vol. 45, 2004, pp. 293-306 
.. See Goergen, Manjon and Renneboog (2008) 
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regulations gov'eming takeover process exist at federal and state level. The Williams Act 
of 1968 and state 'laws such as the popular Delaware corporate law provide guidelines on 
how takeover process is regulated31 .. ' 
The process of harmonising takeover regulation in Europe started "in the 1970s with the 
presentation of the failed takeover directive draft. However, in 1996 the EU revived the 
plans to harmonise the takeover regulation by issuing proposed directive and follow the 
UK takeover code in a number of ways to enhance takeover activities within the region 
(McCahery and Renneboog (2003». The proposed directive failed to 'yield consensus in 
2001 leading to the formation of High Level Group of Company Law Experts to help 
prepare new proposal on takeover issues within the European Union32. The differences 
in corporate law and institutional settings meant that a compromise on key aspects of the 
takeover directive was necessary fo'r it to be approved. In ord~r for the regulation to be 
accepted, the EU commission provide for member countries to choose application of 
Article 9 or n~t33. Takeover Directive (Directive 2004/25/EC) was adopted in April 2004 
and became effective as of May 2006 for implementation into national law by all 
Member State. 
For years the takeover regulations in EU,rope have varied considerably across countries 
resulting in unequal playing field as some failed to appreciate the economic impact of 
market for corporate control while others did. The presence of controlling shareholders, 
Company l~w and governance structure which give strong voice on employees affairs 
presented some of challenges that continental European system faced in promoting 
--~31-------------------- k See Bebchuk, L. A. and Ferrell, A., 'A New Approach to Ta eover Law and Regulatory Competition', 
~,Kirginia Law Review, Vol. 87, No. 1,2001, pp. III -164. . . . 
For names of members and terms of reference, see Company law: CommIssIon creates High Level 
Group of Experts. Available at . . 
h!!p:lleuropa.eulrapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP101/1237 &format=HTML&aged= 1 &Ianguage 
,. ~n&guiLanguage=en . . 
. Article 9 prohibit the use of multiple voting, however a number of countnes have choose not to 
tn,:Orporate into national laws. 
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market for corporate control (Hopner and Jackson (2006». Recent, company and 
takeover reforms signify the desire of EU to integrate European financial markets with 
the rest of the world and provide more power to the shareholders during takeovers 
(Dignam (2008». 
The EU Takeover Directives aimed at reducing managers' ability in frustrating takeover 
bids. For instance, Article 9 of the directive gives power to the shareholders when hostile 
takeover has been launched by preve~ting directors from using defensive tactics. It states 
that "[t) he board of the offeree company shall obtain the prior authorisation of the 
general meeting of shareholders [. .. } other than seeking alternative bids, which may 
result in the frustration of the bid [. .. }" (Article 9 (2». In addition, Article 11 restricts 
multiple voting when deciding the use of defensive measures. It states that H[. .. J mUltiple 
vote securities shall carry only o~e vote each at the generdl meeting of shareholders 
which decides on any defensive measures in accordance with Article 9" (Article 11 (3». 
The two articles brought about the alignment with the UK takeover code which restricts' 
the use of defensive tactics such as poison pills. 
3.5.2 Takeover and Corporate Law in UK and US 
It widely acknowledged that the UK and US takeover markets are far effective and share 
more common features. Howeve~, despite being very active market there are key issues 
that differentiate the two countries. The UK takeover code (City Code) aim at promoting 
fairness and equal treatment among shareholder. In addition, it provides the framework 
from which the takeover process is regulated34• Contrary, in. the, US anti-takeover 
provisions such as poison pills, blank check, classified board and supermajority'are very 
co"inmon in delaying hostile bids or protecting management against takeovers (Gompers, 
---~---------------------"-'----
34' See The Takeover Code, available at http://www.thetakeovemaneLorg.uk/wp_ 
~ntent/uploads/2008/1 I/code.pdf 
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Ishii and Metrick (2003)). The city code prohibit the use of such provisions but allow 
other takeover defence tactics such as profit reports, dividends increase and use of white 
knight to provide counter bid (Sudarsanam (I 995)). 
Furthermore, Bebchuk (2005) suggests that US corporate law"reduce shareholders' 
power to influence governance changes within companies. He argues that shareholders' 
ability to initiate cha~ges is hinder by the fact that most of the power are restricted and 
directed to the board. In addition, Bebchuk (2005) document than "[T]he U.S. 
corporation can be regarded as a "representative democracy" in which the members of 
the polity can act only through their representatives and never directly" (p. 837). This 
therefore limits the influence of shareholders on the gove~ance and takeover issues. 
Also, Bebchuk (2007) indicate that shareholders in the US find it difficult to remove 
existing managers as some laws are"in their favour. 
Becht, et aI., (2009) show that the situation in the UK company law is far different from 
the US and it gives more power to shareholders than the board or. ma~agement. They 
show that UK shareholders have the power to call extraordinary general meetings when 
reaching 10 percent or more of the voting share capital. In addition, the Company Act 
allows the shareholders to appoint and/or remove director{s) from office provided that 
person receive more than 50 percent of the vote casted are in favour of such a resolution. 
However, some states legislation in the U.S with particular reference to Del-aware such 
provisions are restricted35 • In addition, Kraakman and Hansmann (2004) highlight that . 
the Delaware Corporate Law weakens shareholders power in running the company 
relative to the UK law w~ich provide power to the ultimate owners of the company. 
----------------------
35 . . 
Becht et al. (2009) offer detailed differences between the UK Company Law and Delaware Corporate 
Law 
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3.6 Convergence and Divergence of Corporate Governance Models 
,3.6.1 Existing Corporate Governance Models 
Historically, the corporate governance models. in the cont,inental Europe and Anglo-
Saxon have differed considerably. The nature of the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance 
meant that the role of financial market in regulating companies is of fundamental 
importance. On the other hand, the continental European model promotes the role of 
banks and major institutions in stimulating corporate practices. External market forces 
such as hostile takeover provide strong incentive for market to punish underpe~forming 
. managers. However, De long (1991) documents that in most western European markets 
COrporate, legal and/or institutional regimes prevented the working of a free takeover 
market. The dominance of few controlling shareholders and banks ensure that takeovers 
,. 
without their willingness were nearly impossible. 
Cernat (2004) identifies two contrasting features that define the corporate govern~nce 
mechanisms between these models. He argues that Anglo-Saxon and continental 
European models can be summed up as capital and labour-related respectively36. The 
capital-related model signifies that markets function well when self-regulated and the 
.fiduciary" relationship between main players i.e. shareholders and ma~agers. This market 
oriented model focuses on relationship between agent and the principal developed 
contracting environment with main objective being maximising shareholders' wealth 
(Jensen and Meckling (1976)). However, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) indicate that 
developing perfect contract that eliminates managerial discreti~n is nearly impossible 
therefore market forces such as market for corporate control can help solve this problem. 
----------------------
36 Capital-related and labour-related are also described as shareholder system and stakeholder system 
.. respectively see Fauv~r, L. and Fuerst, M .. E., 'Does G~od Corporate. Gov~rnance In:lude Employee 
Representation? Evidence from German Corporate Boards, Journal of Fmanclal Economics, Vol. 82, No . 
. ~! 2006, pp. 673-710.. 
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On the other hand~ the labour-related model highlights the relationship between 
companies and stakeholders other than shareholders. This model is based on relationship 
between company and stakeholders· such as employees, creditors, customers and 
shareholders that affect company's welfare37• Schmidt and Tyrell (1997) document that 
this system works well when there is a binding relationship that creates opportunities for 
all the parties interested in the company. Therefore, it focuses on building long term 
relationship between the company and its partners. Jeffers (2005) indicates that 
corporations in continental Europe are seen as obliged to major role in enhancing 
society's welfare as much as maximising shareholders wealth. Because of the nature of 
this model, building relationship between companies and banks seems to be a preferred 
approach. The role of market for corporate control as disciplining mechanism is not of 
significant importance compared to}he. shareholder model in the UK and US. 
3.6.2 Convergence of Governance Models 
Different ways in which corporate governance systems can converge have been 
described in the literature. Gilson (2001) identifies two ways in ':Vhich governance 
structures can converge; form and function .. The former implies that the institutional and 
legal settings within countries have to change towards a particular superior structure for 
corporate governance systems to converge. On. the other hand,the functional 
convergence can be achieved when institutions within a particular country or countries 
adopt certain behaviours or styles that are popular in another system. However, Gilson 
(2001) emphasises that changing forms of existing institutions is costly and likely to 
cause political backlash. Therefore, Coffee (1999) proposes functional convergence as a 
N tn?st likely outcome in corporate governance convergence. 
----------------'-'-----. . 37 . '. 
See Schmidt, R., H .. and Tyrell, M., 'Financial Systems, Corporate Fmance and Corporate Governance', 
~~ropean Financial Management, Vol: 3, No.3, 1997, pp. 333-361. 
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In addition, consistent with functional convergence argument, Aggarwal, et aI., (2011)' 
show that institutional inve~tors based in common law countries "export" good 
corporate governance across countries with 'different legal regimes. These findings 
suggest that a dominant form of governance is transferred to that perceived as weaker. 
Further, investigating institutional shareholders' preference, McCahery, Starks and 
Sautner (2010) indicate that investor protection gap between countries (and legal 
systems) as essential in their investment decision. Given that corporate governance 
derive its foundation from the legal system, firms in the continental Europe are 
perceived weakly governed relative to their counterparties in the UK and US. 
Recent events in the continental Europe suggest that the move towards Anglo-Saxon' 
model of corporate governance is possible. Following the EU Company reforms, 
takeover directives and development of national corporat~ governance codes all 
indications show the trend that follow well established financial markets of the UK and 
US. The market for corporate control which for years have been underdeveloped and 
faced stringent regulation is now a new possibility in continental Europe. Huizinga and 
'Jonung (2005) document that financial liberalisation in the Europe have 'accelerate the 
growth of financial markets and European competitiveness in the global arena. 
Traditionally, European financial markets have been described as small and illiquid with 
ownership concentrated in the hands of few corporate investors and families (Becht 
(1999». However, privatisation of state owned enterprise and listing of new securities 
have increase the role and importance of European stock markets. In addition, Coffee 
(1999) document that development. of European security markets have been accelerated 
am~ng other factors by liberalisation of cross-border activities. 
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Over the years, the nature of institutional and regulatory settings in Europe suggests the' 
continental models are immune from the failings of Angl,o-American ones. For example, 
Enriques (2003) suggests that Enroti like collapse is less likely to happen in the 
continental Europe., However, recent global financial crisis suggest otherwise. The 
financial crisis which started in the US after collapse of property market and increasing 
default in sub-prime mortgages show how interdependent one country's economy is to 
the rest of the world. The integration of financial markets has necessitated the need to 
enhance models of governance that cut across national boundaries and borrow from one 
national code to another. 
Recent regulatory developments suggest that trends towards Anglo-American model are 
warranted in continental Europew For instance, Goergen, Martynova and Renneboog 
II 
(2005) show that the European takeover regulation which promotes harmonisation of 
national legislations converge towards the UK regime. They argue that abolishment of 
mUltiple voting rights, adoption of mandatory bid and squeeze-out rule highlight some of 
the f~ndamental elements of convergence. In a separate study, Goergen, Manjon and 
Renneboog (2008) document ongoing transformation of Germany corporate governance 
system and indicate .~hat cross border mergers tend to initiate a new business and 
governance practice into Germany corporations. 
Goergen, Martynova and Renneboog (2005) propose that the effect of takeover as a 
Corporate governance device means that changes in takeover regulation should have a 
wider impact on the overall governance system. Supporting this argument, Bris, Brisley 
and Cabolis (2008) and Martynova and Renneboog (2008) suggest that bidders from 
coun~~ies with stronger' shareholder protection and better governance impose those 
~enefits in improving 'targets governance. The studies suggest the spill-over effect of one 
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system of corporate governance being translated into another which is viewed more 
superior. Therefore, reforming takeover regulation and harmonisation across Europe 
promote disciplinary measures for underperforming managers and importation of 
different governance structure. 
On the other hand, the desire to attract external funds from international investors push 
firms to cross lis't in the more advance financial markets with high levels of investor 
protection such as the UK and US (La Porta, et aI., (1997); Klapper and Love (2004». 
Pagano, et aI., (2001) document the likeliness of European companies to cross-list in 
more liquid and larger markets and with better investor protection particularly in the US. 
As a result of cross-listing, companies may be subjected to some foreign regulations 
which change how they operate and governed. For instance, Coffee (2002) document 
I' ' .. ' 
differences between firms that cross-list and those that do not. He argues that cross-
listing subject companies to higher disclosure levels that reduce private benefits which 
enhance their ability to obtain external fund. 
For instance, Aggarwal, et aI., (2009) show that only 12.68% of foreign firms have better 
firm~level governance than US firms in their sample. They suggest that minority 
shareholder benefits from cross-listing. As the, majority of continental European firms 
have a dominant shareholder38, cross-listing minimise the private benefit of control. In 
addition, Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) show that cross-listing affects the information 
environment for non-US firms. That is cross-listing improve ability of stock prices to 
incorporation firm-specific information. 
,,' 
38 Se~. Faccio and Lang (2002) 
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3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter provide an overview of corporate governance issues in two distinct 
governance systems; the Anglo-Saxon and Continental European systems. Major 
changes that took place over the years as the result of financial market liberalisation and 
series of corporate scandals have seen significant shift in corporate governance 
regulations within these two major systems. Despite t_he traditional differences, where 
the Anglo-Saxon and continental European models focus on maximising returns for 
shareholders as the main objective and interest of other stakeholders apart from 
shareholders such as creditors, employees, customers, suppliers, and government 
respectively; recent events suggest that the two models are moving closer in functions 
than ever before. In essence, previous main differences are in descending. Recent 
regulatory developments suggest that some features of Anglo~Saxonmodel are now 
more warranted in continental Europe. 
n· 
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Chapter Four 
Data and Sample Description 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses and describes the data sources, collection process and definition 
. of variables that will be used in the empirical chapters that follow. The chapter also 
describes the construction of corporate governance score at firm-level and country-level. 
The sample comprises of 1065 firm-year for the period 2003-2007. The data is collected 
from across European countries that form part of European Union (EU). The countries 
were chosen for two reasons. First, countries in which the sample has been selected have 
well developed financial markets among the EU members. As s~ch, DemirgU9-Kunt and 
Levine (1996) suggest that in countries with such level of development market exhibit 
strong information disclosure laws and internationally accepted accounting standards. 
These features are essential for nature of data required in corporate governance studies. 
Second, the companies selected in the sample are the largest in Europe and mostly are 
associated with these financial markets. Therefore, they are ideal selection. 
4.2 Scope and sources of data 
This study uses two different types of data, corporate governance (firm and country-
levels) and financial data. These data have been collected from several sources. First, the 
firm-level governance data have been hand collected and is based on published 
information in the annual reports, reference documents39 and companies investor 
.39 Apart from annual reports, some companies' in continental Europe especially France publishes these 
documents that provide more detailed information (in some cases) than the former. 
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rel~tions section in their websites for the period between 2003 and 2007. For companies 
that are cross-listed in the United States additional information have been obtained from 
form 20-F. The data is based on largest companies listed in eleven '(11) Western 
European 0 countries which constitute Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,_ Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
Further, country-level governance data are obtained from a number of different sources. 
First, from La Porta, et aI., (1997), La Porta, et aI., (1998) and La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer (1999) I obtain data for legal system, anti-director rights, law 
enforcement and ownership concentration. Second, - data on financial system 
development is obtained from World Bank's Database on Financial Development and 
Structure constructed by Beck, DemirgUy-Kunt and Levine (2000) and recent updated 
o H 
version by Beck and DemirgUy-Kunt (2009). 
Second, data on firm-specific variables have been collected from two databases namely 
W orldscope and DataStream. The databases have been used in a number of studies and 
are well known for their quality of data and reliability. They cover a large number of 
firms making them appropriate for this study. These databases also share similar 
definition for financial variables and therefore complement each other 'consequently 
make merging easy when data is missing in one. 
As described earlier, due to labour intensive nature of manually collected data and time 
constraints associated with the process, I mainly focus on subset of European Union 
firms. The choice of sample is based on the fact that the amount, quality and level of 
disclosure in large companies is higher than others in lower performance indices. In 
addition, criteria that countries must be member of the European Union before the 
n° 
.. beginning of sample period also contributed to the choice. Further, available sources of 
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information that ·offer detailed corporate governance variables of interest in English also 
added weight to the choice of countries. 
Moreover, the choice of sample that takes into account firm size is influenced by recent 
empirical studies.· For instance, Akhigbe and Martin (2008) document that the 
compliance costs following changes in corporate governance practices have severe 
impact . on smaller companies than large ones. The later firms have resources and 
expertise to implement governance changes that small firms do not. Therefore, to take 
into account several on-going changes in governance practices across. Europe I opt for 
firm size criteria and their implication on respective companies. 
To assemble my sample for each country, I utilise Thomson One Banker database to 
identify composition of the index at the end of calendar year. I managed to identify 
'" .. 
composition of FTSE 100 (United Kingdom) CAC40 (France), DAX30 (Germany) BEL 
20 (Belgium) MIB30 (Italy) and AEX (Netherlands) from Thomson One Banker 
database. Other indices such as OMXC. 20 (Denmark), OMXH25 (Finland), ISEQ20 
(Ireland) IBEX 35 (Spain) and OMXS30 (Sweden) were obtained directly after 
consulting the respective stock exchanges4o• To ensure the accuracy of composites, 
where available the stock exchange indices were compared with the ones available in the 
databases. 
Because the· nature of corporate governance data require thorough reading of annual 
reports that differ in structure, content and detail; understanding of individual country's 
code was essential. In cases were the differences in definition existed, the country's code 
dominate other interpretations. For example, in determining whether the non-executive 
director is independent o~ not several countries offer different criteria. In the UK, non-
.. 40 E-mails were sent to these stock exchanges to get the constituents between March and April 2009 in 
cases where the information could not be obtained in their websites. 
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executive director with more than 9 years on the board is considered not independent 
with respect to the company. In other countries such as France and Sweden board 
member who has worked with and gained knowledge, about the company over a 12-year 
period is not considered as independent in relation to the company. " 
4.3 Construction of the Governance Scores 
4.3.1 Firm-level Corporate Governance Score 
Construction of corporate governance ranking and its usage has been popular in recent 
years. Several studies have used these ratings which gained their popularity following 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003)'s study. However, the choice of which rating and 
methodology to use w~en constructing is not universal. Several <?ommercial companies 
, such as Credit Lyonnais Securities ~sia (CLSA), Standard & Poor's (S&P), and FTSE 
ISS (ISS) have developed ratings covering different economies and purposes based on 
surveyed data. On the other hand, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) use publicly 
available sources gathered by Investor Responsibility Research Center (lRRC). To 
account for these differences, Love (2011) argues that rankings based on surveys of 
firms may suffer from different biases including firms' incentive to misreport. 
In other cases, some rating agencies have applied the use of analysts supplied with the 
questionnaire. Since analysts are more familiar with a number of companies they can 
easily form opinion using their experienc~ and regular following or dealings with listed 
companies. However, the use of analysts in rating process has raise series of questions. 
Klapper and Love (2004) suggest that analysts' may rely on past performance to form 
_opinions. Therefore, their reliability and robustness is questionable. 
Based on previous., limitations, I fo~low a different approach in construction of 
governance score using the 'available information provided in the annual reports, 
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reference documents and company's investor relation's section. The purpose is clear, to 
provide corporate governance rating based on the available information that companies 
provide to their shareholders, prospective shareholders and public in general. The 
disclosure of these. published information is regulated un?er country laws that may 
. reduce possibilities of misreporting, although does' not necessarily eliminate. Love 
(2011) suggests that the published information could be more objective than other forms 
but may suffer from limited scope. 
I examine annual reports and other mandatory reports which cover wide range of issues 
importantly corporate governance section. This part of annual report offers detailed 
account of how firm put into practice governance regulations. As part of reporting 
requirement, boards of directors of listed companies ensure the correctness and 
transparency of reporting. The level II of disclosure varies from 'one country to another; 
however the information provided is sufficient enough to identify whether the company 
has adhered to the self-regulatory codes that exist in European countries in this study or 
not. 
I identify a number of related corporate governance issues outlined in th~ national codes, 
European Union directives on corporate governance and other governance variables that 
have been found to have impact on firms. To ensure that the construction of index is 
consistent and different from those produced by 'commercial rating firms, I follow 
Aggarwal, et aI., (2009) approach. The latter construct their own index that incorporates 
attributes relevant to both U.S. firms and foreign firms from sixty-four attributes 
compiled from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). This allows comparability of 
flrm:-Ievel governance across countries. In addition, corporate governance nature in 
Europe provides more disc~etioi1 for ~rm to choose optimal structure. Andres and 
Th.~issen (2008) provide that corporate governance practices in Europe are, to a large 
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extent, founded 'upon the comply-or-explain principle. In that sense, this offers more 
variability in governance structure across firms and degree of compliance. 
The key issue that distinguish this governance score from previous study such as 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), Aggarwal, et aI., (2009), Chung and Zhang (20 II) 
Aggarwal; et. aI., (20 II) is that, this study construct the corporate governance score 
mainly from issues outlined in the national corporate governance codes. As such, the 
governance score's main foundation is grounded on the main principles. The main 
advantage of this method is that, issues addressed are derived from Europe rather than 
borrowed from the US principles. Although there is no formal corporate governance 
code for all countries covered in this study, elements of coordination and convergence in 
the main country's codes provide a unique avenue to explore issues that are relevant in 
the European context. In essence, this study does not intend to be a copycat of previous 
constructed corporate governance indices. 
From these provisions I develop binary (yes/no) items and find the appropriate answer 
based on the published information. A detailed description is provided in the Appendix 
4-1. The main purpose is to improve objectivity of the index rather than focus on 
SUbjective opinion of individuals. Further, I assign a numerical value equal to 1 (one) 
when the provision has been addressed or adhered to and 0 (zero) otherwise. When 
certain provisions are not available in the official documents strict criteria of awarding 
zero was undertaken. I assume that firms can only make change to their governance 
structures through public disclosure. Because it is difficult to presume company's 
implementation of, corporate governance standards, this assumption is therefore 
"reasonable and consistent. In addition, given the size of the firms covered in this study 
the level of disclose expected is hi~h, as such non-disclosure should reflect non-
implementation. To elaborate how the corporate governance score is constructed, take an 
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example of one"" provision on duality which focuses on whether the Chairman-CEO 
position is separated or held by one individual. If it is separated 1 is awarded or 0 
otherwise. 
The provisions are divided. into four principal groups namely board, disclosure and audit 
process, shareholders' rights and power and compensation. Board sub-score covers the 
issues that arise from" board policies, main board structure and composition. Disclosure 
and audit process highlight disclosed i~form~tion affecting performance criteria that are 
used in" setting remuneration, auditors' and audit committees workings. Shareholders' 
rights and power look at issues surrounding ways in which shareholders' exercise their 
voting and execution of responsibilities that companies have towards their shareholders. 
Finally, compensation (remuneration) sub-score includes provisions that ad~ress issues 
on remuneration committees and 'policies. Finally, all the' sub-scores and overall 
corporate governance score are calculated as equally-weighted average of the provisions. 
I give nu~eric rating with the highest score of 100 per cent. 
To ensure the robustness of the corporate governance score, I also introduce another 
method of construction. In some cases where provision is not found to exist in all firms 
in a particular c~untl'Y, I exclude the provision as missing and hence construct based on 
the available provisions. This approach is used in the chapters that follow to provide 
robustness test of the empirical results. 
4.3.2 Country-level Corporate Governance Index 
In constructing the country~level corporate governance score, I follow Hillier, et aI., 
.(2010) approach which covers broader definition of corporate governance to create a 
,," 
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corporate governance score for countries in their sample41 • Mallin, Pindado and de la 
Torre 0 (2006) argue that corporate governance system derive its foundation on three 
aspect i.e. legal system, ~apital markets and ownership structure. Further, the link 
between corporate governance and financial development is well documented in the 
literature. La Porta, et aI., (2000) and Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) document that 
investor protection exert positive effect in financial development and allocation of 
resources. Because country's institutions have powerful influence on economic and 
financial development, using this approach in constructing country-level corporate 
governance score capture more detailed information. 
The country-level governance index is divided into three main aspects; investor 
protection, financial system development and corporate governance mechanisms. I 
develop investor p~otection score using La Porta, et aI., (1997) and La Porta, et aI., 
(1998) studies which look at firms from different legal environment. These studies 
measure investor protection by character of legal rules, quality of law enforcement and 
identify origin of rules covering investors. Contribution of these studies in constructing 
indices \ used in corporate finance literature is not new. Studies such as Morck,Yeung 
and Yu (2000), Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) and Hillier, et aI., (2010) have all use this 
approach. 
Fo]]owing Hillier, et aI., (2010), I measure effective inyestor protection as the sum of 
three La Porta, et aI., (1997)'s and La Porta, et aI., (1998)'s sub-indices. First, La Porta, 
et aI., (1998) argue that common law countries have the strongest legal rules that protect 
investors. Consistent with recent studies such as Bizjak, Lemmon and Nguyen (2011) 
"and Harford, Humphery~Jenner and Powell (2012), I apply median as cut off point to 
n° 
41 Therefore, corporate governance index in this study is similar in spi~it to the one developed by the said 
st~dy with the exception that some of countries covered different. 
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minimise variation in the measure of country level governance42• I therefore create a 
dummy variable, DCLiI equals to 1 if a firm is located in a common law country and 
zero otherwise. Second, this study also use anti-director rights index (ADRI) from La 
Porta, et aI., (1998) as revised by Djankov, et aI., (2008) to p'roxy for shareholder 
protection which ranges from 0 to 543• Using this index I develop a dummy variable, 
DADRIit equals to 1 if the firm is located in a country with anti-director rights higher 
than the sample median and zero otherwise. Third, I use La Porta, et aI., (1998)' slaw 
enforcement index. The study indicates five measures which however are later 
categorised as "law enforcement proper" and "government's stance towards business". 
For the purpose of this governance score, I use efficiency of judicial system and rule of 
. ' 
law which fits the former definition. Similar to Hillier, et aI., (2010), I sum the two 
indices to form a law enforcement" index. I therefore create 'dummy variable DLEFiI , 
which equals to 1 if the firm is located in a country with higher than median law 
enforcement index and zero otherwise. Finally, I measure effective investor protection as 
the sum of three DCL. DADRl, and DLEF"I by creating a new dummy variable DIPI , II , It I 
which equals to 1 if the firm is located in a country with higher than median investor 
protection and zero otherwise. 
Another aspect of this corporate governance index is financial system development 
(FSD). Using Demirgiic-Kunt and Levine (2001)'s financial structure database, I create a 
dummy variable, DFSDiI equals ,I if the firm is located in a country with a high index of 
financial system development, and zero otherwise. Financial system development is 
.. measured as the sum of two sub-indices: market development and banking development. 
.. 42 Presence of variabl~~ with large score may drive the rating and provide inappropriate measure. 
Limitation of this is that, differences in absolute terms are absorbed. 
43 }-lillier, et aI., (2010) use the original anti-director rights index. 
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OemirgUc-Kunt and Levine (2001) define market development index as the average of 
two measures: market capitalization to gross domestic product (GOP), and total equity 
value traded to GOP. Like Hillier, et aI., (2010), I determine the banking development 
index as the average of three variables: liquid bank liabilities, bank assets, and domestic 
bank deposits; all are standardized by GOP. 
Because of the unique corporate governance features of countries in the sample, I 
develop a third sub-index which affects control mechanisms. Following Hillier, et aI., 
(2010), I use ownership structure, board structure and the market for corporate control to 
create a combine sub-index named control mechanisms.La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer (1999) show countries with concentration of ownership to have poor investor 
protection. I develop a dummy variable, DOCit equals 1 if a firm is located in. a country 
It 
with a high level of ownership concentration and zero otherwise. I define a dummy 
variable, DEBit, as proxy for board structure, which equals 1 if the country has a two-
tier board structure or having independent boards, and zero otherwise. Finally, DMCCit 
equals 1 if the firm is located in a country with an active market for corporate control 
and zero otherwise. The contr~l mechanisms index is determined as the sum of the three 
variables; ownership' concentration, board effectiveness, and market for corporate 
control dummy variables. Finally, the combined dummy variable DCMit equals 1 if the 
firm has a control mechanisms index above the sample median, and zero otherwise. 
I then create overall country-level corporate governance index as the sum of the three 
sub-indexes that is effective investor protection (DE/Pit), financiai system development 
(Df.SDit) and control mechanisms (DCMit ). The combined corporate governance index 
is the dummy variable DCG/it which ~quals 1 if the firm has overall index above the 
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sample median, and zero otherwise. Table 3-1 provides for the sub-indices and aggregate 
corporate governance index. 
While the La Porta, et aI., (1997, 1998) country-level index has been widely used, recent 
study suggest the limitations of the index. Spamann (2010) document the weaknesses of 
the index and argue that definition of the variables fail to appreciate knowledge of local 
legal experts to ascertain the relevant rules in each country. In addition, Djankov, et aI., ( 
2008) critique the index that it fails to provide quantitative me~sure and degree of 
enforcement rather focus on law on the books measures of enforcement and so are less 
vulnerable to .the critique .. 
To add to this, Martynova and Renneboog (2011) propose a new extensive country-level 
governance measure based on ·local expert knowledge of ~elevant country's legal 
structure. They argue that the La Porta, et aI., (1997, 1998) indices failed to capture 
reforms that took place in the 1990s. In addition, the comparative nature of the index 
suggests failure to appreciate distinct nature of the European ~egal system as majority of 
legal provisions are based on US corporate law. To a~dress these weaknesses, 
Martynova and Renneboog (2011) develod indeces that indicate how the law in each 
country addresses various potential agency conflicts between corporate constituencies: 
namely, between shareholder and managers, between majority and minority 
shareholders, and between shareholders and bondholders. 
This study account for issues addressed in this study by using Djankov, et aI., (2008)' s 
revised antidirector index developed using local lawyers who possess knowledge of legal 
institutions within each countries. In addition, the country-level index used in this study 
~ . 
stands best by· taking into. account level of financial system development. Doidge, 
Karolyi and Stulz (2007) show significance of country characteristics such as the level of 
90 
economic and financial development in explaining efficiency of corporate governance 
systems. In addition, the use of other control mechanisms in constructing this broader 
index allows capturing much broader aspects of country-level corporate governance 
systems. 
,., . 
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Table 4-1 Summary statistics for country-level corporate governance factors 
t ' 
The tabl~ presents summary statistics for key country-level, corporate governance variables in the analysis. DCL equals I if a firm is located in a common' 
law country, and zero otherwise. DADRI equals 1 if the firm is located in a country with anti-director rights above the median for the sample, and zero 
otherwise. DLEF equals ,I if the firm is located in a country with legal enforcement stronger than the median country in the sample, and zero otherwise. 
DIP equals 1 if the firm is located in a country with investor protection stronger than the median, and zero otherwise. DMB equals 1 if a firm is located in 
a market-based country, and zero otherwise. DFSD equals 1 if the firm is located in a country with financial system development above the median for the: 
sample, and zero otherwise. DOC equals 1 if the firm belong to a country with ownership concentration (measured by the three largest shareholders in the 
, 10 largest nonfinancial, privately owned domestic firms) higher than the median, and zero otherwise. DEB equals 1 if the firm is located in a country with 
a two-tier board structure system, or when nonexecutive directors represent a significant proportion (50% or more) on boards financial, and zero 
otherwise. DMCC equals 1 if the firm is located in a country with an active market for corporate control, and zero otherwise. DCM equals 1 if the firm 
has a combined corporate control index (computed as the sum of ownership concentration, board effectiveness;and market for corporate control) above 
the sample median, and zero otherwise DCGI equals 1 if the firm has a corporate governance index value higher than the sample median, and zero 
otherwise. The corporate governance index is defined as the average of the shareholder rights index (DEP), the financial system development index 
(DFSD), and ownership concentration (DOC), effective b~ard of directors (DEB), and market for corporate control (DMCC). 
Country DCL DADRI DLEF DIP DMB DFSD DOC DMCC DEB DCM DCGI 
Belgium 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Denmark 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
France 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 ,1 1 0 1 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 1 1 
, Spain 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Sweden 0 0 0 0 O· 0 0 0 0 
. United Kingdom 1 ' 0 0 
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4.4 Sample Selection 
To construct my sample, I obtain a list of all top companies by market capitalisation from 
national indexes (example: FTSE 100~ CAC 40, DAX 30, BEL 20, MIB30) from eleven 
European countries namely; Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden' and United Kingdom. I eliminate financial and utility 
companies from the sample, as the regulations governing those companies are different 
from firms in other sectors (Short and Keasey (1999». In addition, Tobin's Q ratios of the 
financial firms' are not suitable valuation measures for these kind of firms (see Lins 
(2003». 
The initial sample starts with 370 firms per year making a full sample of 1850 from 2003 
through 2007. To avoid sample selection bias, se:veral criteria have been taken into 
.. 
account. First, firms must be listed for at least a year. Second, to alleviate survivorship 
bias, I retain firms that were available at the beginning of the sample period but dropped 
from the indices during the sample period and remained publicly listed. I further require .', 
that each firm have at least two consecutive years of observations over the sample period 
to allow for application of different econometric specifications. -As a result I remain with a 
final full sample of 1965 firm-year after taking into account the exclusion of financial and 
utility firms, missing observations following takeovers, cessation of operation and change 
in listing country outside Europe44• The remaining sample is therefore unbalanced panel. 
Given that the nature of the sample is unbalanced panel and unevenly distributed in each 
country, this may pose potential biasness in the result. In ad.dition, the UK firms 
dominate the sample comprising nearly 25%. To address these issues, a number of factors 
are t~ken into account. First, a number of robustness test are used to check whether the 
". 
44 Firms that are listed outside their national indices, for instance, in the United States only were excluded 
reg~rdless of their country of origin as they are fully subjected to different regulations. . 
93 
results are driven by the large number of UK firms. Second, the imbalance in the sample 
used in this study is relatively moderate with the exception of the sample of UK firms. 
Third, the cross section is significantly large enough making large sample asymptotic 
properties work better. Baltagi and Chang (1994) propose that despite the limitations that 
exist, the second and third arguments should minimise the biasness in the results. 
4.5 Variable definitions 
This section provides the definition of the main corporate governance provisions that are 
used in the construction of the firm-level corporate governance score. 
4.5.1 'Board Provisions 
Split is defined as a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the company separates 
the roles of Chairman and CEO, and zero otherwise. Outside'Directors are defined as' 
non-executives without any financial or, personal ties to company management. Grey 
Directors are non-executives who fail to meet the criteria for being classified as outsiders. 
Inside Directors are those who are full-time executive members of the board. Board 
Independence defined as a dummy variable that takes the val~e of one if the board has 
large number of independent outside directors than inside and grey directors. 
Non-Executive Directors Meeting defined as a dummy variable that takes the value of one 
if the meeting between non-executive directors in the absence of chairman for boards with 
single tier and meeting of the Supervisory Board without chairman/president presence 
took place during the financial year. Chairman-Non-Executive Directors Meeting defined 
as a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the board meeting in the absence of any 
executive director(s) for 'boards with single tier and meeting ~f the Supervisory Board 
without Board of M~nagement present took place during the financial year. Director's 
Training 'is defined as a dummy variable that takes the value of one if availability and 
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attendance of non-executive directors both new and existing in training programmes to , 
enable them to carry out their roles effectively (rel~vant to their duties) within the 
financial year. 
Board Evaluation defined as a dummy variable that takes the value of one if there is a 
formal system to evaluate the board and individual director's performance. Evaluation 
Process defined as a dummy variable that takes the value of one if board engage external 
evaluation parties in undertaking f~rmal board review process. 'Busy I Independent 
Directors is defined as number of Independent outsiders with multiple directorships. 
F~rris, Jagannathan and Pritchard (2003), Fich and Shivdasani (2006) and Jiraporn, Kim 
and Davidson (2008) define a "busy" director as one that holds a total of three or more 
directorships (or, in other words, two or more outside directorships). I therefore, follow 
the definition in identifying Hb~sy If directors. As such Multiple Directorship is dummy 
variable equal to 1 if less than 50% of the independent directors are classified as busy in a 
given year. 
4.5.2 Audit and Disclosure Provisions 
Audit Fee is defined as, a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the amount paid to 
the external auditors for the audit services provided exceeds consulting fees within the 
financial year. A.uditor Independence defined as a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if company's disclosing on the auditor's independence. Audit Committee Expertise 
defined as a dummy variable that takes the value of one if audit committee member is 
identified as a "financial expert" and who is independent. Audit CC!mmittee Independence 
defined as a dummy variable that takes the value of one if audit committee comprises of 
at l~.ast two-third of independent outside directors. 
n' 
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Peer Group defined as a dummy variable that ta~es th,e value of one if the companies 
disclose comparators for comparison purpose in setting up performance benchmark. 
Auditor-Audit Committee Meeting (External Auditor Meeting) defined as. a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the meeting between the external auditor and audit 
committee member(s) with no executive management present took place during the 
financial year. R7lated Party defined as a dummy variable that takes the value of one if 
transactions that firm undertake with other parties that have close ties or related to 
anytime during the financial year are disclosed. In case of no related party transaction, 
one is recorded if the disclosure is made and zero for non-disclosure. 
4.5.3 . Shareholder Rights Provisions 
Proxy Vote is defined as allowance for shareholde~s to be represented by written proxy 
tI 
and presence of appropriate technology to support electronic voting. Vote Withheld is 
defined as the information that firm provide on number of votes that are withheld. Call 
Poll is defined as the right to call a poll in all resolutions at the meeting. Chairmen IS 
Attendance is defined as the presence of chairmen of the major board committees in the 
Annual O'eneral Meeting. Voting Power is defined as proportionality of votes and cash 
flow rights 
4.5.4 Compensation Process Provisions 
Stock Compensation is defined as mandate for directors to own firm's shares. 
Remuneration Committee Independence is defined as the remuneration committee that 
comprises of at least two-third of independent outside directors. Performance Target is 
defined as disclosure of specific numeric performance target. Remuneration Policy is 
defi'ned as a clear outline of policy setting remuneration levels for the non-executive and 
o· 
.. executive directors in the annual report.' 
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4.6 Descriptive Statistics 
4.6.1 Corporate Governance Provisions 
The first descriptive statistics is based on the corporate governance provisions presented 
in Tables 4-2 and Appendix 4-2. The tables present means and full descriptive statistics 
for pooled sample of companies in each country over the sample period from 2003 to 
2007 respectively. The break down in countries allows exploring the sample in detail to 
determine unique features of firm-level corporate governance characteristics in each 
country. The main focus here is on cross country variation of these provisions that are 
used to construct the governance score (GSCORE). The descriptive statistics discussed 
here look at the overall country information, however each firm has been rated 
individually for consistency. 
4.6.2 Board Provisions 
Table 4-2 shows variation ~n firms that separate key positions of Chairman of the board 
and Chief Executive officer with average ranging from 54.74% to 100%. Countries such 
as Denmark, German and Sweden show that all firms in the sample separate those two 
positions. The nature of corporate governance system in German makes it possible to split 
.. 
the, post as all firms follow the two-tier system., This system is also widespread in 
countries such as Denmark, Netherlands, Finland and Belgium with 100%,96.77%,91% 
and 78.13% of firms respectively separating the position. Significant variations are 
observed for firms in which mixed system prevails. For instance while Sweden has 1000/0 
of firms separating the position, on average only 54.74% of French firms do so. In 
countries where unitary system is prevalent such as UK, Spain, Italy and Ireland the 
variation is not very significant ranging from 81.93% in Spain to 93.91 % in the UK. 
n' 
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Ireland and Italy follows with 83.33% and 83.78% of firms separating the positions 
respectively. 
Overall average board size shows German firms to have the largest and Finnish firms the 
smallest with 17.87 and 7.6 members respectively. The presence of workers' 
representative at same proportion makes these boards larger than their respective firms in 
other countries. Firms in German also have large number of outside directors averaging at 
8.83 members, followed by Netherla~ds, France, and Sweden with 7.31, 6.93 and 6.88 
members respec~ively. Italy tops countries popular for unitary board system with an 
average of 6.57 outsiders followed by the UK with 5.96 members while Ireland and Spain 
having close average of 4.82 and 4.75 members respectively. As for insiders sitting on the 
board, firms in Denmark and Finland show predominant features towards two-tier system 
with nearly no insiders having an av~rage of 0.11 and 0.35 me~bers respectively. Ireland, 
,UK, Italy and Spain have relatively large number of insider at the average of 3.88, 3.76, 
3.65 and 2.78 members respectively. The presence of more insiders than other countries' 
can be explained by the prevailing nature of unitary boards that comprise of non-
executive and executive directors. 
,,' 
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Table 4-2 Descriptive Statistics for Corporate Governance Provisions 
This table show means for corporate governance provisions for each country i.e. Belgium, Denmar~· Germany, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden and the UK. The data period is 2003-2007 from the sample of 1065 firm-year. All corporate governance data are hand collected. The corporate governance 
provisions are defined as follows: Split is a dummy identifying firms that separates the roles of Chairman and CEO. Inside Directors are full-time executive members of 
the board. Outside Directors are non-executives without any financial or personal ties to company management. Grey Directors are non-executives who fail to meet the 
criteria for being classified as outsiders. Board Independence as a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the board has large number of independent outside 
directors than inside and grey directors. Board Meetings are the number of annual board of director meetings. Non-Executive Directors Meetings is a dummy identifying 
meeting between non-executive directors in the absence of chairperson for boards with single tier and meeting of the Supervisory Board without chairperson/president: 
during the financial year. Chair-Non-Executive Directors Meeting is a dummy variable identifying board meeting without management presence. Board Evaluation is a 
dummy variable identifying existence of formal system to evaluate the board and individual directors. Evaluation Process is a dummy variable identifying engagement of 
external/independent parties in board review process .. Multiple Directors is a dummy identifying board which has less than 50% of its independent members classified as 
"busy". Audit Fee is a dummy variable identifying fee paid to the single external auditor for the audit services is higher than non-audit. Auditor Independence is a dummy 
identifying firm disclosure on the auditor's independence. Audit Committee Independence is dummy identifying audit committee independence. Audit Committee 
Expertise is a dummy identifying presence of audit committee member identified as a "financial expert" and who is independent. Peer Group is a dummy identifying 
disclosure of firms for comparison purpose in setting up performance benchmark. Auditor-Audit Committee Meeting is a dummy identifying meeting between external 
auditor and audit committee member(s) with no executive management present during the fiscal year. Related Party is a dummy identifying transactions between firm 
and other parties with close ties or related to anytime during the financial year. Proxy Vote is a dummy identifying allowance for shareholders to be represented by 
written proxy and presence of appropriate technology to support electronic voting. Vote Withheld is a dummy variable identifying the information that firm provide on 
number of votes withheld. Call Poll is a dummy identifying the right to call a poll in all resolutions at the meeting. Chairpersons' Attendance is a dummy identifying the 
presence of chairperson of the major board committees in the Annual General Meeting. Voting Power is a dummy identifying proportionality of voting rights. Stock 
Compensation is a dummy identifying mandate for directors to own firm's shares. Remuneration Committee Independence is a dummy identifying the remuneration 
committee independence. Performance Target is a dummy identifying disclosure of specific numeric performance. target. Remuneration Policy is a dummy identifying 
clear outline of policy setting remuneration levels for the non-executive and executive directors in the annual report. 
Mean 
Variable I Belgium German SEain Finland France Ireland Ital~ Netherland Sweden UK Denmark 
Split (%) 78.13 100.00 8l.93 9l.00 " 54.74 83.33 83.78 96.77 100.00 93.91 100.00 
Inside Directors 1.41 0.00 2.78 0.35 1.23 3.88 3.65 0.29 0.85 • 3.76 0.11 
Outside Directors 4.94 8.83 4.75 6.08 6.93 4.82 6.57 7.31 6.88 5.96 5.28 
Grey Directors 5.41 9.05 6.43 1.17 5.44 4.00 4.24 0.71 2.81 l.56 3.73 
Boa!d Independence (%) 37.50 74.55 26.51 99.00 60.58 37.88 43.24, 98.39 95.00 69.89 77.33 
Board Meetings 7.97 5.13 . 10.58 11.79 7.03 8.18 10.00 7.61 9.43 8.32 8.27 
Non-Executive Directors Meetings (%) 7.81 0.00 4.82 0.00 0.00 72.73 16.22 91.94 0.00 59.86 0.00 
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Table 4-2 c~ntinued 
Chair-Non-Executive Directors Meeting (%) 
Non-Executive Directors' Training (%) 
Board Evaluation (%) 
Evaluation Process (%) 
Multiple Directors (%) 
Audit ~ ee (%) 
Auditor Indep~ndence (%) 
Audit Committee Expertise (%) 
Audit Committee Independence (%) 
Peer Group (%) 
Auditor-Audit Committee Meeting (%) 
Related Party (%) 
Proxy Vote (%) 
Vote Withheld (%) 
Call Poll (%) 
Chairpersons' Attendance (%) 
Votil!g Power(~) 
Stock Compensation (%) 
Remuneration Committee Independence (%) 
Performance Target (%) 
Remuneration Policy(%) 
Belgium German Spain Finland France Ireland Italy Netherland Sweden UK Denmark 
0.00 23.64 . 0.00 24.00 5.84 72.73 0.00 
7.81 15.45 7.23 0.00 29.93 68.18 0.00 
20.31 87.27 27.71 100.00 91.97 80.30 32.43 
0.00 14.55 8.43 11.00 10.22 0.00 13.51 
6·8.75 50.91 57.83 36.00 37.96 74.24 48.65 
64.06 - 100.00 95.18 85.00 96.35 74.24 67.57 
7.81 58.18 95.18 42.00 48.91 28.79 100.00 
14.06· 50.91 0.00 56.00 37.96 71.21 43.24 
65.63 100.00 12.05 86.00 83.21 37.88 97.30 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
37.50 84.55 25.30 66.00 56.20 60.61 43.24 
57.81 100.00 97.59 63.00 85.40 84.85 100.00 
96.88 100.00 100.00. 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 36.36 0.00 . 
0.00 ,0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.58 0.00 
0.00 23.64 13.25 78.00 16.79 68.18 70.27 
96.88 100.00 100.00 57.00 91.97 100.00 86.49 
51.56 100.00 0.00 95.00 100.00 84.85 100.00 
57.81 95.45 14.46 ·71.00 78.83 28.79 59.46 
0.00 0.00 0.00 14.00 0.00 15.15 0.00 
84.38 97.27 93.98 97.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
100 
17.74 
58.06 
74.19 
3.23 
19.35 
80.65 
45.16 
80.65 
85.48 
74.19 
59.68 
72.58 
90.32 
12.90 
12.90 
46.77 
100.00 
100.00 
70.97 
40.32 
91.94 
13.00 59.14 6.67 
24.00 51.61 9.33 
96.00 84.59 81.33 
3.00 22.58 4.00 
8.00 53.76 38.67 
89.00 58.42 94.67 
20.00 50.54 84.00 
19.00 78.85 34.67 
100.00 74.55, 49.33 
0.00 50.54 . 0.00 
100.00 58.78 64.00 
55.00 77.06 100.00 
100.00 97.85 100.00 
0.00 21.86 0.00 
0.00 26.88 0.00 
94.00 66.67 29.33 
35.00 100.00 66.67 
90.00 87.46 100.00 
93.00 68.46 60.00 
0.00 30.11 0.00 
95.00 95.70 90.67 
The descriptive statistics in the Table 4-2 also show that countries that are predominantly 
two-tier comprise many independent directors. For instance 99% of Finnish and 98.39% 
of Netherlands' firms have independent boards. The average board independence is also 
high for firms in Sweden, Denmark and Germany at 95%, 77.33 and 74.55% respectively. 
On the other hand, firms in Italy, Ireland, Belgium and Spain show the lowest levels of 
board independence with averages at 43.24%, 37.88%, 37.5% and 26.51 % respectively. 
As for the UK firms, 69.89% of boards have independent non-executive directors as 
majority. Similarly, French firms have relatively large number of in?ependent directors at 
60.58%. As such, concentration of power in the hands of one person does not 
significantly affect board composition in these firms. 
The independence of European boards is also affected by the proportion of independent 
. . 
directors with multiple directorships who are classified as 'busy'. On average, Irish and 
Belgian firms have highest proportion of 'busy' directors at 74.24% and 68.75% 
respectively. In my sample, more than half of the firms in Spain, UK and Germany have 
outsiders with multiple directorships with Italy coming very close to 50% mark. Swedish 
firins have exceptionally low proportion o~ 'busy' directors with an average of 8% with 
Dutch, Finnish, French and Danish firms following with averages of 19.35%, 36%, 
37.96% and 38.67% respectively .. 
Table 4-2 also shows that Non-executive directors' meetings are not common in majority 
of countries in the sample. From the eleven countries, firms in Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Spain and United Kingdom· only indicate existence of those meetings. However there is a 
significant variation in those meetings for the countries that report with an average of 
"91.94% in Netherland a~ the highest and 4.82% in Spain at the lowest point. The Table 
also shows Belgium and Italy to have. relatively .low average meetings with 7.81 % and 
I ~.22% of the firms respectively undertaking them. Firms in UK and Ireland have also 
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higher reporting rate of the meetings with averages of 59.86% and 72.73% respectively. 
However, Tables in appendix 4-2 indicate that the median rate is relatively high for 
Ireland, Netherlands and UK at 100%; 
In my sample, meeting between chairman of the board and non-executive directors appear 
to be more common with eight (8) countries reporting them. There is a considerable 
variation in the average meetings among these countries. Firms in Finland, Germany, 
Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and France have the smallest ranging between 24% as the 
highest and 5.86% as the lowest. However, the UK and Ireland have the highest average 
at 59.14% and 72.73% respectively. The median values in Appendix 4-2 for UK and 
Ireland are even higher at 100%, suggesting that the average value for the UK is affected 
by the broader coverage that captures a more diverse set of firms compared to Ireland. 
. . 
As shown in the Table 4-2 and Appendix 4-2, 'the mean number of training and 
development programme for non-executive directors exist in nine (9) of the eleven (11) 
countries in the sample. Ireland, Netherlands and UK have the highest tendency to arrange 
trainings for new and existing directors with mean (median) value of 68.8% (100%), 
58.06% (100%) and 51.61 % (100%) of firms reporting presence of trainings. Firms in 
France, Sweden and German indicate fewer such arrangement exist with averages of 
29.93%, 24% and 15.45%. The trend is even lower in Denmark, Belgium and Spain with 
only 9.33%,7.81% and 7.23% of firms outline existence of training opportunities. 
The sample also indicates significant level of evaluation of board performance. and 
effectiveness in European firm. Overall mean for sample ranges from a low 0['20.31 %, 
27.71% and 32.43% for Belgium, Spain and Italy to a high of 100% for Finland. The 
mean percentages for remaining countries are relatively higher. Board evaluation in the 
,,' 
.. Sweden, France, Germany, UK, Denmark, Ireland and Netherlands stands at averages of 
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96%,91.97%, 87.27%, 84.59%, 81.33%, 80.3%, and 74.19% of firms respectively. This 
shows a significant desire for firms to review boards' operations and performance. 
Despite higher levels of board evaluation, further exploration of the process gives a 
different picture of the ·sample. On average number of firms undertaking board evaluation 
using external consultants or advisors is significantly low. In the UK, external parties are 
employed to conduct evaluation process at an average of 22.58% of firms which is the. 
highest in the sample with Ireland and .Belgium having none. Such reviews also take place 
in the Germany, France, Spain, Denmark and Netherlands at the average of 14.55%, 
10.22%, 8.43%, 4% and 3.23% of firms respectively.' Surprisingly, Italy which has 
relatively low number of firms undertaking evaluation process, employ external 
consultants in about a half of those firms. 
4.6.3 Audit and Disclosure Provi~ions 
. 'The audit fee)ooks at the remuneration paid to the external auditor for audit and non-audit 
works. The sample indicates that majority of. firms in all countries pay less for non-audit 
(consulting) work than audit. On average, Germany firms are on the lower end with 100% 
of firms pay less for non-audit work and UK higher with only 58.42% of firms. French, 
Spanish and Danish" firms follow closely with averages of 96.35%, 95.18% and 94.67% 
respectively paying low non-audit fee than audit to the external auditors. Italy and 
Belgium follow closely as countries with higher num~er of firms paying inore on non-
audit works with only 67.57% and 64.06% of firms respectively paying higher audit fees. 
The sample also shows great variation for firms that disclose auditor's independence 
.ranging between 100% for Italian and 7.81 % for Belgian firms. Overall, there is little 
disclosure of auditor ind~pendence for Irish, Swedish and Finnish firms which on average 
,., . 
. , 42%,28.79%, and.20% provide for such information. On the top end, Spanish firms show 
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, relatively higher level of disclosure with an average 95.18% followed closely with Danish 
with 84%. Germany and UK also have more than half of sample firms that provide 
information for auditor independence with averages of 58.18% and 50.54%'respectively. 
Employing qualified audit committee financial expert is not a norm in majority of 
European firms. The sample show significant acceptability in some countries while 
uncommon in majority. Netherlands and UK have the highest presence of independent 
members with financial expertise serving on audit committees at averages of 80.65% and 
78.85% of firms respectively. Irish firms follow closely with 71.21 % of audit committees 
having financial expert member. In contrast, the level is very low in continental European 
firms ranging from non-existence in Spain to 43.24% in Italy. There is also little presence 
in France, Denmark, Sweden and Belgium having averages of 37.96%, 34.67%, 19% and 
14.06% respectively. 
The sample indicates that the audit committees are populated by a significant number of 
) 
independent directors in firms from eight (8) of the eleven (11) countries. Germany and 
Swedish firms have 100% of thei~ audit committees categorised as independent. Italy 
-
follow closely with 97.30%~ Netherlands and UK have 80.65% and 78.85% of firms 
respectively with independent audit committee. The trend is significantly different for 
Spanish firms which have very few independent audit committees with an average of 
12.05%. The data also re~eals that Irish and Danish firms have relatively few independent 
audit committees which average at 37.88% and 49.33% respectively. 
Another aspect of audit and disclosure is the meeting between the external auditor and the 
audit committee with no executive directors present. This is well implemented in some 
countries and very uncommon in some. On average, 100% of Swedish firms conduct 
.. those private meeti~gs while only 25.3% of Spanish firms do so. The sample shows that 
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majority of countries have at least more than half of the firms that arrange private 
meetings between auditors and the audit committee. Italian and Belgian firms have 
relatively few meetings which average at 43.24% and 37.50% respectively. 
The sample indicates higher levels of disclosure for transactions between related parties. 
Normally, firms can disclose or exempt themselves not to disclose details of transactions 
with other members of the group or subsidiary. In the sample, over 50% of firms disclose 
transactions with related parties with Germany, Italy and Denmark having disclosure of 
100%. Spanish, French, Irish and the UK firms also have relatively higher disclosure 
levels in the sample with 97.59%, 85.4%, 84.85% and 77.06% of them disclosing. The 
remaining firms especially in the UK indicate that they have taken advantage of the 
exemption not to disclose transactions. 
4.6.4 Shareholder Rights Provisions 
. This section of the descriptive statistics looks at firm behaviour towards their 
shareholders. That is rights for shareholdersto vote and question firm's decision in their 
. , 
respective meetings with management and/or the board. The sample shows that proxy 
voting is highly acceptable in all the countries with around 90% of the firms or more 
allow this practice:' Majority of the firms in sample fully endorse proxy voting. With 
exception of9.58% of firms in Netherlands which failed to disclose that shareholders may 
be represented by written proxy and have technology in place to support electronic voting, 
almost all firms provide for means to undertake. 
Firms in the sample from five countries; Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Spain and the 
.. UK appear to fully endorse 'one share, one vote' principle. Deviation from this principle 
is significant in Swedish firm only 35% following it and majority tend to have mUltiple 
". 
.. and/or special voting rights. Some ot French, Italian and Belgian firms also implement 
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double or multiple voting rights which may influence voting outcomes. However, 
majority of the firms in the sample adhere to the 'one· share, orie vote' principle with 
96.88%, 91.91 %, 86.49%, and 66.67% of Belgian, French, Italian and Danish firms 
respectively. 
The disclosure of voting outcomes and ability of shareholders to vote for each resolution 
is not common in European countries and sample covered in this study. This disclosure is 
rarely practised during the sample period with the exception of firms in the Ireland and 
UK having the highest level of disclosure at lowly 36.36% and 21.86% for vote withheld 
and 7.58% and 26.88% for calling polls respectively. In majority of the sample, there is 
no or insufficient disclosure on this aspect. 
Another area of disclosure that receives considerable variation is chairmen's attendance in 
the AGM. The presence of chairmen of board's committees allows shareholders to raise 
. issues during the meetings. Firms in Sweden show higher levels of attendance at 94% and 
Belgium counterparts with no firm indicating chairpersons' do atten~. Firms in Spain, 
France, Germany and Denmark also have relatively low attendance with. only 13.25%, 
16.79%, 23.64% and 29.33% respectively. In contrast, firms in the UK, Ireland, Italy and 
Finland have significantly higher attendance reported at an average of 66.67%, 68.18%, 
70.27%, and 78% respectively . 
. 4.6.5 Remuneration Provisions 
This part discusses the disclosure aspect of firms' remuneration policy, structure and 
process. In the sample, majority of firms covered disclose existence of shareholding 
.. programme that encourage executive directors to own shares in their respective 
companies with the exception of Spanish firms. All firms in countries such as Denmark, 
,,' 
.. France, Germany, Italy and Netherlands provide disclosures that require executive 
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directors to build up shareholding in their firms. There is also significant level of 
disclosure in Finland,' Sweden, UK and Ireland with average of 95%, 90%, 87.46% and 
84.850/0 of firms respectively providing for such a policy. Firms in Belgium also show a 
relatively low disclosure with an average 51.56% disclosing. 
The involvement of independent directors in the remuneration committees is observed in 
a number of countries in the sample. At 95.45% and 95% on average respectively, 
German and Finnish firms have the m.ajority of remuneration committee composed of at 
least to-third independent outsiders. Swedish, French, Dutch and English firms also show 
higher levels of independence with average of 93%,· 78.83%, 70.97% and 68.46% 
respectively having independent remuneration committee. However, firms in Ireland and 
Spain lag far behind the rest with average of only 28.79% and 14.46% respectively . 
. Another aspect of remu~eration is how it is tied to performance. Although this is common 
. in many companies, there is unique feature for some firms to provide specific numerical 
performance target. Firms in Netherlands and the ~UK tend to employ this feature at 
relatively low level with average of 40.32% and 30.11 % respectively. The disclosure is 
also lower in Irish and Finnish firms with average of 15.15% and 14% respectively. 
However, the disclosure is relatively uncommon in ~ajority of firms in the sample. 
Disclosure of information on firm's remuneration policy attracts more attention in the 
sample covered. The overall level of disclosure on the policy is relatively higher in all the 
countries. Belgium is the only country where disclosure on remunerat~on policy is lagging 
behind with an average of 84.38% of firms providing for it. For the remaining countries in 
the sample, 91 % of the firms or higher disclose the existence of the policy. Sufficient 
level of disclosure indicates that codes' requirements on remuneration policy' which 
" . 
.. applies by most EU Members States is well implemented. 
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4.7 Corporate Governance Score - Sorted by Total Assets 
This section carries out descriptive statistics sorted by the size of the firm, as measured by 
Total Assets. I sort data using Total Assets for a number of reasons. First, previous studies 
have used total assets as a p~oxy for the degree of information asymmetry. As such, lung, 
Kim and Stulz (1996) argue that large firms are followed more closely by analysts and 
have more stringent reporting requirements. Second, this method of sorting company data 
is standard in corporate finance studies. Therefore, my expectation is that measure of firm 
size would reflect the corporate governance rating. I expect that those firms with large 
size to be associated with high corporate governance rating. Conversely, relative small 
si~e firms would have lower rating. The implication is that, because corporate governance 
rating is based on the level of compliance and disclosure large firms have resources and 
expertise to accommodate those costs in relative terms 
, Table 4-3 presents pooled descriptive statistics of corporate governance indices for the 
sample sorted by Total Assets. Figure 4-1 present the mean value of corporate governance 
scores for countries sorted by Total Assets. I present the descriptive statistics in quartiles 
where quartile 1 consists of those firms with the lowest Total Asset value in the sample 
and quartile 4 has .. the highest Total Asset values. The data is analysed by corporate 
'governance scores and for countries. I group data into sub-scores and separate on country 
basis. In this way, I can highlight overall characteristics of data in my sample and unique 
features for individual countries. 
Table 4-3 presents the pooled descriptive statistics for corporate governance score and 
sub-scores derived from corporate governance provisions. It is clearly seen from the 
pooled sample an obvious trend from the quartiles that corporate governance scores 
improve with increase in firms' size. rhis follows expectations that the largest firms will 
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have resources '~md expertise to undertake governance changes required by regulations. 
However, variation in corporate governance scores is higher between firms in different 
quartiles of sub-scores than overall corporate governance score. 
Table 4-3A presents the pooled descriptive statistics for Board sub:score derived from the 
board provisions. For the board score few patterns can be observed from the data. The 
smallest sized firms (Q1) have the average score of 47.31 %. The range here is quite high 
with the minimum score of zero and the maximum being 88%. For Q4, the average board 
score is slightly higher than the nearest Q3 at the average of 50.29%. However, the range 
is considerably higher at 100%. The pattern drawn from these score is that the average 
board scores show slight increase as the firms' size increase. 
,,' 
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Table 4-3 Corporate Governance Indices by Total Assets 
The tables below present the descriptive statisti~s for corporate governance score and sub-scores derived from corporate governance provisions extracted in the annual 
reports, reference documents, form 20-F and investor relations section on the firm's website. The data sample consists of 1065 European firms from 11 countries. The 
data period is 2003-2007. Here firms are sorted by Total Assets where Quartile 1 is the lowest value~ of Asset and Quartile 4 is the highest Asset values. All values are in 
percentages 
A. Board Sub-Score B. Audit Sub- Score 
Quartiles Mean Std Min Max Quartiles Mean Std Min Max 
1 . 47.31 19.52 0 88 50.95 20.82 0 86 
2 48.23 20.77 0 100 2 56.56 19.67 0 100 
3 49.31 21.62 0 100 3 60.2 18.48 0 100 
4 50.29 20.69 0 100 4 68.13 18.92 14 100 
c~ Shareholder Rights Sub- Score D. Compensation Sub-Score 
Quartiles I Mean Std Min Max Quartiles Mean Std Min Max 
48.63 16.31. 0 100 60.34 21.94 0 100 
2 48.63 17.42 20 100 2 62.41 20.57 0 100 
3 49.28 17.13 20 100 3 65.56 20 0 100 
4 53.41 16.61 20 100 4 70.61 16.72 25 100 
E. GScore 
Quartiles Mean Std Min Max 
50.84 14.26 0 79 
2 53.15 13.87 13 92 
3 55.19- 13.74 17 83 
4 59.53 13.97 29 92 
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For the audit scores in Table 4-3B, the same pattern is observed as for the board score 
above. The average score for smallest firms (QI) is lower than the score for the largest 
firms (Q4). The main difference being that the difference between the two is much higher 
than previous. The table shows that the smallest firms (Q I) have the average score of 
50.95% whereas the largest (Q4) are averaged at ~8.13%. The range here is similar but 
with contrasting features. The minimum score for smallest firms is zero and the highest is 
86%, but the range for Q4 is also 86% having the maximum of 100% and minimum of 
14%. 
Table 4-3C presents descriptive statistics for shareholders right. The average score for 
firms in Q 1 is 48.63% for shareholders right score and the range is 100%. While for Q4 
the average score is 53.41 % and the range is ~O%. The pattern show consiste!lt increase in 
average score relative to firm size. "The range also show sligh't decrease with firms from 
. Q2 to Q4 indicating a higher minimum score compared to Q 1 with a difference of 20%. 
Again the difference between the smallest firms and largest in the sample is relatively 
small. 
For the compensation score presented in Table 4-30, the pattern that can be observed is 
the same as the Audit score where the difference between the average scores for the firms 
in Q4 is greater than QI by a large margin. From the table the firms in QI have average 
score of 6034% and the range is 100%. For Q4 the average score is 70.61 % and the range 
is 75%. The minimum score for largest firms is higher than for the rest. The table also 
shows that on average, firms of similar size score well in their compensation provisions 
relative to other scores. 
Figure 4-1.1 presents graphical descriptive of average board scores for each country 
'f' 
.. sorted by Total Assets. These graphical presentations provide a more insight account of 
111 
the data in the'sample. Interestingly, the graph shows that smallest firms (Ql) in the 
sample from Germany have significantly higher scores than largest (Q4). For Ql the 
average score is 79.33% while for Q4 the average score is 47.23%. Also the trend for 
individual countries is not consistent with the exception of the Ireland, Italy and the UK 
where the scores increase with size. 
For the audit and disclosure score the trend seen previously shows no difference. Smallest 
firms (QI) in Germany and Denmark have higher average scores than the largest (Q4). 
, . 
The average score for Ql is 86% and 59.74% while for Q4 is 71% and 57% in Germany 
and Denmark respectively. Again, the trend for other countries does not tell us much 
about the average scores and size. Firms in Finland and France are exception to this as a 
particular pattern is observed in, which the average score increase with size. 
From the shareholder rights graphs, interesting observation on average scores is captured. 
, Although the pattern shows Q4 to be larger than Q I, the average values for Q2, Q3 and 
Q4 all show similar score. Smallest firms (Q I) in France have higher average scores than 
the largest (Q4). The average score for Q 1 is 50% while for Q4 is 44%. For the rest of the 
countries in the sample with the exception of the UK, the pattern is not very clearly 
observed. 
The compensation average scores for Sweden indicates no difference between the 
smallest firms (Ql) in the sample and the largest (Q4). The average score value for both is 
70%. The average value for firms in Belgium and Finland show specific pattern relating 
to score and size. From the graph, no particular pattern is observed in other countries 
similar to p~evious governance provisions. 
n' 
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4.8 Corporate Governance Score Sorted by Tobin's Q 
Next I perform sort of data based upon the Tobin's Q and the data do not show obvious 
pattern. The sort choice is based on the theoretical grounds that corporate governance 
influences the value of the firm as measured by Tobin's Q. The latter is also standard 
metric in corporate finance studies and a suitable measure of corporate value. Through 
this sort, it allows me to assess whether higher scores corresponds to higher corporate 
value. I therefore have a first look at the nature of sample data. My expectation is that 
firms with higher Tobin's Q will have corresponding higher corporate governance score. 
Based on this intuition I would expect that firms grouped in higher quartiles to have 
higher scores. Contrary, firms in lower quartile are expected to have lower corporate 
governance score and sub-score. 
It 
Table 4-4 present the descriptive statistics of the corporate governance score and sub-
, scores sorted by Tobin's Q. Table 4-4A shows the descriptive statistics of the Board sub-
score sorted by Tobin's Q. F~r those firms in quartile 1 the average Board Sub-score is 
43.45% and in quartile 4, the average is 49.73%. The range for both Ql and Q4scores 
, . 
is 100%. Interestingly, Board scores with respect to Tobin's Q do not provide a clear-cut 
picture. T~e scores .~how gradual increase from Q 1 to Q3 and decline in Q4. 
Table 4-4B also presents the descriptiv'e statistics of the Audit and Disclosure sub-score 
sorted by Tobin's Q. Again those firms with higher Tobin's Q show greater score. Audit 
score for firms with the largest Tobin's Q is higher than those firms with lower Tobin's Q. 
For those firms in quartile 1 the average Audit score is 55.64% and in quartile 4, the 
average Audit score is 60.21. The range for Q 1 firms is 86% and Q4 is 100%. The pattern 
here is in ascending order from the lower to third quartile, and then descends in the fourth 
quartile. 0' 
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: Table 4-4 CorpJrate Governance Scores by Tobin's Q 
The tables below present the descriptive statistics for corporate governance score and sub-score. It shows the observations mean value, median value, standard deviation 
value, and minimum and maximum value (s) in column one. The data sample consists of 1065 European firms from 11 countries. The data period is 2003-2007. Tobin's Q 
defined as the ratio of market value to book value of assets (market value of assets is computed as market value of equity pI us book value of assets minus book value of 
equity). Here firms are sorted by Tobin's Q where Quartile 1 is the lowest values of Tobin's Q and Quartile 4 is the highest Tobin's Q values. All values are in percentages. 
A. Board Sub-Score B. Audit and Disclosure Sub-Score 
Quartiles Mean Std Min Max Quartiles Mean Std Min Max 
1 , 43.45 18.84 0.00 100.00 55.64 18.52 0.00 86.00 
2 49.65 21.05 0.00 100.00 2 59.66 20.29 0.00 100.00 
3 52.47 20.29 13.00 100.00 3 60.46 19.98 0.00 100.00 
4 49.73 21.47 0.00 100.00 ~ 4 60.21 22.54 0.00 100.00 
C. Shareholder Ri hts Sub-Score D. Com ensation Sub-Score 
Quartiles Mean Std Min Max Quartiles Mean Std Min Max 
1 44.90 14.06 .20.00 100.00 1 64.51 19.17 0.00 100.00 
2 50.90 18.58 20.00 100.00 2 65.39 19.91 0.00 100.00 
3 53.71 16.34 20.00 100.00 3 65.63 19.83 0.00 100.00 
4 50.61 17.53 0.00 -100.00 4 63.44 22.00 0.00 100.00 
E. GScore 
Quartiles Mean Std Min Max 
1 50.83 12.78 13.00 83.00 
2 55.47 14.46 21.00 92.00 
3 57.25 13.48 25.00 88.00 
4 55.29 15.65 0.00 88.00 
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Table 4-4C presents the descriptive statistics of the Shareholde'rs Rights sub-score sorted 
by Tobin's Q. The table shows consistent pattern from quartile 1 to quartile 3 with the 
higher quartile indicates higher scores. Further, firms in quartile 1 have lower average 
Shareholders Rights score of 44.90% compared to quartile 4 at average Shareholders 
Rights of 50.61 %. Therange for both Ql is 80%. 
Table 4-40 also presents the descriptive statistics of the Compensation sub-score sorted 
by Tobin's Q. The table shows similar pattern from previous Table in which firms with 
higher quartiles increase in score from quartile 1 to quartile 3 'then decline in quartile 4. 
Firms in quartile 1 have average score of 64.51 % and quartile 4 with average Q of 
63.44%. The range for both Ql and Q4 is 100%. 
Figure 4-2 show graphical presentation of the mean values o~f corporate governance sub-
scores by Tobin's Q and country. For each country in the sample, the graphical 
presentations of the quartiles intend to highlight nature of this information in details. 
Figure 4-2.1 presents mean values of Board sub-score. The figure shows that there is 
inconsistency in relation to quartiles and Board scores. While Belgian, Germany and 
Swedish firms show gradual increase from Q 1 to Q3 then decrease in Q4, the rest of the 
countries do not show a regular pattern. Further, the figures show that average score in Q 1 
and Q4 is similar at 62%. In addition, quartiles ,I for firms in Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany and Italy show higher values than quartile 4. 
Figure 4-2.2 shows the mean values of the Audit and Disclosure score for countries in the 
sample. Of the all the countries, only Germany firms show c~nsistency in with higher 
quartile correspond to the higher score values. Further, trend shows that firms that are in 
quartile 1 from Belgium" Finland, Germany, Ireland and Italy have scores greater that 
,., . 
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quart~le 4. This pattern can also be observed in. the Figure 4-2.3 and 4-2.4 which also 
shows inconsistent values of Shareholders Right and Compensation Scores respectively. 
4.9 Stock Return Synchronicity 
This section analyses the ranking of countries in the sample by stock price synchronicity 
as measured by RJ . In measuring country's stock market synchronicity, I follow Morck, 
Yeung and Yu (2000) method. I estimate firm specific return variation 1:lsing two-factor 
international model. The model which includes both the 19cal and US market index 
returns is as follows: 
Where r il is stock i's return in week (month) t (in country}), and rm,j,1 is the local market 
t> 
index, r is the u.s. market index return (a proxy for the global market). Here measure 
U.S.,I 
country's stock market synchronici~y using average R2 for each year for all countries in 
the sample. 
Table 4-5 presents summary statistics for average RJ using weekly and monthly total . 
return index which includes dividends and price changes. The table shows stock market 
synchronicity by country from firm-level regressions. The table indicates that RJ for 
countries in the sample is much closer using weekly than monthly returns. The RJ using 
monthly return ranges from 16% in Ireland to 39% in Germany. This suggests that stock 
prices in countries with higher RJtend to move together (Morck,.Yeung and Yu (2000» . 
. " . 
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Table 4-5 Country Ranking by Stock Market Synchronicity 
The table below show summary statistics for 11 countries' stock market synchronicity, measured as the 
average R2 of firm-level regressions of monthly stock include dividends. 
Country R2j (Monthly) Country R2j (Weekly) 
Ireland 0.16 Ireland 0.18 
Denmark 0.24 Belgium 0.22 
Belgium 0.25 U.K. 0.24 
U.K. 0.26 Finland 0.25 
Finland 0.27 Denmark 0.27 
France 0.28 Spain 0.28 
Netherland 0.28 France 0.30 
Spain 0.30 Italy 0.32 
Italy 0.33 Netherland" 0.33 
Sweden 0.37 Sweden 0.35 
Germany 0.39 Germany 0.36 
The RJ using weekly total return are much more closer to the one calculated by Jin and 
Myers (2006) in terms of values but inconsistent on rankings. The tables indicates that the 
range is smaller than for weekly ranging from 18% to 36% with Ireland and Germany 
occupying both ends respectively. the table also shows that Belgium and the UK to 
follow closely at 2}% and 24% respectively. In contrast, Italy and Netherlands are much 
closer to Germany with average RJ values of32%"and 33% respectively. 
4.10 Summary and Conclusion 
The data analysis and descriptive statistics underlie a number of issues in the sample of 
European firms. First, size of firms has significant impact on the implementation of 
.. corporate governance changes that took place in the sample of countries covered. 
Although the sample selection is based on firm size, there are still significant differences 
,," 
.. between them. However, there are also contradictory indications that in some countries 
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size are not significantly important. This may warranty further investigation. Second there 
is indication that corporate governance is important aspect in enhancing firm value. This 
indication however is not as clear as expected. For this reason, subsequent empirical 
chapter provide in depth analysis of these early findings .. 
The relevance of this chapter is to provide the insight on data and how the corporate 
governance· scores have been created. Since there is no universal methodology for 
developing corporate governance indices, new inventions which fill the weaknesses of 
previous ones focusing on firm-level is essential. With respect to firm information 
environment, the earlier indicati~n at country-level is not clear-cut relative to previous 
studies. This also warranty further investigations. 
". 
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Appendix 4.1: Firm-level Corporate Governance Provisions 
The Table below provide list of corporate governance provisions (attributes) used in the construction of the 
corporate governance score. 
Board: Describes Board policies, structure and composition 
1. Split: CEO and Chairperson positions are separated 
2. Board Independence: Board with large number of independent non-executive directors 
3. Non-executives Meeting: Non-executive directors meet without chairman of the board and executives 
present 
4. Chairman-Non-executives Meeting: Chairman of the board and Non-executive directors meet without 
executive directors present 
5. Training Policy: Training programmes for new and existing directors exist and are conducted once a 
year 
6. Board Evaluation: Formal system 0' evaluating board performance, procedures and effectiveness is in 
place, and is conducted yearly 
7. Evaluation Process: The Board of Directors engages external evaluation parties to perform assessment 
reviews its performance. 
8. Multiple Directorships: Less than 50% of independent outsiders have commitment in two.or more 
outside boards. 
Disclosure and Audit: Provide information affecting performance criteria, issues related to working of and 
.. compensation for external auditors and audit committee. 
9. Auditor Fees: Consulting fees paid to auditor is less than audit fee paid to the auditor 
10. Auditor Independence: External auditor offer written confirmation that it considers itself independent, 
and information is disclosed in the annual report 
11. Audit Committee: Audit committee composed of at least two-third independent outsiders 
12. Audit Committee Expertise: Audit committee comprise of at least a member clearly identified as an 
independent financial expert. 
13. External Audito~ Meeting: External auditor meet with the Audit Committee without executive present 
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14. Peer Group: Disclosure of peers (comparators) groups/companies for performance benchmark exist 
15. Related Party: Disclose details of transactions with its subsidiary undertakings and other related parties 
Shareholder rights: Describes shareholders rights in voting and company's responsibilities towards their 
shareholder 
16. Proxy vote: Proxy voting is possible and technology to support voting exist 
17. Call Poll: Right for all shareholders' resolutions to be decided on a poll 
18. Vote Withheld: Disclosure of the voting outcome on each resolution, including votes withheld 
( abstained) 
19. Chairmen Attendance: Chairmen of the board committees attend the Annual General Meeting and are 
available to answer questions from shareholders 
20. Voting Power: All shareholders have similar voting rights (No shares carry special rights) 
Remuneration Policy and Process: Address issues related to remuneration committees and policies 
21. Stock compensation: Directors are subject to establish and maintain a minimum personal shareholding 
22. Committee Independence: Remuneration committee composed of at least two-third independent 
outsiders 
23. Performance target: Specific numerical performance target 
24. Remuneration Policy: Presence of a clear outlined policy on setting remuneration in the annual report 
,," 
120 
~. 
Appendix 4~2 Descriptive Statistics for Corporate Governance Provisions by 
Country . 
The .tables below show descriptive statistics for corporate governance provisions for each country i.e. 
BelgIUm, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK. The 
data period is 2003-2007 from the sample of 1065 firm-year. All corporate governance data are hand 
collected from company annual reports, reference documents and company's investor relations section in 
!he websites. The corporate governance provisions are defined as follows: Split is a dummy variable 
Identifying firms that separates the roles of Chairman and CEO. Inside Directors are full-time executive 
members of the board. Outside Directors are non-executives without any financial or personal ties to 
company management. Grey Directors are non-executives who fail to meet the criteria for being classified 
as outsiders. Board Independence is the board with large number of independent outside directors. Board 
Meetings are the number of annual board of director meetings. Non-Executive Directors Meetings is a 
dummy variable identifying meeting between non-executive directors in the absence of chairperson for 
boards with single tier and meeting of the Supervisory Board without chairperson/president being present 
during the financial year. Chair-Non-Executive Directors Meeting is a dummy variable identifying board 
meeting without management presence. Board Evaluation is a dummy variable identifying existence of 
formal system to evaluate the board and individual directors. Evaluation Process is a dummy variable 
identifying engagement of external/independent parties in board review process. Multiple Directors is a 
dummy variable identifying board which has less than 50% of its independent members classified as 
"busy". Audit Fee is a dummy variable identifying fee paid to the single external auditor for the audit 
services is higher than non-audit. Auditor Independence is a dummy variable identifying firm disclosure on· 
the auditor's independence. Audit Committee Independence is a dummy variable identifying audit 
committee independence. Audit Committee Expertise is a dummy variable identifying presence of audit 
co~mittee member identified as a "financial expert:' and who is .indep~ndent. Peer Group is a dummy 
vanable identifying disclosure of firms for comparison purpose m settmg up performance benchmark. 
Auditor-Audit Committee Meeting is a dummy variable identifying meeting between external auditor and 
audit committee member(s) with no exe,yutive management present d~ring. the fiscal. year. Related Party is a 
du~my variable identifying transaction~ between firm a~d oth~r pa~l~s with close ties or related to anytime 
durmg the financial year. Proxy Vote IS a dummy variable Identlfymg allowance for shareholders to be 
represented by written proxy and presence of appropriate technology to support electronic voting. Vote 
Withheld is a dummy variable identifying the infor~ation that firm pro~ide on numb.er of votes withheld. 
Call Poll is a dummy variable identifying the right to call a poll In all resolutions at the meeting. 
Chairpersons' Attendance is a dummy variable identifying the presence of chairperson of the major board 
committees in the Annual General Meeting. Voting P~wer ~s a ~u~my variable iden~ifying proportionality 
of voting rights. Stock Compensation is a dummy v~rlable Identlfymg. mand~te f~r ~Irectors to own firm's 
shares. Remuneration Committee Independence IS a dummy variable Identlfymg the remuneration 
committee independence. Performance Target. is . a dummy vari~ble i.denti.fyi.ng disclosur~ of specific 
numeric performance target. Remuneration p.oltcy IS a du~my ~arlable .Identlfymg clear outline of policy 
setting remuneration levels for the non-executive and executive directors m the annual report. 
I Bel ium 
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max 
Split (%) 78.13 100.00 41.67 0.00 100.00 
Inside Directors 1.41 1.00 0.89 0.00 4.00 
Outside Directors 4.94 4.00 2.71 0.00 11.00 
Grey Directors 5.41 5.00 2.85 1.00 13.00 
Board Independence (%) 37.50 0.00 48.80 0.00 100.00 
Board Meetings 7.97 7.00 2.89 4.00 ' 19.00 
Non-Executive Directors Meetings (%) 7.81 0.00 27.05 0.00 100.00 
Chair-Non-Executive Directors Meeting (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Non-Executive Directors' Training (%) 7.81 0.00 . 27.05 0.00 100.00 
Board Evaluation (%) 20.31 0.00 40.55 0.00 100.00 
Evaluation Process (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Multi Ie Directors (% 68.75 100.00 46.72 0.00 100.00 
.. Audit Fee (%) 64.06 100.00 48.36 0.00 100.00 
Auditor Independ~nce (%) 7.81 0.00 27.05 0.00 100.00 
Audit Committee Expertise (%) 14.06 0.00 35.04 0.00 100.00 
Audit Committee Independence (%) 65.63 100.00 47.87 0.00 100.00 
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Mean Median SD Min Max 
Peer Group (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Auditor-Audit Committee Meeting (%) 37.50 0.00 48.80 0.00 100.00 
Related Party (%) 57.81 100.00 49.78 0.00 100.00 
Proxy Vote (%) 96.88 100.00 17.54 0.00 . 100.00 
Vote Withheld (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Call Poll (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Chairpersons' Attendance (%) 0.00 0.00 • 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Voting Power (%) 96.88 100.00 17.54 0.00 100.00 
Stock Compensation (%) 51.56 100.00 50.37 0.00 100.00 
Remuneration Committee Independence (%) 57.81 100.00 49.78 0.00 100.00 
Performance Target (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Remuneration Policy (%) 84.38 100.00 36.60 0.00 100.00 
,I 
,,' 
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II) Denmark 
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max 
Split (%) 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Inside directors 0.11 0.00 O.SI 0.00 4.00 
Outside directors S.28 6.00 1.49 1.00 8.00 
Grey directors 3.73 3.00 1.79 0.00 9.00 
Board Independence (%) 77.33 100.00 42.1S 0.00 100.00 
Board Meetings 8.27 7.00 3.71 4.00 26.00 
Non-Executive Directors meetings (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Chair-Non-Executive Directors meeti.ng (%)' 6.67 0.00 2S.11 0.00 100.00 
Non-Executive Directors' Training (%) 9.33 0.00 29.29 0.00 100.00 
Board Evaluation (%) 81.33 100.00 39.23 0.00 100.00 
. Evaluation Process (%) 4.00 0.00 19.73 0.00 100.00 
Multiple Directors (%) 38.67 0.00 49.03 0.00 100.00 
Audit Fee (%) 94.67 100.00 22.62 0.00 100.00 
Auditor Independence (%) 84.00 100.00 36.91 0.00 100.00 
Audit Committee Expertise (%) It 34.67 0.00 "47.91 0.00 100.00 
Audit Committee Independence (%) 49.33 .0.00 SO.33 0.00 100.00 
Peer Group (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Auditor-Audit committee meeting (%) 64.00 100.00 48.32 0.00 100.00 
Related Party (%) 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Proxy Vote (%) 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Vote Withheld (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Call Poll (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Chairpersons' Attendance (%) 29.33 0.00 4S.84 0.00 100.00 
Voting Power (%) 66.67 100.00 47.46 0.00 100.00 
Stock Compensation (%) 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Remuneration Committee Independence (%) 60.00 100.00 49.32 0.00 100.00 
Performance Target (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Remuneration Policy (%) 90.67 100.00 29.29 0.00 100.00 
". 
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III) Finland 
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max 
Split (%) 91.00 100.00 28.76 0.00 100.00 
Inside directors 0.35 0.00 0.70 0.00 3.00 
Outside directors 6.08 6.00 1.57. 3.00 9.00 
Grey directors 1.17 1.00 1.07 0.00 4.00 
Board Independence (%) 99.00 100.00 10.00 0.00 100.00 
Board Meetings 11.79 11.00 4.82 3.00 46.00 
Non-Executive Directors meetings (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Chair-Non-Executive Directors meeting (%) 24.00 0.00 42.92 0.00 100.00 
Non-Executive Directors' Training (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Board Evaluation (%) 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Evaluation Process (%) 11.00 0.00 31.45 0.00 100.00 
Multiple Directors (%) 36.00 0.00 48.24 0.00 100.00 
Audit Fee (%) 85.00 100.00 35.89 0.00 100.00 
Auditor Independence (%) 42.00 0.00 49.60 0.00 ,100.00 
Audit Committee Expertise (%) .1 56.00 100.00 '49.89 0.00 100.00 
Audit Committee Independence (%) 86.00 100.00 34.87 0.00 100.00 
Peer Group (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Auditor-Audit committee meeting (%) 66.00 100.00 47.61 0.00 100.00 
Related Party (%) 63.00 100.00 48.52 0.00 100.00 
Proxy Vote (%) 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Vote Withheld (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Call Poll (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Chairpersons' Attendance (%) 78.00 100.00 41.63 0.00 100.00 
Voting Power (%) 57.00 100.00 49.76 0.00 100.00 
Stock Compensation (%) 95.00 100.00 21.90 0.00 100.00 
Remuneration Committee Independence (%) 71.00 100.00 45.60 0.00 100.00 
Performance Target (%) 14.00 0.00 34.87 0.00 100.00 
Remuneration Policy (%) 97.00 100.00 17.14 0.00 100.00 
.. 
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IV) France 
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max 
Split (%) 54.74 100.00 49.96 0.00 100.00 
Inside directors 1.23 1.00 1.06 0.00 5.00 
Outside directors 6.93 6.00 2.31 3.00 15.00 
Grey directors 5.44 5.00 2.95 1.00 19.00 
Board Independence (%) 60.58 100.00 49.05 0.00 100.00 
Board Meetings 7.03 7.00 2.65 3.00 17.00 
Non-Executive Directors meetings (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Chair-Non-Executive Directors meeting (%) 5.84 0.00 23.53 0.00 100.00 
Non-Executive Directors' Training (%) 29.93 0.00 45.96 0.00 100.00 
Board Evaluation (%) 91.97 100.00 27.27 0.00 100.00 
Evaluation Process (%) 10.22 0.00 30.40 0.00 100.00 
Multiple Directors (%) If 37.96 0.00 48.71 0.00 100.00 
Audit Fee (%) 96.35 100.00 18.82 0.00 100.00 
Auditor Independence (%) 48.91 0.00 50.17 0.00 100.00 
Audit Committee Expertise (%) 37.96 0.00 48.71 0.00 100.00 
Audit Committee Independence (%) 83.21 100.00 37.51 0.00 100.00 
Peer Group (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Auditor-Audit committee meeting (%) 56.20 100.00 49.80 0.00 100.00 
Related Party (%) 85.40 100.00 35.44 0.00 100.00 
Proxy Vote (%) 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Vote Withheld (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Call Poll (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Chairpersons' Attendance (%) 16.79 0.00 37.51 0.00 100.00 
Voting Power (%) 91.97 100.00 27.27 0.00 100.00 
Stock Compensation (%) 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Remuneration Committee Independence (%) 78.83 100.00 41.00 0.00 100.00 
Performance Target (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Remuneration Policy (%) 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
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V) German 
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max 
Split (%) 100.00 IOO.OO 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Inside directors 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Outside directors 8.83 9.00 2.50 5.00 15.00 
Grey directors 9.05 10.00 2.61 1.00 15.00 
Board Independence (%) 74.55 100.00 43.76 0.00 100.00 
Board Meetings 5.13 5.00 1.30 3.00 11.00 
Non-Executive Directors meetings (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Chair-Non-Executive Directors meeting (%) 23.64 0.00 42.68 0.00 100.00 
Non-Executive Directors' Training (%) 15.45 0.00 36.31 0.00 100.00 
Board Evaluation (%) 87.27 100.00 33.48 0.00 100.00 
Evaluation Process (%) 14.55 0.00 35.42 0.00 IOO.OO 
Multiple Directors (%) 50.91 IOO.OO 50.22 0.00 100.00 
Audit Fee (%) IOO.OO 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 9 
,I 
Auditor Independence (%) 58.18 100.00 49.55 0.00 100.00 
Audit Committee Expertise (%) 50.91 100.00 50.22 0.00 100.00 
Audit Committee Independence (%) 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Peer Group (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Auditor-Audit committee meeting (%) 84.55 100.00 36.31 0.00 100.00 
Related Party (%) 100.00 IOO.OO 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Proxy Vote (%) 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Vote Withheld (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CaJJ PoJJ (%) 0.00' 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Chairpersons' Attendance (%) 23.64 0.00 42.68 0.00 100.00 
Voting Power (%) 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Stock Compensation (%) 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Remuneration Committee Independence (%) 95.45 100.00 20.93 0.00 100.00 
Performance Target (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Remuneration Policy (%) 97.27 100.00 16.36 0.00 100.00 
,," 
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VI) Ireland 
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max 
Split (%) 83.33 100.00 37.55 0.00 100.00 
Inside directors 3.88 4.00 1.67 1.00 8.00 
Outside directors 4.82 5.00 1.96 1.00 10.00 
Grey directors 4.00 3.00 3.99 0.00 15.00 
Board Independence (%) 37.88 0.00 48.88 0.00 100.00 
Board Meetings 8.18 8.00 2.46 4.00 17.00 
Non-Executive Directors meetings (%) 72.73 100.00 44.88 0.00 100.00 
Chair-Non-Executive Directors meeting (%) 72.73 100.00 44.88 0.00 100.00 
Non-Executive Directors' Training (%) 68.18 100.00 46.93 0.00 100.00 
Board Evaluation (%) 80.30 100.00 40.08 0.00 100.00 
Evaluation Process (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Multiple Directors (%) 74.24 100.00 44.07 0.00 100.00 
Audit Fee (%) 74.24 100.00 44.07 0.00 100.00 
Auditor Independence (%) 28.79 0.00 45.62 0.00 100.00 
Audit Committee Expertise (%) 71.21 100.00 45.62 0.00 100.00 
Audit Committee Independence (%) 37.88 0.00 48.88 0.00 100.00 
Peer Group (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Auditor-Audit committee meetings (%) 60.61 100.00 49.24 0.00 100.00 
Related Party (%) 84.85 100.00 36.13 0.00 100.00 
Proxy Vote (%) "- 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Vote Withheld (%) 36.36 0.00 48.47 0.00 100.00 
Call Poll (%) 7.58 0.00 26.66 0.00 100.00 
Chairpersons' Attendance (%) 68.18 100.00 46.93 0.00 100.00 
Voting Power (%) 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Stock Compensation (%) 84.85 100.00 36.13 0.00 100.00 
Remuneration Committee Independence (%) 28.79 0.00 45.62 0.00 100.00 
Performance Target (%) 15.15 0.00 36.13 0.00 100.00 
.. Remuneration Policy (%) 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
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VII) Italy 
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max 
Split (%) 83.78 100.00 37.37 0.00 100.00 
Inside directors 3.65 3.00 1.77 1.00 6.00 
Outside directors 6.57 5.00 2.79 3.00 13.00 
Grey directors 4.24 4.00 2.60 0.00 9.00 
Board Independence (%) 43.24 0.00 50.22 0.00 100.00 
Board Meetings 10.00 10.00 2.45 6.00 17.00 
Non-Executive Directors meetings (%) 16.22 0.00 37.37 0.00 100.00 
Chair-Non-Executive Directors meeting (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Non-Executive Directors' Training (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Board Evaluation (%) 32.43 0.00 47.46 0.00 100.00 
Evaluation Process (%) 13.51 0.00 34.66 0.00 100.00 
MultiEle Directors {%) 48.65 0.00 50.67 0.00 100.00 
Audit Fee (%) 67.57 100.00 47.46 0.00 100.00 
Auditor Independence (%) 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Audit Committee Expertise (%) 43.24 0.00 50.22 0.00 100.00 
Audit Committee Independence (%) 97.30 100.00 16.44 0.00 100.00 
Peer Group (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Auditor-Audit committee meeting (%) 43.24 0.00 50.22 0.00 100.00 
Related Party (%) 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
I Proxy Vote (%) 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Vote Withheld (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Call Poll (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Chairpersons' Attendance (%) 70.27 100.00 46.34 0.00 100.00 
Voting Power (%) 86.49 100.00 34.66 0.00 100.00 
Stock Compensation (%) 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Remuneration Committee Independence (%) 59.46 100.00 49.77 0.00 100.00 
Performance Target (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Remuneration Policyj%) 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
.. 
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VIII) Netherland 
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max 
Split (%) 96.77 100.00 17.81 0.00 100.00 
Inside directors 0.29 0.00 1.34 0.00 7.00 
Outside directors 7.31 7.00 2.02 3.00 11.00 
Grey directors 0.71 0.00 1.16 0.00 4.00 
Board Independence (%) 98.39 100.00 12.70 0.00 100.00 
Board Meetings 7.61 7.00 2.52 4.00 19.00 
Non-Executive Directors meetings (%) 91.94 100.00 27.45 0.00 100.00 
Chair-Non-Executive Directors meeting (%) 17.74 0.00 38.51 0.00 100.00 
Non-Executive Directors' Training (%) 58.06 100.00 49.75 0.00 100.00 
Board Evaluation (%) 74.19 100.00 44.11 0.00 100.00 
Evaluation Process (%) 3.23 0.00 17.81 0.00 100.00 
Multiple Directors (%) 19.35 0.00 39.83 0.00 100.00 
Audit Fee (%) 80.65 100.00 39.83 0.00 . 100.00 
Auditor Independence (%) 45.16 0.00 50.17 0.00 100.00 
Audit Committee Expertise (%) 80.65 100.00 39.83 0.00 100.00 
Audit Committee Independence (%) 85.48 100.00 35.51 0.00 100.00 
Peer Group (%) 74.19 100.00 44.11 0.00 100.00 
Auditor-Audit committee meeting (%) 59.68 100.00 49.45 0.00 100.00· 
Related Party (%) 72.58 100.00 44.97 0.00 100.00 
Proxy Vote (%) 90.32 100.00 29.81 0.00 100.00 
Vote Withheld (%) 12.90 0.00 33.80 0.00 100.00 
Call Poll (%) 12.90 0.00 33.80 0.00 100.00 
Chairpersons' Attendance (%) 46.77 0.00 50.30 0.00 100.00 
Voting Power (%) 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Stock Compensation (%) 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Remuneration Committee Independence (%) 70.97 100.00 45.76 0.00 100.00 
Performance Target (%) 40.32 0.00 49.45 0.00 100.00 
Remuneration Policy (%) 91.94 100.00 27.45 0.00 100.00 
,,' 
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IX) Spain 
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max 
Split (%) 81.93 100.00 38.71 0.00 100.00 
Inside directors 2.78 3.00 1.49 1.00 7.00 
Outside directors 4.75 5.00 1.8 I 1.00 8.00 
Grey directors 6.43 6.00 3.65 1.00 16.00 
I 
Board Independence (%) 26.51 0.00 44.40 0.00 100.00 
Board Meetings 10.58 11.00 3.59 4.00 18.00 
Non-Executive Directors meetings (%) 4.82 0.00 21.55 0.00 100.00 
Chair-Non-Executive Directors meeting (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Non-Executive Directors' Training (%) 7.23 0.00 26.05 0.00 100.00 
Board Evaluation (%) 27.71 0.00 45.03 0.00 100.00 
Evaluation Process (%) 8.43 0.00 27.96 0.00 100.00 
Multiple Directors (%) 57.83 100.00 49.68 0.00 100.00 
Audit Fee (%) 95.18 100.00 21.55 0.00 100.00 
Auditor Independence (%) 95.18 100.00 21.55 0.00 100.00 
Audit Committee Expertise (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Audit Committee Independence (%) 12.05 0.00 32.75 0.00 100.00 
Peer Group (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Auditor-Audit committee meeting (%) 25.30 0.00 43.74 0.00 100.00 
Related Party (%) 97.59 100.00 15.43 0.00 100.00 
Proxy Vote (%) 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Vote Withheld (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Call Poll (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Chairpersons' Attendance (%) 13.25 0.00 34.1 I 0.00 100.00 
Voting Power (%) 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Stock Compensation (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Remuneration Committee Independence (%) 14.46 0.00 35.38 0.00 100.00 
Performance Target (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Remuneration Policy (%) 93.98 100.00 23.94 0.00 100.00 
.. 
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X) Sweden 
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max 
Split (%) 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Inside directors 0.85 1.00 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Outside directors 6.88 7.00 1.22 4.00 9.00 
Grey directors 2.81 3.00 0.95 0.00 5.00 
Board Independence (%) 95.00 100.00 21.90 0.00 100.00 
Board Meetings 943.00 900.00 347.65 500.00 2600.00 
Non-Executive Directors meetings (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Chair-Non-Executive Directors meeting (%) 13.00 0.00 33.80 0.00 100.00 
Non-Executive Directors' Training (%) 24.00 0.00 42.92 0.00 100.00 
Board Evaluation (%) 96.00 100.00 19.69 0.00 100.00 
Evaluation Process (%) 3.00 0.00 17.14 0.00 100.00 
Multiple Directors (%) 8.00 0.00 27.27 0.00 100.00 
Audit Fee (%) 89.00 . 100.00 31.45 0.00 100.00 
Auditor Independence (%) 20.00 0.00 40.20 0.00 100.00 
Audit Committee Expertise (%) 19.00 0.00 39.43 0.00 100.00 
Audit Committee Independence (%) 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Peer Group (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Auditor-Audit committee meeting (%) 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Related Party (%) 55.00 100.00 50.00 0.00 100.00 
Proxy Vote (%) 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Vote Withheld (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Call Poll (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Chairpersons' Attendance (%) 94.00 100.00 23.87 0.00 100.00 
Voting Power (%) 35.00 0.00 47.94 0.00 100.00 
Stock Compensation (%) 90.00 100.00 30.15 0.00 100.00 
Remuneration Committee Independence (%) 93.00 100.00 25.64 0.00 100.00 
Performance Target (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Remuneration Policy (%) 95.00 100.00 21.90 0.00 100.00 
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XI) United Kim!:dom 
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max 
Split (%) 93.91 100.00 23.96 0.00 100.00 
Inside directors 3.76 4.00 1.51 1.00 8.00 
Outside directors 5.96 6.00 1.78 0.00 11.00 
Grey directors 1.56 1.00 1.34 0.00 7.00 
Board Independence (%) 69.89 100.00 45.95 0.00 100.00 
Board Meetings 8.32 8.00 2.46 3.00 20.00 
Non-Executive Directors meetings (%) . 59.86 100.00 49.11 0.00 100.00 
. Chair-Non-Executive Directors meeting (%) 59.14 100.00 49.25 0.00 100.00 
Non-Executive Directors' Training (%) 51.61 100.00 50.06 0.00 100.00 
Board Evaluation (%) 84.59 100.00 36.17 0.00 100.00 
Evaluation Process (%) 22.58 0.00 41.89 0.00 100.00 
Multiple Directors (%) 53.76 100.00 49.95 0.00 100.00 
,I 
Audit Fee (%) 58.42 100.00 49.37 0.00 100.00 
Auditor Independence (%) 50.54 100.00 50.09 0.00 100.00 
Audit Committee Expertise (%) 78.85 100.00 40.91 0.00 100.00 
Audit Committee Independence (%) 74.55 100.00 43.64 0.00 100.00 
Peer Group (%) 50.54 100.00 50.09 0.00 100.00 . 
Auditor-Audit committee meeting (%) 58.78 100.00 49.31 0.00 100.00 
Related Party (%) 77.06 100.00 42.12 0.00 100.00 
Proxy Vote (%) 97.85 100.00 14.53 0.00 100.00 
Vote Withheld (%) 21.86 0.00 41.41 0.00 100.00 
Call Poll (%) 26.88 0.00 44.41 0.00 100.00 
Chairpersons' Attendance (%) 66.67 100.00 47.23 0.00 100.00 
Voting Power (%) 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Stock Compensation (%) 87.46 100.00 33.18 0.00 100.00 
Remuneration Committee Independence (%) 68.46 100.00 46.55 0.00 100.00 
Performance Target (%) 30.11 0.00 45.95 0.00 100.00 
Remuneration Policy (%) 95.70 100.00 20.32 0.00 100.00 
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Appendix 4-3 Corporate Governance Sub-Score Sorted by Total Assets and Country 
Figure 4-1 Corporate Governance Sub-Scores for countries by Total Assets 
The graphs below present the descriptive statistics for corporate governance sub-scores for firms in each 
country derived from corporate governance provisions extracted from annual reports, reference documents, 
form 20-F and investor relations section on the firm's website. The data sample consists of 1065 European 
firms from 11 countries. The data period is 2003-2007. 
Figure 4-1.1 Board Sub-Score 
The graph below present the descriptive statistics of board sub-scores by Total Assets for firms in each 
country derived from corporate governance provisions extracted from annual reports, reference documents, 
form 20-F and investor relations section on the firm's website. Board sub-index covers the issues that arise 
from board policies, structure and composition. Here firms are sorted by Total Assets where Quartile 1 is 
the lowest values of Asset and Quartile 4 is the highest Asset values. 
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Figure 4-1.2 Disclosure and Audit Process Sub-Score 
The graph below present the descriptive statistics of Disclosure and Audit Process Sub-Score for fir.ms in 
each country derived from corporate governance provisions extracted from annual reports, reference 
documents, form 20-F and investor relations section on the firm's website. Disclosure and audit process 
highlight disclosed information affecting performance criteria used in setting remuneration, auditors' and 
audit committees ' working. Here firms are sorted by Total Assets where Quartile 1 is the lowest values of 
Asset and Quartile 4 is the highest Asset values. 
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Figure 4-1.3 Shareholder Rights Sub-Score 
The graph below present the descriptive statistics of Shareholder Rights and Power Sub-Score for firms in 
each country derived from corporate governance provisions extracted from annual reports, reference 
documents, form 20-F and investor relation~ section on the firm's website. Shareholders' rights and power 
look at issues surrounding ways in which share~olders' exercise their voting and execution of 
responsibilities that companies have towards their shareholders. Here firms are sorted by Total Assets where 
Quartile 1 is the lowest values of Asset and Quartile 4 is the highest Asset values. 
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Figure 4-1.4 Compensation Sub-Score 
The graph below present the descriptive statistics of Compensation Sub-Score 'for firms in each country 
derived from corporate governance provisions extracted from annual reports, reference documents, form 20-
F and investor relations section on the firm 's website. Compensation sub-score includes provisions that 
address issues on remuneration committees and policies. Here firms are sorted by Total Ass¥ts where 
Quartile 1 is the lowest values of Asset and Quartile 4 is the highest Asset values. 
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Appendix 4.4 Corporate Governance Sub-Score Sorted by Tobin's Q and Country 
Figure 4-2 Corporate Governance Sub-Scores for countries by Tobin's Q 
The graphs below present the descriptive statistics for corporate governance sub-scores. The data sample 
consists of 1,095 European firms from II countries. The data period is 2003-2007. Here firms are sorted by 
Tobin's Q defined as the ratio of market value to book value of assets (market value of assets is computed 
as market value of equity plus book value of assets minus book value of equity) where Quartile I are the 
lowest values of Tobin's Q values and Quartile 4 are the highest Tobin's Q vaIu.es. 
Figure 4-2.1 Board Sub-Score by Tobin's Q 
The graph below present the descriptive statistics of Board Sub-Score by Tobin's Q for firms in each 
country derived from corporate governance provisions extracted from annual reports, reference documents, 
form 20-F and investor relations section on the firm's website. Board sub-index covers the issues that arise 
from board policies, structure and composition. Tobin's Q defined as the ratio of market value to book value 
of assets (market value of assets is computed as market value of equity plus book value of assets minus 
book value of equity). Here firms are sorted by Tobin's Q where Quartile I is the lowest values of Tobin ' s 
Q and Quartile 4 is the highest Tobin's Q values. 
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Figure 4-2.2 Disclosure and Audit Process Sub-Score by Tobin's Q 
The graph below present the descriptive statistics of Disclosure and Audit Process Sub-Score sorted by 
Tobin's Q for firms i~ each country derived from corporate governance provisions extracted from annual 
reports, reference documents, form 20-F an4 investor relations section on the firm's website. Disclosure and 
audit process highlight disclosed information affecting performance criteria used in setting remuneration, 
auditors' and audit committees' working. Tobin's Q defined as the ratio of market value to book value of 
assets (market value of assets is computed as market value of equity plus book value of assets minus book 
value of equity). Here firms are sorted by Tobin's Q where Quartile 1 is the lowest values of Tobin's Q and 
Quartile 4 is the highest Tobin's Q values. 
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Figure 4-2.3 Shareholder Rights Sub-Score by Tobin's Q 
The graph below present the descriptive statistics of by Shareholder Rights Sub-Score sorted by Tobin's Q 
for firms in each country derived from corporate governance provisions extracted from annual reports, 
reference documents, form 20-F and investor relations section on the firm's website. Shareholders' rights 
and power look at issues surrounding ways in which shareholders' exercise their voting and execution of 
responsibilities that companies have towards their shareholders. Tobin's Q defined as the ratio of market 
value to book value of assets (market value of assets is computed as market value of equity plus book value 
of assets minus book value of equity). Here firms are sorted by Tobin's Q where Quartile 1 is the lowest 
values of Tobin's Q and Quartile 4 is the highest Tobin's Q values. 
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Figure 4-2.4 Compensation Sub-Score by Tobin's Q 
The graph below present the descriptive statistics of Compensation Sub-Score sorted by Tobin's Q for firms 
in each country derived from corporate governance provisions extracted from annual reports, reference 
documents, form 20-F and investor rela.tions section on the firm's website. Compensation sub-score 
includes provisions that address issues on remuneration committees and policies. Tobin's Q defined as the 
ratio of market value to book value of assets (market value of assets is computed as market value of equity 
plus book value of assets minus book value of equity).Here firms are sorted by Tobin's Q where Quartile 1 
is the lowest values of Asset and Quartile 4 is the highest Tobin's Q values. 
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Chapter Five 
Does Corporate Governance Affect Stock Price Synchronicity? 
5.1 Introduction 
In an ideal world, stock prices incorporate all information about the firm and all market 
participants share the same information. That is production and aggregation of 
information available in the market is done at a relatively lower costs. However , 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) document that market participants undertake this process 
only if the benefit outweigh the costs. Therefore, attaining informational efficient market 
is costly. Adding to this, Roll (1988) show that all else being equal the amount of 
information impounded into stock prices is reflected by the R-squared statistic from the 
., 
market model. That is not all information is incorporate in stock prices. 
From agency point of view, insiders' knowledge about the firm encourages managerial 
opportunism. This is more likely to happen when the degree of information asymmetry is 
high. Jin and Myers (2006) suggest that transparency discourages this managerial 
behaviour. Further, Easley and O'Hara (2004) document that in an environment where 
private information dominates, disclosure enhances production and availability of firm 
specific information. Therefore, if governance enhances disclosure and transparency, then 
it is expected that firm-specific information to be widely available in public domain. 
In this study," I examine how corporate governance affects firm's information enviromnent 
proxy by stock price synchronicity. Several studies have examined the relation between 
Corporate governance and synchronicity at country-level by highlighting differences in 
"financial market development and institutional structures. For instance, Morck, Yeung 
.. , ' 
and Yu (2000) and Jin and Myers (2006) suggest that stock price synchronicity is higher 
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in countries with poor legal system, governance and less market development. They argue 
that less developed markets have higher risk associated with poor investor protections that 
promote opaqueness. At firm-level, Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) find informed parties 
to have influence on firm's information environment but the .extent of their influence 
depends on nature of their activities. 
Despite the significance of corporate governance on transparency, there are still few 
empirical studies that link synchronicity and overall firm-level governance. The closest 
studies to this are Ferreira and Laux (2007) and Chung, Elder and Kim (2010) which 
investigate the influence of corporate governance on idiosyncratic fisk and market 
liquidity respectively. Ferreira and Laux (2007) show that better governed firm to have 
more informative stocks while Chung, Elder and Kim (2010) find that adopting 
governance standards mitigates information asymmetry' and enhance stock market 
liquidity. However, both studies are limited to U.S. industry-level and antitakeover 
provisions. Extending to international evidence, Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) show that 
enforcing insider trading laws improves stock price informativeness. This study follows 
this strand of literature that supports stock price synchronicity as a measure of finn's 
information qua}ity. 
Using the sample of large European firms, I find that well governed firms have less 
synchronous stock returns indicating that firm specific information is impounded into 
stock prices on timely basis. The implication of this result is that firm-level governance 
reduces the cost of collecting and trading on private information encouraging more 
infonned trading. The findings are consistent with those reported in Ferreira and Laux 
(2007). Furthermore, I find that boards operations and audit quality do not have 
significant impact on their own. I!0wever, the firm's commitment towards shareholders 
(shareholders score) and compensation policies improve production of finn specific, 
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information. Board operations and audit quality show significant impact when interacting 
with other variables. I also find strong negative relation between proportions of outsiders 
in the board and synchronicity; In addition, I find positive association between 
synchronicity and board size. The results indicate that larger bo~rds increase information 
asymmetry. 
The results also show that country institutions play major role in enhancing firm's 
information environment. I find that stocks prices are more informative when country's 
institutions are stronger. The results indicate that firms in countries with stronger anti-
director rights, effective legal system and in common law countries, to be more 
informative. In addition firms in countries with active market for corporate control are , . 
also informative. These results suggest that country-level governance reduces insiders' 
ability to expropriate by providi~g investor friendly environment (Fernandes and Ferreira 
(2008». In addition, I find that the effect of firm-level governance is magnified when 
country-level governance is better. I also show that boards operations and audit quality to 
be effective in countries with better institution. 
This study contribute's to the existing literatures on stock price synchronicity and 
corporate governance in a number of ways. First, I introduce a new and comprehensive 
corporate governance score that build its foundation on the provisions found in the 
national corporate governance code(s) and variables that have been found to have 
significant impact on firms. Using hand collected data; I construct governa,nce score that 
is not commercial motivated. In addition, the governance score takes into account 
differences in governance across Europe. A number of empirical studies have used several 
ways to proxy for corp?rate governance, however recent strand of literature show that 
aggregating governance attribute~ provide significant information on firms (Aggarwal, et 
aI., (2009». Second, I examine the impact of corporate governance on the finn's . 
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information environment In a cross-country setting. This study sheds light on the 
relevance of firm-level governance in Europe. Several studies in this subject such as . 
Ferreira, Ferreira and Raposo (2011) and Ferreira and Laux (2007) have covered a single 
aspect of governance or a single country respectively, thi~ study offer a broader 
perspective. Third, taking into account differences in institutional and legal environment45 
across Europe I investigate the relevance country-level governance as means of enhancing 
firms' information environment. Fourth, I examine whether stock prices of well governed 
firms impound more firm specific information in countries with better institution. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 presents a review of 
related academic literature leading to the hypotheses development. Section 3 describes the 
data sources and descriptive statistics. Section 4 discusses the econometric methods and 
describes the empirical results·1 while Section 5 shows the robustness of the results. 
Finally, Section 6 concludes the chapter. 
5.2 Related literature and hypotheses development 
5.2.1 Firm-level governance and stock price synchronicity 
Recent strands of the literature have moved towards aggregating corporate governance 
variables instead of examining single aspect of governance. A number of studies have 
focused on the relevance of firm-level governance. The first study to introduce this view 
is Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). Using 24 antitakeover provisions to construct a 
firm level governance index, they show that firms with stronger shareholder rights receive 
higher valuations and have higher profits, higher sales .growth, and lower capital 
expenditure. These results highlighted the central agency issue in modem corporation, 
.. expropriation of shareholders and ways to mitigate them (Dyck and Zingales (2004)). 
45 
, . See La Porta, et al. (1998). 
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Shleifer and Vishny (1997) posit that corporate governance provides mechanisms that 
enable investors in corporations get a return on their investments. Better governance 
therefore, ensures that different forms of expropriation are mitigated. On the other hand , 
Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) argue that the level of firm information is essential in 
reducing firm-specific risk that investors bear. They suggest that strong property right 
encourages informed arbitrage that capitalises the use of firm-specific information to 
facilitate efficient corporate investment. In other words, Durnev, Morck and Yeung 
(2004) indicate that market allocate resources efficiently when information is quickly 
incorporated into stock prices, as such provide mechanisms that limit poor managerial 
decisions. 
Kose, Lubomir and Bernard (2008) suggest that if resource allocation is efficient when 
stock prices are more informative, then private benefits that managers derive from 
choosing sub-optimal investment project are mitigated. Eng and Mak (2003) document 
the effect of corporate governance on voluntary disclosure. Thus, if governance enhances 
disclosure and transparency at firm level. which in turn enhance efficient resource 
allocation, then it is expected that firm-specific information to be widely available in 
pUblic domain .. Therefore, I provide formal presentation of the first hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 1 (HI): Stock price synchroniCity is negatively related to firm-level 
governance. 
5.2.2 Corporate boards and stock price synchronicity 
The importance of internal corporate governance system s~ch as corporate boards has 
been viewed as key element in monitoring the actions of management and serve 
.. shareholders' interests. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) assert that boards have evolved as 
part of the market solution to contractual problems within organisations. Therefore, apart 
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from hiring arid firing managers (Fama and Jensen (1983) and Jensen (1993)), boards also 
provide monitoring and advisory roles (Adams and Ferreira (2007)). Linck, Netter and 
Yang (2008) document that monitoring guards agai~st harmful behaviours and advising 
provides input on strategy. 
However, the level of board oversight and effectiveness in scrutinising managers depends 
on the size and the composition of the board. For instance, Jensen (1993), Lipton and 
Lorsch (1992) and Yermack (1996) argue that large boards can make coordination, 
communication, and decision making more cumbersome than in smaller ones. Because 
board's decisions rely on available informati,on to its members (Harris and Raviv (2008)), 
coordinating this information and executing decisions that provide input on firm's 
strategy become difficult in large boards. 
Board composition also fosters board's power over insiders' opportunistic behaviours. For 
instance, Weisbach (1988) suggests that boards dominated by outsiders are more likely to 
reduce CEO power. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) suggest a positive stock price reaction 
at the announcement of the appointment of an additional outside director. Because outside 
directors are viewed as professional referees, their value in directorship market depends 
on their ability -to monitor and add value to firms in which they sit (Fama and Jensen 
(1983)). 
Therefore, board are more effective when outsiders dominate. As a result, Cheng and 
Courtenay (2006) point out that it increases the level of voluntary disclosure. Ferreira, 
Ferreira and Raposo (2011) document a positive relation be~ween price informativeness 
and low attendance at board meetings, and negative relation with number of meeting. In 
.. addition, Gul, Srinidhi and Ng (2011) show that board diversity to improve stock price 
,,' 
Informativeness through increased public disclosure in large firms. Thus, if board 
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effectiveness . improves stock price informativeness I would expect that outsiders who 
enhance that effectiveness on the boards to provide mechanisms that improves firm's 
information environment. How~ver, as boards become large the cost of monitoring is 
more likely to increase. Therefore, I provide formal presentation ,of the second hypothesis 
as follows: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Stock price synchronicity is negatively related proportion of outsiders 
and positively related to board size. 
5.2.3 Country-level governance and stock price synchronicity 
La Porta, et aI., (1998) document that legal institutions are important for a well-
functioning of financial markets. They argue that strong institutional infrastructures are 
essential in safeguarding minority interest. Beck, DemirgU9-Kunt and Levine (2003) 
suggest that legal origin matters for financial development because legal traditions differ 
in their ability to adapt efficiently to evolving economic conditions. Because country's 
governance structure derives its foundation from the legal and cultural tradition, then 
investment in investor protection will be different. La Porta, et aI., (1998) and Djankov, et 
aI., (2008) indicate that differences in legal origins, investor protection and ownership 
concentration have implication on the working of financial markets and firm-level 
decisions. Therefore, I provide formal presentation of the third hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Stock price synchronicity is negatively related to better institutions. 
In addition, Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007) show that country characteristics have 
significant impact in explaining variation in firm-level governance. Therefore, I provide 
formal presentation of the fourth hypothesis as follows: 
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Hypothesis 4(H4): The negative relation between stock price synchronicity and firm-
level governance is stronger for firms in countries with better institutions. 
5.3 Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics 
5.3.1 Sample construction 
To construct my sample, I select top firms by market capitalisation from national indexes 
from eleven (II) countries. I start with all firms composed in the FTSE 100 (United 
Kingdom) CAC40 (France), DAX30 (Germany) BEL 20 (Belgium) MIB30 (Italy) and 
AEX (Netherlands) which are obtained from Thomson One Banker database. Firms 
\ 
included in the OMXC 20 (Denmark), OMXH25 (Finland), ISEQ20 (Ireland), IBE?, 35 
(Spain) and OMXS30 (Sweden) were obtained from the database and directly from their 
respective stock exchanges46• My sample covers the period between 2003 and 2007. I 
omit utility and financial firms as these firms have different and additional set of 
regulations (see Short and Keasey (1999)). 
To avoid sample selection bias, several criteria have been taken into account. First, firms 
must be listed for at least a year. Second, to alleviate survivorship bias, I retain firms that 
were available at the beginning of the sample period but dropped from the indices during 
the sample period and remained publicly listed. I further require that each firm have at 
least two years of observations over the sample period to allow for application of different 
econometric specifications. As a result, I therefore remain with 1143 firm-year, an 
average of 228 firms per year after taking into account the exclusion of financial and 
utility firms, missing observations following takeovers, cessat.ion of operation and change 
in listing country outside Europe47• I also exclude observations with missing variables and 
46 Direct contact with"the respective stock exchanges was made to get this information. 
47 Firms that changed their listing from their e national indices during the sample period and list outside Europe, 
_, for instance, in the United States were exc1uded. 
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winsorise data" at bottom and top I % levels. This method allows reduction of errors and 
possible outliers. As a result, I remain with 213 European non-financial and utility firms 
(1,065 firm-years observations) for analysis. 
5.3.2 Firm-level governance 
The governance data have been hand collected and are based on published information in 
the annual reports, reference documents and company's investor relation's section in the 
websites for the period between 2003 and 2007. For companies that are cross-listed in the 
United States additional information have been obtained from form 20-F. The data is 
based on largest companies listed in eleven (II) Western European countries which 
constitute Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. 
In this study, I identify 24 corporate governance provisions outlined in the individual 
country's governance code and European Union directives on corporate governance. To 
ensure that the construction of corporate governance score is consistent and different from 
those produced by commercial rating firms, I follow Aggarwal, et aI., (2009) approach. 
The latter construct their own index that incorporates 41 attributes relevant to both U.S. 
firms and foreign firms from 61 ISS's list of corporate governance attribute. This allows 
comparability of firm-level governance across countries. Furthermore, corporate 
governance nature in Europe provides more discretion for firm to choose optimal 
structure. Andres and Theissen (2008) suggest that corporate governance practices in 
Europe are, to a large extent, founded upon the comply-or-explain principle. In that sense, 
this method offers more variability in governance structure across firms and degree of 
compliance. 
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From the provisions, I develop binary (yes/no) questions and find the appropriate answer 
from published information. A detailed description of the questions is provided in the 
appendix 4-1. The main purpose is to improve objectivity of the index rather than focus 
on subjective opinion of individuals. Further, I assign a numerical value equal to 1 (one) 
when the provision has been addressed or adhered to and 0 (zero) otherwise. For example, 
one provision on duality focuses on whether the chairperson-CEO position is separated or 
held by one individual. If it is separated 1 is awarded or 0 otherwise. When certain 
provisions are not available in the official documents strict criteria of awarding zero was 
undertaken. I assume that firms can only make changes to their governance structures 
through public disclosure. 
The questions are divided into four principal groups namely board, disclosure and audit 
process, shareholders' rights and" power and compensation.'" Board covers the issues that 
arise from board policies, structure and composition. Disclosure and audit process 
highlight disclosed information affecting performance criteria used in setting 
remuneration, auditors' and audit committees workings. Shareholders' rights and power 
look at issues surrounding ways in which shareholders' exercise their voting and 
execution of re~ponsibilities that companies have towards 'their shareholders. Finally, 
compensation sub-index includes provisions. that address issues on remuneration 
committees and policies. I therefore construct governance score (GSCORE) as the 
equally-weighted average of the sub-scores (provisions). 
5.3.3 Country-level governance 
In constructing a country-level corporate governance score, I follow Hillier, et aI., (2010) 
.- approach which covers broader definition of corporate governance to create new 
corporate govenlance score for co,:!ntries in the sample. Mallin, Pindado and de la Torre 
.. (2006) argue that corporate governance system derive its foundation on three aspect i.e. 
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legal system, capital markets and ownership structure. Further, the link between corporate 
governance and financial development is well documented in the literature. La Porta, et 
aI., (2000) and Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) document that investor protection exert 
positive effect in financial development and allocation of resources. Because country's 
institutions have powerful influence on economic and financial development, using this 
approach in constructing country-level corporate governance score capture detailed 
information. 
The country-level governance index is divided into three main aspects; investor 
protection, financial system development and corporate governance mechanisms. I 
develop investor protection score using La Porta, et aI., (1997) and La Porta, et aI., (1998) 
studies which look at firms in different legal environment. Data for financial system 
development are derived from Beck, DemirgU9-Kunt and Levine (2000)'s and Beck and 
DemirgU9-Kunt (2009)'s financial structure databases. 
5.3.4 Firm characteristics 
Data on firm-specific variables have been collected from two databases' namely 
W orldscope and Datastream. The databases have been used in a number of studies and are 
well known for their quality of data and reliability. They cover a large number of firms 
making them appropriate for this study. These databases also share similar definition for 
financial variables and therefore complement each other consequently make merging easy 
when data is missing in one. Consistent with previous studies such as Piotroski and 
Roulstone (2004), Ferreira and Laux (2007) and Gul, Kim and Qiu (2010); I include 
seven control variables that have been documented to have impact on synchronicity. 
-D~finitions of all variables used in this study are attached in appendix 2. 
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5.3.5 Measuring Stock Price synchronicity 
The main dependent variable in this study is stock price synchronicity (SYNCH) which 
proxy for firm-specific information. I estimate synchronicity by decomposing firm 
specific return from the market-wide return following previous studies such as Durnev, et 
aI., (2003), Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) and Gul, Kim and Qiu (2010). For each firm-
year, I construct and regress monthly stock return that includes lag return for both market 
and industry. Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) and Gul, Kim and Qiu (2010) signify the 
importance of including lag returns as a way to mitigate potential non-synchronous 
trading bias. As such, the following market model is used: 
(1) 
Where RET;,t is monthly stock return for firm i and montht, using DataStream's total 
return index (RI), which includes dividends as well as price changes based on 12 monthly 
observations in the year48. MKTRET and INDRET represent market and industry return 
respectively both collected from the DataStream and 8;,t is unspecified error term. 
Consistently with other studies, I follow Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) and Piotroski and 
Roulstone (2004) method in determining synchronicity. The latter is therefore calculated 
as follows: 
SYNCH = LO{ 1 ~:2 ) (2) 
.. 48 For weekly return (used in the robustness test), a total of 52 weekly observations in the year are used. 
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Where R2 is the coefficient of determination from the estimation of Equation (l) above. 
The log transformation of R2 creates an unbounded continuous variable out of a variable 
originally bounded by 0 and 1," yielding a dependent variable with a more normal 
distribution. SYNCH is measured for each firm-year in the sample based on 12 monthly 
observations in the year. 
5.3.6 Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis 
Table 5-1 report the descriptive statistics for variables of interest in the sample of firms 
used in this study for the overall sample period. The mean (median) value of R2 is 0.576 
(0.570) higher than reported mean value of 0.117 and 0.286 in Morek, Yeung and Yu 
(2000) and Jin and Myers (2006) respectively49. The values are also significantly higher. 
than 0.193 (0.148) reported by Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) for U.S. firms in their 
It 
sample. The mean (median) value of the SYNCH is 0.288 (0.282) which are much higher 
and indicates that stock prices of firms in the sample frequently move together with 
market and industry information. Further, both R2 and SYNCH show significant variation 
in their higher standard deviations and inter quartiles. The lower quartile for R2 and 
SYNCH are 0.380 and -0.490 while the upper are 0.770 arid 1.208 respectively. The mean 
values of R2 and SYNCH are higher than the median values, indicating that the 
distribution of these variables are right-skewed. 
49 The mean values here include corresponding countries which are in this study's sample that is 11 in 
.. Morek, et aI., (2000) and lOin Jin and Myers (2006) studies. 
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Table 5-1. Descriptive statistics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics' for corporate governance, firm-specific information and control variables. The sample period is from 2003 to 2007. R2 and 
SYNCH refer to the R2 statistic and the stock price synchronicity measure given as 10g(R2 /1- R2) respectively calculated using monthly returns from m~ket model 
regression. BSCORE is refers to board score rating. ASCORE refers to firms' audit and disclosure rating. SSCORE is the shareholders rights score. CSCORE is the 
compensation score. GSCORE is the overall corporate governance score. OUTSIDERS defined as the proportion of outside directors on the board. BSIZE is the total 
number of directors on the board. LEV is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets. VOL is trading volume computed as the total number of shares traded in a year, 
divided by the total number of shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year. SIZE is firm size computed as the natural of total assets at the end of the fiscal year in · 
millions. STDROA is the standard deviation of return on assets. MlB is market-to-book ratio, computed as the total market value of equity, divided by the book value of 
equity at the end of the fiscal year. INDNUM is the number of firms in the industry in which a firm belongs. INDSIZE is the total asset of all sample firms in the industry 
to which a firm belongs in millions. All variables are winsorised at the bottom and top 1 %. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev 5th Pct! 25th Pct! Median 75th Pct! 95th Pct! 
If 0.576 0.251 0.l50 0.380 0.570 0.770 0.910 
SYNCH 0.288 1.685 -1.735 -0.490 0.282 1.208 2.314 
BSCORE 0.498 0.172 0.200 00400 00400 0.600 0.800 
ASCORE- 0.647 0.201 0.250 0.500 0.750 0.750 1.000 
SSCORE 0.548 0.149 0.310 0.440 0.540 0.640 0.800 
CSCORE 0.557 0.151 . 0.320 0.470 0.560 0.660 0.780 
GSCORE 0.547 0.144 0.310 0.460 0.540 0.650 .0.790 
OUTSIDERS 0.557 0.199 0.250 0.429 0.545 0.667 1.000 
BSIZE 11.953 4.060 6.000 9.000 11.000 14.000 20.000 
VOL 1.313 0.928 0.020 0.660 1.200 1.840 3.020 
SIZE 22.715 2.179 19.442 20.470 22.742 24.426 26.710 
LEV 0.222 1.072 0.000 0.070 0.110 0.170 00410 
STDROA 0.054 0.045 0.008 0.025 0.043 0.066 0.l46 
MIB 3.785 4.909 1.000 1.720 2.660 4.110 8.840 
INDNUM 5.397 3.468 1.000 3.000 5.000 7.000 14.000 
In(INDNUM) 1.450 0.739 0.000 1.099 1.609 1.946 2.639 
INDSIZE 11517.480 25333.810 15.860 55.620 123.510 8650.130 58533.030 
In(INDSIZE) 19.891 2.907 16.579 17.834 . 18.632 22.881 24.793 
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Table 5-2 Firm-level governance score 
The table below show the average corporate governance score by country and year for firms in the sample. 
A score of 100% means that firms have fol1owed al1 24 provisions. The column titled Average yearly 
change shows the average annual change in governance score in 2003-2007. 
Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average 
Yearly 
Change 
Belgium 30.3% 33.2% 36.2% 39.3% 39.6% 7.0% 
Denmark 48.7% 52.4% 52.8% 51.0% 51.5% 1.5% 
Finland 50.5% 54.8% 55.5% 57.3% 57.5% 3.4% 
France 47.6% 50.3% 52.9% 52.8% 54.0% 3.2% 
Germany 54.0% 55.7% 58.7% 58.9% 59.4% 2.4% 
Ireland 43.3% 55.0% 61.3% 62.6% 64.5% 10.9% 
Italy 39.8% 43.8% 46.6% 56.6% 58.3% 10.2% 
Netherlands 47.3% 61.6% 68.2% 69.0% 70.8% 11.2% 
Spain 34.1% 35.7% 35.8% 36.8% 37.0% 2.1% 
Sweden 49.3% 50.7% 53.9% 55.3% 57.2% 3.8% 
United Kingdom 51.0% 61.1% 67.4% 68.6% 72.8% 9.5% 
The standard deviations of R2 and SYNCH are 0.251 and 1.685 respectively indicating 
that there is a big cross-section variation especially on the later. This variation can be 
explained by the cross-country differences in the sample which appears, to have 
significant impact on the firm-specific information. Table 5-1 also presents the mean 
(median) value of corporate governance score and sub-scores. The average (median) 
governance score (GSCORE) is 54.700% (54%), during the sample period, indicating that 
firms in the sample meet at least half of the corporate governance standards. It is assumed 
that the higher the score the better the firm-level governance. The mean and median value 
of GSCORE is nearly the same indicating that the distribution is nearly perfe~t. 
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Table 5-3 Correlation Matrix 
The table below presents correlation for corporate governance, firm-specific information and control 
variables .. The sample contains firm-years from 2003 to 2007. SYNCH is the stock price synchronicity. 
GSCORE IS the overall corporate governance score. OUTSIDERS refer to proportion of outside directors on 
the board. BSIZE is the board size. LEV,is leverage. VOL is trading volume. SIZE is firm size. STDROA is 
the standard deviation of return on assets. MB is market-to-book ratio. INDNUM is the number of firms in 
the industry in which a firm belongs. INDSIZE is the industry size. All variables are defined in Appendix 2. 
Here *, ** and ***. indicate statistical significance at the 10%,5% and 1% leyels, respectively. All variables 
are winsorised at the bottom and top 1 %. 
SYNCH GSCORE OUTSIDERS BSIZE 
SYNCH 1.000 -0.103*** -0.251 *** 0.183*** 
GSCORE 1.000 -0.369*** -0.027 
OUTSIDERS 1.000 -0.494*** 
BSIZE 1.000 
VOL SIZE LEV STDROA MIB INDNUM INDSIZE 
SYNCH -0.046* 0.014 0.015 -0.124*** -0.003 0.033 -0.056* 
IVOL 0.060** -0.039 -0.034 0.071 ** 0.005 -0.003 -0.031 
GSCORE 0.221 *** 0.259*** 0.139*** -0.028 0.069** 0.029 0.182* 
OUTSIDERS -0.064** 0.007 -0.017 -0.042 -0.004 0.113*** 0.044 
BSIZE 
-0.306*** -0.005 -0.042 -0.067** -0.089* 0.105* 0.018 
VOL 1.000 0.163**: 0.172* 0.108*** 0.012 -0.027 0.1 02*** 
SIZE 1.000 -0.766*** 0.003 0.234*** -0.024 0.454*** 
LEV 1.000 -0.082*** 0.334*** -0.047 0.339*** 
STDROA 1.000 -0.047 0.136*** 0.104*** 
MlB 1.000 -0.006 0.181*** 
INDNUM 1.000 0.473*** 
The mean (median) value of board score, audit score, shareholder score and compensation 
score is 49.800% (40%), 64.700% (75%), 54.800% (54%) and 55.700% (56%) 
respectively. The average board score value suggest that firms in the sample have 
I . 
relatively poor board a'rrangements as they fail to meet half of the requirements of 
governance, however show impressive audit standards. The average (median) corporate 
board in the sample comprised of 11.953 (11.000) board members of which 55.700% 
(54.500%) are independent non-executive directors. Therefore, on average the sample of 
firms in this study is largely composed of board members considered as independent. 
.. Table 5-2 shows average values of overall corporate governance score for each country in 
the sample. At the start of the sample period, only three countries (Finland, Germany and 
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the UK) meet average governance requirements. On average, in 2008 nine countries 
exceed at least half of the requirements. In 2007, on average the UK and Netherland firms 
meet 72.8% and 70.8% of 24 provisions respectively. However, over the sample period, 
Netherlands (11.2%), Irish (10.9%), Italian (10.2%) and the. UK (9.5%) firms show 
significant average improvements5o• On the other hand, the average yearly positive 
change is least in Germany (2.4%), Spain (2.1 %) and Denmark (1.5%) indicating that 
over the sample period, firms in these countries shows least changes on their governance 
structures. 
Table 5-3 presents the Pearson's pair-wise correlation matrix between key variables in 
this study. The correlation coefficients between main variables, SYNCH, GSCORE, 
OUTSIDERS and BSIZE . are largely consistent with expectations. The correlation 
coefficients between SYNCH and all corporate governance variables are negative except 
for BSIZE which is positive and both are statistically significant at 1 %. At this point 
multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem with the maximum value of correlation 
coefficient at -0.494. To confirm this, I use variance inflation factor. With all the key 
variables in the table 3 included in the model, the average variance inflation factor is 1.61 
(with a maxi~um of 2.93), this also suggest that multicollinearity does not pose 
significant problem in the model. 
5.4 Panel regression tests and results 
In this section, I present econometric design, and provide regression analyses on the 
relation between stock price synchronicity and corporate governance. 
50 Martynova and Renneboog (2011) indicate that improvement in corporate governance may not be 
meaningful when enforcement is poor. This is particularly the case in country like Italy. 
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5.4.1 Methodology 
To examine the impact of corporate governance on stock price synchronicity, which 
proxy for firm-specific information I follow the following regression model: 
SYNCH = a + f3x GSCORE;,t + 'LojCONTROL;,t + (YearD~mmies) + (IndustryDummies) 
+ (CountryDummies) + C"t 
(3) 
Where i represents the firm and t represents the year. I include both dummies i.e., 
industry and country to account for potential heterogeneity. I also include year dummies 
to account for positive time trend in governance over the sample period. Further, I correct 
conventional standard error which biased downward using clustered standard error 
following Petersen (2009) approach. Petersen (2009) and Thompson (2011) document 
that this method provide unbiased results of the true variability of the coefficient 
estimates. Consistent with Aggarwal, et aI., (201 1), I cluster observations at country level 
assuming that observations are independent across countries but not within countries. 
Finally, I employ ordinary least square panel regression with the dependent variable 
SYNCH, given as logarithmic transformation of R2. 
5.4.2 Results 
5.4.2.1 Stock price synchronicity andfirm-level governance 
Table 5-4 presents OLS panel regression outcome of stock price synchronicity on firm 
level governance. Columns (1)-(4) present results for corporate governance sub-scores. 
The results show that board score (BSCORE) and audit score (ASCORE) in columns (l) 
"":. and (2) have negative coefficients but insignificant. Columns (3) and (4) present results 
for shareholders and compensation scores respectively. The results indicate significant 
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negative relationship with synchronicity (SYNCH). The regression coefficients on the 
SSCORE and CSCORE are -0.661 and -0.843 with robust I-statistics of -1.97 and -2.87 
respectively. The results suggest that firms with higher levels of shareholders rights (more 
responsible towards their shareholders) and remuneration policies have less synchronous 
stock prices. 
Table 5-4 also presents results for overall firm-level governance (GSCORE) and 
additional governance mechanisms; proportion of outsiders (OUTSIDERS) and board size 
(BSIZE). Columns (5)-(7) display the results. The coefficient for GSCORE is -0.861 and 
robust I-statistic of -2.08. The higher level of GSCORE indicates that firm is well 
governed. The interpretation here is that better governed firms have less synchronous 
stocks prices and as such more firm-specific information is impounded on the stock 
It '; 
prices. In addition, column (6) shows significant negative relation between proportion of 
outsiders and synchronicity. Column (7) presents results for association between board 
size and synchronicity. The result shows significant robust positive link. The positive 
relation may suggest the agency problem of larger boards. It indicates that large boards 
encourage members to free-ride their responsibilities. Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) 
suggest that as ..the board increases in size, agency costs as a result of coordination 
problems increases. This could mean that larger boards reduces information flow and 
hence reduces firm-specific information. 
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Table 5-4 The regression of stock price synchronicity on firm-level governance 
This table shows results of panel regression of stock return synchronicity on finn-level for European finns from 2003 to 2007. The depelIu~ 
synchronicity. The main independent variables are overall corporate governance score (GSCORE), board score (BSCORE), audit score (ASCORE), shru\" .. ~ 
(SSCORE), compensation score (CSCORE), proportion of outside directors (OUTSIDERS) and board size (BSIZE). All variables are defined in Appendix 5-2. The table 
reports results for panel regressions with country, industry and year fixed effects and standard errors corrected for country-level clustering. Robust t-statistics are reported 
in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%,:5% and 1% levels. 
BSCORE 
ASCORE 
SSCORE 
CSCORE 
GSCORE 
OUTSIDERS 
BSIZE 
VOL 
SIZE 
LEV 
STDROA 
MB 
l1\IT)NUM 
(1) (2) (3) 
-0.264 
(-1.10) 
-0.683 
(-1.78) 
-0.661 * 
(-1.97) 
(4) 
-0.843** 
(-2.87) 
(5) 
-0.861 * 
(-2.08) 
(6) 
-0.085*** 
(-3.46) 
(7) (8) 
-0.800** 
(-2.79) 
-0.421 * 
(-1.98) 
-0.261 * 
(-l.86) 
-0.897*** 
(-4.56) 
(9) 
-0.753** 
(-2.35) 
-0.398* 
(-1.93) 
-0.162* 
(-1.93) 
-0.599*** 
(-3.35) 
,-0.053** 
(-2.63) 
0.046*** 0.024** 
(4.07) (2.46) 
-0.13.2** -0.125** -0.132** -0.122** -0.129** -0.130** -0.153*** -0.105*** -0.117** 
(-2.98) (-2.66) (-2.65) (-2.27) (-2.49) (-2.81) (-3.40) (-2.32) (-2.86) 
0.033** 0.035** 0.032** 0.032** 0.032** 0.029** 0.025** 0.033*** 0.027** 
(2.88) (3.06) (2.96) (3.03) (2.98) (2.87) (2.38) (3.44) (3.00) 
0.010 0.006 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.011 0.008 0.009 
(0.38) (0.25) (0.49) (0.47) (0.48) < (0.57) (0.42) (0.29) (0.38) 
-0.176 -0.057 -0.176 -0.152 -0.139 -0.147 -0.052 -0.163 -0.102 
(-0.55) (-0.19) (-0.56) (-0.48) (-0.44) . (-0.47) (-0.16) (-0.55) (-0.36) 
-0.007 -0.007 -0.006 < -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 
(-l.18) (-1.23) (-1.20) (-1.28) (-1.25) (-1.30) (-1.13) (-1.32) (-1.34) 
0.112 0.105 0.120 0.113 0.134 0.138 0.178 0.131 0.182 
(0.50) (0.48) (0.?2) ~ . JQ.4~) (0.60) (0.71) (0.83) ~n •. _ .• _. (9.57) (0.85) 
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Table 5-4 
(Continued) 
(1) (2) (3} (4) (5) {6} {7) (8) (9) 
INDSIZE 0.046* 0.039 0.049** 0.047* 0.048** 0.041 * 0.043* 0.045* 0.041 
(2.22) (1.62) (2.36) (2.17) (2.23) (1.86) (2.15) (1.87) (1.58) 
Constant -1.207*** -0.617 -0.922*** -0.529 -0.708** -0.526 -0.437 -0.632 -0.178 
(-4.72) (-1.57) (-3.31) (-1.69) (-2.29) (-1.74) (-1.60) (-1.80) (-0.52) 
If 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.41 
N 1,065 1,065 1,065 1,065 1,065 !,Q65 1,065 1,065 1,065 
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Table 5-5 The regression of stock price synchronicity on country-level governance 
This table shows results of panel regression of stock return synchronicity on country-level governance for 
.;, 
I ~ the period 2003 to 2007. The dependent variable is stock return synchronicity. The main independent ! ~ ; 
variables are common law (DCL), anti-director rights (DADIR), legal enforcement (DLEF), market based 
(DMB), ownership concentration (~OC), board structure (DEB), market for corporate control (DMCC), 
.. I investor protection (DEIP), financial system development (DFSD), control mechanisms (DCM), and overall country-level governance index (DCGI). All variables are defined in Appendix 5-2. Panel A includes all 
u 
,; variables used in construction of the country-level governance and panel B includes sub-indices and the 
\ main index. The table reports results for panel regressions with industry and year fixed effects and standard 
i 
~ errors corrected for country-level clustering. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** i 
'\ 
,.~, 
indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1 % levels. 
ij (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
'l. Panel A 
f DCL 
-0.249*** I ! 
"i (-3.69) 
DADIR -0.513** 
( -3.07) 
DLEF -0.261 *** 
(-3.37) 
DMB -0.020 
(-1.10) 
DOC -0.001 
( -1.02) 
, DEB 
-0.206** 
(-3.17) 
DMCC -0.131* 
(-1.96) 
i VOL -0.062 -0.061 -0.060 -0.059 -0.059 -0.058 -0.059 
,; (-1.61 ) (-1.62) ( -1.57) (-1.48) (-1.44) (-1.51 ) (-1.50) 
I SIZE 0.018* 0.020 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 
t (1.91) (1.01) (1.61 ) (1.65) (1.63) (1.63) (1.67) 
i LEV 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
. ~ (0.64) (0.11 ) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13) (0.16) I', (0.41 ) t. 
\ STDROA -0.317 -0.321 -0.325 -0.327 -0.330 -0.330 -0.327 
I (-1.31 ) ( -1.30) ( -1.37) (-1.37) (-1.38) ( -1.39) ( -1.36) 
, ( 
I MB 
-0.165 -0.180.* -0.094 -0.097* -0.094* -0.091 -0.101 * ! 
! (-1.43)' (-1.84) (-1.04) (-1.95) ( -1.88) ( -0.82) (-1.95) 
INDNUM 0.017 0.004 0.033 0.031 0.031 0.030 0.030 
. \ (0.24) (0.06) (0.46) (0.43) (0.43) (0.42) (0.42) INDSIZE 0.020 0.016 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.023 
t (1.02) (0.83) (1.23) (1.20) . (1.21) (1.19) (1.18) 
I GDP 0.300 0.397 0.106 0.089 0.103 0.119 0.066 . ~ (0.49) (0.82) (0.24) (0.17) (0.18) (0.20) (0.12) i 
'/ NSTOCK 0.041 * 0.055* 0.112* 0.095 0.1 01 * 0.101 * 
0.093 
(1.98) (1.88) (1.89) (1.16) (1.93) (1.92) (1.79) t, VGDP -0.047 -0.074 -0.083* -0.080* -0.078* -0.077 -0.075* ( -1.53) (-1.73) (-1.96) (-1.94) (-1.91) (-1.75) ( -1.87) I CSIZE 0.030 0.033 0.034 0.038 0.042 0.041 0.036 t 
~ (0.42) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.53) (0.49) (0.44) ~ Constant 
-2.356 -3.283 -2.215 -1.868 -1.970 -2.157 -1.636 
R2 (-0.35) (-0.60) , (-0.43) (-0.33) (-0.30) (-0.32) (-0.28) i 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.19 
! 
-!i. 1,065 1,065 1,065 1,065 1,065 1,065 1,065 \ 
,', 170 
Panel B 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
DEIP -0.479** 
( -2.52) 
DCM -0.329* 
(-2.14) 
DFSD -0.159 
(-0.32) 
DCGI -0.229* 
(-2.05) 
VOL -0.061 . -0.058 -0.060 -0.058 
( -1.59) ( -1.46) (-1.55) (-1.46) 
SIZE 0.021 0.013 0.012 0.013 
(1.05) (0.64) (0.61) (0.64) 
LEV 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.53) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) 
ROA 0.317 0.326 0.337 0.326 
(1.33) (1.37) (1.41) (1.37) 
MB . -0.001 * -0.001 * -0.002* -0.001 * 
( -1.8~) (-1.85) ~ ( -1.87) (-1.85) 
INDNUM 0.004 0.032 0.028 0.032 
(0.05) (0.44) (0.39) (0.44) 
INDSIZE 0.017 0.024 
0.024 0.024 
(0.89) (1.21 ) (1.19) (1.21 ) 
GDP -0.865 -0.075 
-0.063 -0.075 
(-1.29) (-0.14) (-0.13) (-0.14) 
NSTOCK 0.021 0.093 
0.118 0.093 
(0.26) (1.25) (1.56) (1.25) 
VGDP -0.021 -0.084* 
-0.073* -0.084* 
(-1.23) (-1.90) (-1.84) (-1.90) 
CSIZE 0.019 0.035 
0.062 0.035 
(0.26) (0.41 ) (0.60) (0.41) 
Constant -7.853 -1 !763 
-1.398 -1.763 
(-1.08) (-0.32) (-0.24) (-0.32) 
R2 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.22 
N 1,065 1,065 
1,065 1,065 
Columns (8) and (9) present interactions between corporate governance variables. 
Column (8) shows results for corporate governance sub-scores. Interestingly, the results 
indicate significant negative relation for all sub-scores with synchronicity. At this' point, 
interaction qfthese variables might pose worry on possibility of multicollinearity between 
. regressors. The average variance inflation factor is 1.94 a~d the maximum VIF of 3.1 
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(CSCORE) suggesting that multicollinearity a~ong regressors is not a problem in the 
model. Column (9) also displays results that include both sub-scores and additional 
governance mechanisms. The results confirm earlier findings. Again the possibility of 
multicollinearity is tested and the average variance inflation factor is 1.95 and the 
maximum VIF is 3.5 (CSCORE). 
5.4.2.2 Stock price synchronicity and country-level governance 
Table 5-5 presents the results of OLS panel regression with stock price synchronicity as 
dependent variable on country-level governance. Panel A of Table 5-5 reports results of 
the synchronicity on all variables used in construction of country-level index while Panel 
B displays results for sub-index and the main country-level index. Here I include country- . 
level variables following Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) as control for stock price 
. .~ 
synchronicity regression. Regression estimates in column (1 )-(3) of Panel A of Table 5-5 
show negative significant relations. Regression coefficients on the common law (DCL), 
anti-director rights (DADIR) and legal enforcement (DLEF) dummies are -0.249, -0.513 
and -0.261 with robust t-statistics of -3.69, -3.07 and -3.37 respectively. The results 
support the earlier findings such as La Porta et aI., (1997; 1998) and Durnev and Kim 
(2005) that,provide insight on effects of regulatory environments on firms. The findings 
suggest that country's institutional structure have impact on stock price synchronicity. 
Regression estimate in column (1) of Panel B also show that significant negative relation 
between investor protection dummy (DEIP) and synchronicity. In ~e~eral, the results 
show that firms in countries with higher investors' protection (investor-friendly 
environment) have le~s synchronised stock prices. In other words, stock prices are more 
informative. 
The regressions estimates in column (4) and (5) of Panel A of Table 5-5 show negative 
but insignificant relation between market based (DMB) and ownership concentration 
172 
(DOC) dummies and synchronicity. However, column (6) and (7) of Panel A of Table 5-5 
show significant negative and robust relation. Regression coefficients on the board 
structure (DEB) and market' for corporate control dummies are -0.206, and -0.131 with 
robust t-statistics of -3.17, and -1.96 respectively. The results suggest that board structure 
is essential in enhancing firm-specific information. The finding is consistent with Adams 
and Ferreira (2007)'s board theory on two-tier boards effectiveness in monitoring 
management and informative independent one-tier boards' role. Further, the results 
indicate that environment in which market for corp'orate control is effective; firm's 
information environment improves due to exposure to disciplinary actions. Column (2) of 
.Panel B of Table 5-5 also shows significant negative relation between control mechanism 
dummy and synchronicity. Again, the results indicate that strong control mechanisms 
enhance firm-specific information. 
Panel B of Table 5-5 also presents the estimates for relation between synchronicity and 
financial market development dummy (DFSD) in column (3). The coefficient on DFSD is 
negative but insignificant. Column (4) presents result for country-level governance index 
dummy (DCGI). The coefficient of DCGI is -0.229 with robust t-statistic of-2.05. The 
conclusion ~hat can be drawn here is that firms in countries with effective institutional and 
legal environment have less synchronous stock prices. 
5.4.2.3 Stock price synchronicity,jirm-level and country level governance 
I repe~t the analysis above by investigating joint impact of firm-level and country-level 
governance. Here I use the overall firm-level score and sub-score with country-level 
SCore. The r~su1ts are presented in Table 5-6. The results show that in columns (1) and (2) 
the results are signifi~ant negative. The coefficient of BSCORE and ASCORE are -0.114 
and -0.256 with robust t-statistics of -2. I 6 and -3.48 respectively. In table 5-4 above these 
two variables appeared insignificant. The results indicate that country-level governance 
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has an important role to play in enhancing firm-level governance. The results in column 
(3)-(9) remain the same that is significant negative. However, some results appear to be 
more pronounced with the in·clusion of country-level governance. For instance, results in 
column (3), (5), (6) and some in columns (8) and (9) show large t-statistics values. In 
general, firm-level governance show significant improvement with the inclusion of 
country-level governance in the models. This is also reflected with the R-squared for each 
regression model. 
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Table 5-6 The regression of stock price synchronicity on firm-level and country-level governance 
This table shows results of panel regression of stock return synchronicity on firm-level and country-level governance for European firms from 2003 to 2007. The 
dependent varIable is stock return synchronicity. The main independent variables are overall corporate governance score (GSCORE), board score (BSCORE), audit score 
(ASCORE), shareholder score (SSCORE), compensation score (CSCORE), proportion of outside directors (OUTSIDERS), board size (BSIZE) and country-level 
govern~nce index (DCGI). All variables are defined i~ ~ppendix 5-2. The table reports results for panel regressions with country, industry and year fixed effects and 
standard errors corrected for country-level clustering. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, **'" indicate significance at 1 0%, 5% and 1% levels. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
BSCORE -0.114** -0.268** -0.265** 
(-2.16) (-2.25) , (-2.30) 
ASCORE -0.256*** -0.340*** -0.108*** 
(-3.48) (-4.22) (-4.05)** 
SSCORE -0.563** -0.382** -0.310* 
(-2.50) (-2.40) (-2.07) 
CSCORE -0.601 ** -0.417*** -0.301 *** 
(-2.78) (-3.64) (-3.18) 
GSCORE -0.677** 
(-2.73) 
OUTSIDERS -0.072*** -0.045** 
(-5.13) (-2.61) 
BSIZE 0.044*** 0.029** 
(4.05) (2.28) 
VOL -0.058* -0.054* -0.056 -0.053 -0.056 -0.063 .:-0.080** • -0.054** -0.074* 
(-l.94) (-1.86) (-l.73) (-1.64) (-1.63) (-1.66) (2.19) (-2.34) (-1.95) 
SIZE 0.013 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.013 - 0.010 0.011 . 0.010 
(0.64) . (0.63) (0.55) (0.53) (0.55) (0.70) . (0.53) (0.53) (0.51) 
LEV 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 
(0.13) (0.22) (0.15) (0.12) (0.20) (0.19) (0.13) (0.05) (0.17) 
STDROA -0.033 -0.032 -0.034 -0.034 -0.033 -0.031 -0.023 -0.036 -0.028 
(-l.38) (-1.32) (-l.44) (-1.45) (-1.41) (-1.34) (-0.98) (-1.52) (-1.23) 
MB -0.002* -0.002** -0.002 -0.002 -0.002* -0.002** -0.002* -0.002** -0.002** 
(-1.88) (-1.98) (-l.62) (-1.73) (-1.88) (-2.02) ( -l.88) (-2.00) ( -1.98) 
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Table 5-6 
(Continued) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) 
INDNUM 0.032 0.028 0.028 0.036 0.032 0.019 0.026 0.031 0.020 
(0.44) (0.39) (0.39) (0.49) (0.44) (0.28) (0.36) (0.43) (0.28) 
INDSIZE 0.024 0.023 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.024 0.024 0.026 0.026 
(1.20) (1.18) (1.33) (1.36) (1.35) (1.27) (1.21) (1.29) (1.30) 
GDP 0.070 0.156 0.259 0.242 0.297 0.055 0.252 0.267 0.108 
(0.13) (0.30) (0.50) (0.47) (0.57) (0.11) (0.48) (0.51) (0.21) 
NSTOCK 0.092 0.081 0.089 0.082 0.089 0.038 0.078 0.073 0.031 
0.23) (1.08) (1.20) (1.10) (1.20) (0.51) . (1.07) (0.94) (0.40) 
VGDP -0.084 -0.070 -0.085 -0.088 -0.089 -0.064 -0.099 -0.079 -0.077 
(-0.89) (-0.76) (-0.92) (-0.95) (-0.97) (-0.74) (-1.07) (-0.85) , (-0.87) 
CSIZE 0.035 0.017 0.010 0.004 0.004 0.034 0.014 0.006 0.071 
(0.41) (0.20) (0.12) (0.05) (0.05) (0.42) (0.17) (0.07) (0.86) 
DCGI -0.029*** -0.064*** -0.092*** -0.106*** -0.107*** -0.162*** -0.109*** -0.120*** -0.232*** 
(-3.42) (-3.34) (-3.61) (-3.59) (-3.67) (-3.71) (-3.80) (-3.62) (-3.95) 
Constant -1.714 -2.571 -3.703 -3.531 -4.113 -0.529 -1.504 -3.841 -0.106 
(-0.30) (-0.46) . (-0.66) (-0.63) (-0.73) (-0.10) (-0.27) (-0.69) (-0.02) 
K 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.40 0.43 0.44 
N 1,065 1,065 1,065 1,065 1,065 1,065 1,065 1,065 1,065 
" 
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5.5 Robustness tests 
In this section, I perform several robustness checks on the p,rimary results. I provide 
different alternative test to a·ccount for endogenity, sample selection and governance 
measures. 
5.5.1 Endogeneity: omitted var.iables and reverse causality 
The main potential problem in this study is endogeneity. ~ike many corporate governance 
studies variables can b.e jointly determined as a result increase the possibility of reverse 
causality. For instance, Ferreira, Ferreira and Raposo (2011) show that price 
informativeness and governance can act as substitute monitoring mechanisms. In 
addition, the relationships could be spuriously caused by some omitted variables. I 
therefore use firm-fixed effect and OLS panel regression on lagged corporate governance 
u ~ 
variables to further analyse the relation between stock price synchronicity and corporate 
governance. Brooks (2008) suggests fixed effect regression as appropriate control for 
omitted variables. The main variables of interest remain the same, stock price 
synchronicity measured using monthly stock returns. 
Table 5-7 present summaries of the results. Columns (1 )-(3) present results for firm-fixed 
effects. Column (1) reports results for GSCORE, measure of firm-level governance. The 
result shows negative and significant coefficient. Columns (2) and (3) present results for 
sub-scores and additional variable together respectively. All variables remain the similar 
to the earlier results. Columns (4)-(6) shows results with lagged governance variables. 
The governa~c·e variables are lagged for one year. The results are also robust to the 
previous finding suggesting that they are not driven by omitted variables nor jointly 
determined. Other regressions are not reported but the results are qualitatively similar. 
177 
Table 5-7 Stock price synchronicity and firm-level: firm fixed effect and lagged explanatory variables 
This table shows results of alternative estimation methods for regression of stock return synchronicity on 
firm-level governance for European firms from 2003 to 2007. Columns 1 to 3 present estimates of panel 
regressions with fixed effects and year dummies. Column 4 to 6 presents estimation of regression using 
lagged governance variables with country, industry and year dummies. The dependent variable is stock 
return synchronicity. The main independent variables are overall corporate governance score (GSCORE), 
board score (BSCORE), audit score (ASCORE), shareholder score (SSCORE), compensation score 
(CSCORE), proportion of outside directors (OUTSIDERS), board size (BSIZE) and country-level 
governance index (DCGI). All variables are defined in Appendix 5-2. Robust t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels and standard errors corrected for 
country-level clustering. 
Firm fixed effects Lag governance variables 
{I} {2} p~ {4} {5} {6} 
BSCORE 
-0.221 * -0.212* -0.211 ** -0.232*** 
(-1.88) (-1.99) (-3.07) (-3.19) 
ASCORE 
-0.132* -0.162* -0.329* -0.342* 
(~1.94) (-1.92) (-1.82) (-1.94) 
SSCORE 
-0.406* -0.429* -0.737*** -0.759*** 
( -1.98) ( -1.89) (-4.67) (-4.71) 
CSCORE 
-0.222** -0.193** -0.020** -0.006** 
(-2.66) (-2.47) (-2.29) (-2.26) 
GSCORE 
-0.423* -0.585** 
(-1.90) (-2.95) 
OUTSIDERS -0.08* -0.0 11 * 
(-2.17) (-1.90) 
BSIZE 0.049** 0.018* 
(2.5 1) (1.84) 
VOL 
-0.056 -0.055 -0.053 -0.082* -0.078* -0.079* 
( -1.50) (-1.47) (-1.36) (-2.16) (-2.12) (-2.21) 
SIZE 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.028 0.021 0.021 
(0.06) (0.02) (0.07) (0.57) (0.42) (0.42) 
LEV 0.009 0.011 0.012 0.057 0.06 0.061 
(0.74) (0.85) (0.95) . (1.25) (1.32) (1.26) 
STDROA 
-0.043* -0.046* -0.042* -0.137 -0.16 -0.184 
(-1.84) (-1.95) (-1.91) (-0.47) (-0.54) (-0.62) 
MB 
-0.005 -0.005 -0.006* -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
(-1.49) (-1.52) (-2.00) (-1.43) (-1.42) (-1.45) 
INDNUM 0.034 0.017 0.001 0.197 0.191 0.19 
(0.16) (0.08) (0.23) (0.64) (0.61) (0.61 ) 
INDSIZE 0.049 0.052 0.053* 0.01 0.005 0.005 
(1.66) (1.73) (1.93) (0.21) (0.10) (0.10) 
Constant 
-0.685** -0.754** -0.128 -0.292 -0.328 -0.447 
(-2.73) (-2.99) ( -0.29) (-0.96) (-0.98) (-0.87) 
R2 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.23 0.23 0.24 
N 1,065 1,065 1,065 848 848 848 
-
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Table 5-8 Stock price synchronicity and country-level governance: Robustness test 
This table shows panel regression results for regression of stock return synchronicity on alternative country-
level governance country-level governance and change in sample from 2003 to 2007. Columns 1 to 3 
present results estimates using alternative country-level governance. Column 4 to 6 presents estimation of 
regression with sample excluding the UK. The dependent variable is stock return synchronicity. The main 
independent variables are overall corporate governance score (GSCORE), board score (BSCORE), audit 
Score (ASCORE), shareholder score (SSCORE), compensation score .(CSCORE), proportion of outside 
directors (OUTSIDERS), board size (BSIZE), country-level governance index (DCGI), disclosure index 
(DISC) and good government index (GGI). All variables are defined in Appendix 2. Regressions include 
industry and year dummies. Robust t:-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, ***'indicate significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1 % levels and standard errors corrected for country-level clustering. 
Alternative country-level governance Excludes United Kingdom 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
BSCORE -0.796** -0.744** -0.521 * -0.644* 
(-2.83) (-2.34) (-1.91) (-2.17) 
ASCORE -0.419* -0.394** 0.355* 0.215** 
(-2.14) (-2.31) (2.12) (2.76)* 
SSCORE -0.232* -0.123* 0.140* 0.226* 
(-2.07) (-1.98) (-2.10) (-1.98) 
CSCORE -0.908 -0.604 -0.050** -0.069** 
GSCORE 
-0.857* 
OUTSIDERS 
( -2.12) 
BSIZE 
VOL 
-0.129** 
(-2.41) 
SIZE 0.032** 
(3.13) 
LEV 0.016 
(0.49) 
STDROA 
-0.014 
(-0.46) 
MB 
-0.001 *** 
(-3.81) 
INDNUM 0.03 
(0.20) 
INDSIZE 0.046** 
(2.29) 
GDP 1.283 
(0.58) 
NSTOCK 0.217 
(0.76) 
VGDP 
-0.129 
(-0.70) 
CSIZE 
-0.656 
(1.64) 
DISC 
-3.762* 
(-1.98) 
GGI 
-0.457* 
DCGI 
(-2.19) 
Constant ~2.644** 
R2 (-2.41) 0.38 
N 1,065 
-
(-5.68)** (-3.88)** , (2.69) (2.93) 
-0.054* 
(-1.98) 
0.024** 
(2.26) 
-0.105** -:0.117** 
(-2.26) (-2.81 ) 
0.033*** 0.027** 
(3.45) (2.98) 
0.009 0.011 
(0.30) (0.39) 
-0.016 -0.099 
(-0.54) (-0.36) 
-0.001 *** -0.001 *** 
(-3.70) (-3.93) 
0.039 0.068 
(0.23) (0.40) 
0.044* 0.039 
(1.92) (1.60) 
1.092 1.384 
(0.57) (0.73) 
0.293 0.301 
( 1.15) (1.18) 
-0.113 -0.141 
(-0.69) (-0.99) 
0.258 0.108 
(1.29) (-1.22) 
-3.8Il ** -3.661 ** 
(-2.45) (-2.36) 
-0.448** -0.143** 
(-2.68) (-2.59) 
-4.067** -7.384** 
(-2.99) (-2.75) 
0.40 0.42 
1,065 1,065 
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-0.967* 
(-2.24) 
-0.176* 
(-2.04) 
0.016 
(0.41) 
0.010 
(0.45) 
-0.107 
( -0.23) 
-0.001 * 
(-2.06) 
0.186 
(0.83) 
0.048 
(1.01) 
0.609 
(0.28) 
0.349 
(1.20) 
-0.366 
(-1.67) 
-0.076 
(-0.55) 
. -0.787** 
( -3.20) 
-5.059 
(-0.23) 
0.46 
794 
-0.146* 
(-1.95) 
0.01I 
(0.31) 
0.005 
(0.27) 
-0.069 
( -0.18) 
-0.00 1* 
(-2.26) 
0.212 
(0.92) 
0.046 
(0.93) 
0.836 
(0.41) 
0.358 
(1.30) 
-0.304 
(-1.48) 
-0.096 
(-0.75) 
-0.939** 
(-2.62) 
-7.578 
(-0.38) 
0.48 
794 
0.023** 
(2.65) 
0.034** 
(2.42) 
-0.151 * 
( -2.03) 
0.005 
(0.14) 
0.007 
(0.35) 
-0.007 
(-0.02) 
-0.001** 
(-2.27) 
0.235 
(1.03) 
,0.050 
(1.05) 
1.099 
(0.53) 
0.35 
(1.28) 
-0.266 
(-1.30) 
-0.081 
( -0.60) 
-0.921 ** 
(-2.42) 
-10.814 
(-0.54) 
0.49 
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5.5.2 Alternative measure of country-level governance 
Previous studies have used different measure for country-level governance. Therefore, 
there is not universal measure." However, some studies provide benchmark on what can be 
alternative measure. Morek, Yeung and Yu (2000) and :1in and Myers (2006) offer 
different ways in which country governance can be determined. Using La Porta, et aI., 
(1998), Morek, Yeung and Yu (2000) develop index named good government index 
(GOOD) which measures government corruption, the risk of government expropriation of 
private property and the risk of government repudiation of contracts to proxy for 
government's protection of property rights. I develop dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if a country has GOOD above the median variable and zero otherwise51 .In addition, I 
use disclosure score (DISC) to account for country's transparency level. Columns (1)-(3) 
of Table 5-8 report the results. In the table, the results remain consistent with the primary 
findings. 
5.5.3 Excluding UK firms 
In the main regression tests, the sample comprises of around 25% of firms from the UK. 
This may have significant impact on the results. To ensure that my results are not driven 
by sample size from a single country I exclude UK firms and perform additional test. The 
results are reported in Columns (4)-(6) of "Table 5-8. In the table, the results remain 
consistent with the primary findings. I can therefore confidently support the main 
findings. 
5.5.4 Alternative Measures of Firm-level Governance 
In Chapter 4, the construction of the corporate governance score indicate that few 
provisions are not very common in some countries included in the sample. As such, this 
reduces the" score for firms in that particular country. To investigate whether this has 
51 The results remain consistent when using good government index values: 
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impact on the results, I reconcstruct the governance score by excluding the provision as 
I 
missing if it is unavailable in all firms from a particular country52. Therefore, the 
provisions are reduced from 24 to 20. I then repeat all the regressions presented i~ the 
main finding. The analyses (not tabulated) provide qualitatively similar results and 
then;fore the hypotheses continue to be supported. 
5.5.5 Changes in Variables 
To further check the robustness of the result, I employ change in variable regressions. 
Klock, Mansi and Maxwell (2005) suggest this method as appropriate to mitigate 
potential feedback problem. As such, I repeat the main regression models by including the 
both change in variables and lag governance variables by one year change. The regression 
yields consistent results. Therefore, I can conclude the results are not driven by any bias. 
5.5.6 Alternative measure of stock price synchronicity 
To test whether the results are driven by choice data used in determining stock price 
synchronicity I use weekly returns· instead. A number of previous studies have used daily 
and/or weekly returns in estimating synchronicity which proxy for firm-specific 
information. The use of monthly data minimise the possibility of encountering correlation 
problem, as 'a result drive the findings of this study. I re-estimate the main results and 
yield consistent finding. The results therefore are not driven by choice of data. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This study examines the impact of corporate governance on the firm's information 
environment in a cross-country setting using stock price synchronicity as the primary 
measure of firm's information environment. I explore both firm-level and country-level 
52 This makes sense because the provisions are derived from the national corporate governance codes. 
Missing provision at individual firms can be as a result of non-implementation. 
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governance impact of ability of firm's to impound information into stock prices in timely 
manner. 
The main contribution of this study is to show that firm-level governance is associated 
with improvement in firm's information environment. I find that better governed' firms 
have more informative stock prices. The implication of this finding is that better 
governance reduces information asymmetry associated as a result of managerial 
behaviours. As an outcome of this it reduces the cost of collecting and trading on private 
information. 
Further, previous studies suggest importance of country-level governance in less 
developed financial markets. For instance, Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) and Jin and 
Myers (2006) suggest that ,prms in emerging market~ have higher synchronicity than 
developed ones and that country-level governance is essential in reducing this. In this 
study, I add to this line of literature and show that country-level governance is also 
important in developed economies in addressing information asymmetry. I find that 
country-level governance enhance firm-specific information. In addition, the strength of 
firm-level governance is magnified in countries with better institutions. 
My results also suggest increasing relevanc~ of outsiders' dominated boards. I find that 
proportion of outsiders in the board enhances incorporation of firm-specific information. 
This ~nding suggests that. presence of outsider improves levels of disclosure and 
information flow. However, I show that increasing number of members on the boards 
have negative impact in incorporating firm-specific information. Previous studies suggest 
possible explanation for this that larger board face communication and coordination 
problem which in turn may have impact on quality and timing of disclosure. Further, 
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larger boards are associated with free-ride issue in which outsiders' incentive to fulfil 
their roles is limited. 
These findings have significant policy implication for regulators and policy makers. First, 
corporate governance principles that encourage greater scrutiny of firms are more likely 
to enhance transparency and disclosure. Moreover, additional emphasis on promoting 
non-executive involvement in boards can also lead to reduced information asymmetry. As 
such, encouraging firms to investment in corporate governance can ultimately ensure the 
increased level of information and efficient allocation of resources. 
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Appendix 5-1: Firm-level Corporate Governance Provisions 
The Table below provide list of corporate governance provisions (attributes) ~sed in the construction of the 
Corporate governance score. 
Board: Describes Board policies, structure and composition 
I. Split: CEO and Chairperson positions are separated 
2. Board Independence: Board with large number of independent non-executive directors 
3. Non-executives Meeting: Non-executive directors meet without chairman of the board and executives 
present 
4. Chairman-Non-executives Meeting: Chairman of the board and Non-executive directors meet without 
executive directors present 
5. Training Policy: Training programmes for new and existing directors exist and are conducted once a 
year 
6. Board Evaluation: Formal system of evaluating board performance, procedures and effectiveness is in 
place, and is conducted yearly 
7. Evaluation Process: The' Board of Directors engages external evaluation parties to perform assessment 
reviews its performance. 
8. Multiple Directorships: Less than 50% of independent outsiders have commitment in two or more 
outside boards. 
DiSclosure and Audit: Provide information affecting performance criteria, issues related to working of and 
compensation for external auditors and audit committee. 
9 .. Auditor Fees: Consulting fees paid to auditor is less than audit fee paid to the auditor 
10. Auditor Independence: External auditor offer written confirmation that it considers itself independent, 
and information is disclosed in the annual report 
II. Audit Committee: Audit committee composed of at least two-third independent outsiders 
12. Audit Committee Expertise: Audit committee comprise of at least a member clearly identified as an 
independent financial expert. 
13. External Auditor Meeting: External auditor meet with the Audit Committee without executive present 
,., . 
14. Peer Group: Disclosure of peers (comparators) groups/companies for performance benchmark exist 
15. Related Party: Disclose details of transactions with its subsidiary undertakings and other related parties 
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Shareholder rights: Describes shareholders rights in voting and company's responsibilities towards their 
shareholders 
16. Proxy vote: Proxy voting is possible and technology to support voting exist 
17. Call Poll: Right for all shareholders' resolutions to be decided on a poll 
18. Vote Withheld: Disclosure of the voting outcome on each resolution, including votes withheld 
(abstained) 
19. Chairmen Attendance: Chairmen of the board committees attend the Annual General Meeting and are 
available to answer questions from shareholders 
20. Voting Power: All shareholders have similar voting rights (No shares carry special rights) 
Remuneration Policy and Process: Address issues related to remuneration committees and policies 
21. Stock ~ompensation: Directors are subject to establish and maintain a minimum personal shareholding 
22. Committee Independence: Remuneration committee composed of at least two-third independent 
outsiders .t 
23. Performance target: Specific numerical performance target 
24. Remuneration Poli~y: Presence of a clear outlined policy on setting remuneration in the annual report 
,," 
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Appendix 5-2: Definition of yariables 
Variable 
Corporate governance score 
Board score 
Audit score' 
Shareholders score 
Compensation score 
Proportion of outsiders 
Board size 
Trading volume 
Firm size 
Leverage 
Return on asset's standard deviation 
Market to book 
Industry number 
Industry size 
Common law 
Anti-director rights 
Legal enforcement 
GSCORE 
BSCORE 
ASCORE 
CSCORE 
CSCORE 
OUTSIDERS 
BSIZE, 
VOL 
SIZE 
LEV 
STDROA 
MB 
INDNUM 
INDSIZE 
DCL 
DADIR 
DLEF 
Definition 
The overall corporate governance score 
board score rating covering board policies, structure and composition 
, Audit and disclosure rating measuring corporate disclosure and transparency 
Shareholders rights score measuring shareholders power and firm's responsibilities towards shareholders 
Compensation sub-score measuring remuneration issues and policies 
Number of outside directors on the'board divided by total number of directors (outsiders are defined as 
non-executives without any financial or personal ties to company management. 
The total number of directors on the board 
Trading volume computed as the total number of shares traded in a year, divided by the total number of 
shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year, 
The log of total assets at the :nd of the fiscal year 
The ratio of total debt to total assets 
The standard deviation of return on assets 
Total market value of equity, divided by the total net assets at the end of the fiscal year 
Natural log of number of firms in the industry in which a firm belongs 
Log of total asset of all sample firms in the industry to which a firm belongs 
Equals 1 if a firm is located in a common law country, and zero otherwise 
Equals 1 if the firm is located in a country with anti-director rights above the median for the sample, and 
zero otherwise 
Equals 1 if the firm is located in a country with legal enforcement stronger than the median country in 
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Market based DMB 
Ownership concentration DOC 
Board structure DEB 
Market for corporate control DMCC 
Investor protection DEIP 
Control mechanisms 
DCM 
Financial system development DFSD 
Country's corporate governance DCGI 
Good government index GGI 
Disclosure index DISC 
GDP per capita GDP 
Number of stocks traded NSTOCK 
Variance ofGDP VGDP 
Country size CSIZE 
the sample, and zero otherwise 
Equals I if a firm is located in a market-based country, and zero otherwise. 
Equals I if the firm bel<;>ng to a country with ownership concentration (measured by the three largest 
shareholders in the 10 largest nonfinancial, privately owned domestic firms) higher than the median, and 
zero otherwise 
Equals 1 if the firm is located in a country with a two-tier board structure system, or when nbnexecutive 
directors represent a significant proportion (50% or more) on boards financial, and zero otherwise 
Equals 1 if the firm is located in a country with an active market for corporate control, and zero 
otherwise 
::;. 
Equals 1 if the firm is located in a country with investor protection stronger than the median, and zero 
otherwise 
Equals 1 if the firm has a combined corporate control index (computed as the sum of ownership control) 
above the sample median, and zero otherwise concentration, board effectiveness, and market for 
corporate 
Equals 1 if the firm is located in a country with financial system development above the median for the 
sample, and zero otherwise 
Dummy variable measuring Country~level corporate governance 
Index of the country's government respect for private prope~ rights 
Score for country's level of accounting transparency (Global Competitiveness Report) 
The logarithm of the gross domestic product per capita in u.S. dollars 
)'he log of the number of stocks traded in each country and year. 
Sample variance of the annual GDP per capita growth 
The logarithm of the geographic size in square kilometres 
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Chapter 6 
The Effect of Institutional ownership on Stock Price Synchronicity 
6.1 Introduction 
The role of institutional shareholders as governance mechanisms has been well 
documented in corporate finance literature. The stakes that these shareholders hold 
provide incentive to ensure that managers behave in the manner that adds value to the 
firm. Therefore, institutions given their level of resources have powers to intervene. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) document that the resources available to large shareholders 
enable them collect information useful in executing their role of monitoring managerial 
actions. The key feature of their actions is to enhance information content of stock prices 
~ ~ 
by reducing degree of information asymmetry. 
In the context of monitoring, free-riding problem among shareholders remain divisive 
threat in maximising potential to intervene when managers fail to act in the shareholders' 
interest. However, recent studies show that inability to act collectively provide another 
effective governance mechanism though exit. Parrino, Sias and Starks (2003) provide 
evidence of institutions' exit when dis~atisfied with management as disciplining 
mechanism. They report decrease in ·holding of well-informed institutional following 
forced CEO turnover. Edmans (2009) suggest that selling process have two direct impacts 
on firms· and managers; first, it allows information to be impounded into stock prices and 
hence reflect the fundamental value. Second, affect equity compensation attached to 
managers by driving down prices. 
On the oth~r hand, increasing number of large shareholders enhance their ability to voice 
on matters related to the firm. Attig, Guedhami and Mishra (2008) suggest that multiple 
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large shareholders structures exert an internal governance role in curbing private benefits 
and reducing information asymmetry, perhaps to sidestep deficiencies in the external 
.. 
institutional environment. Small, Smith and Yildirim (2007) point out" that as 
the number of blockholders increases, the individual cost' that each free-rider costs 
decrease. It can therefore argued that presence of large number of blockholders can better 
institute governance through voice as ,the stake of each have the power to draw 
management attention and reduce managerial opportunism. 
This study examines the impact of institutional shareholders on firm's information 
environment in eleven (1 I) Europen countries. I investigate the role of largest shareholder 
and blockholders in reducing information asymmetry within firms. Several studies have 
shown that shareholders with . substantial holding in firms provide effective monitoring 
that reduce agency problem. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) document that large shareholders 
are better monitor given the stake invested in the firms. Chen, Harford and Li (2007) 
suggest that institutions gather and use information to affect firm policies as part of their 
monitoring role. In this study, I focus on the effect of institutions that is largest 
shareholder and blockholders, on incorporation of firm's specific information into stock 
prices. 
Recent studies also suggest that not all institutions have similar impact on firms, the level 
and influence in their monitoring depends on the business relationship with firms they 
invest in. Brickley, Lease and Smith Jr (1988), Almazan, Jay and Laura (2005) and 
Ferreira and Matos (2008) document that institutions with close relationship with 
. . 
management and business association are not good monitors. I investigate whether type of . 
largest shareholder affects the firm's information environment. Previous studies in this 
area invest'igate anti takeover· amendment proposals, compensatio~ and performance, 
therefore at best little has' been covered on the ability to affect firm's information 
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environment. I also examine whether the number of blockholders affects incorporation of 
firm-specific information. Edmans and Manso (2010) provide a theoretical model and 
"" 
document that multiple blockholders offer effective governance mechanism through exit. 
In addition," McCahery, Starks and Sautner (2010) show that 80% of the investors they 
interview are willing to sell their shares as form of activism. 
This study is motivated by Brockman and Van (2009) and Gul, Kim and Qiu (2010) 
which investigate the effect of ownership on firm-specific information. Brockman and 
Yan (2009) examine the impact of blocks owned by outsiders and employee on the firm's 
information environment and argue that while outsider blockholders have significant 
impact; employees' ownership does not have any effect for U.S. firms. On the other hand, 
Gul, Kim and Qiu (2010) show concave relationship between ownership and firm 
informativeness using Chinese listed firms. They also find that stock prices are less 
informative when the largest shareholder i~ government. In this study I provide a more 
extensive examination of largest and block ownership effect in different institutional 
structures. 
I contribute to the literature on stock price informativeness by showing a significant 
.. 
negative relation between largest shareholder and synchronicity. Stock" price 
synchronicity proxy for the amount of firm-specific information impounded into stock 
prices. Interestingly, I find the relation to be significant in countries with better 
institutions and insignificant without introducing country-level governance. I show that 
largest shareholder affects firm's information environ~ent in countries with strong 
shareholder protection measured by anti-director index, effective investor protection and 
overall country-level governance. I also investigate the relationship between type of 
largest sh~~eholder and stock price informativeness. I "find that when the largest 
shareholder is independent; stock prices are more informative. The result is consistent 
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with the view that independent institutions are more effective in collecting information 
and hence monitoring. 
I also show that the blockholders have significant negative relationship with 
synchronicity. This therefore supports previous findings that blockholders have 
significant impact on firm-specific information. A number of empirical studies on 
corporate governance features and cour~try characteristics have been conducted. Durnev 
and Kim (2005) and Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007) provide evidence on the effect that" 
country institutions have on governance. I add to this. developing line of literature by 
showing that the effect of blockholders is more pronounced in countries with better 
institutional structure. In addition, I examine whether the number of block owners 
influence firm information environment. Gallagher, Gardner and Swan (2012) examine 
II 
the effect of governance through trading by looking at the institutions trading sequence. I 
find a significant negative relation between the number of blockholders and 
synchronicity. One explanation for this finding is that increasing number of h,lockholders 
enhances the production of firm specific information as an outcome of their ability to 
monitor and continuous trading activities. 
This remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 develops hypotheses by 
building on from previous works. Section 3 discusses ·data, sample characteristics and the 
variables used. Section 4 presents the main evidence from the empirical analysis, which is 
followed by robustness tests and concluding remarks In Section 5 and Section 6 
respectively. 
". 
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6.2 Hypothesis Development 
6.2.1 Largest shareholder and stock price synchronicity 
Empirical evidence on the nature ownership around the world provides contrasting view. 
Early study by Berle and Means (1932) suggest that ownership is widely dispersed, but 
the myth is different' around the world. Recent evidence suggests that ownership is more 
concentrated in the hands of few shareholders in some countries. La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer (1999) find that majority of firms have controlling shareholder. 
Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) investigate separation of ownership and control in 
nine East Asian countries and find that more than two-thirds of firms are controlled by a 
single shareholder. Faccio and Lang (2002) provide a clear nature of ownership in 
Western European firms. They show different ownership characterised by widely held 
firms especially in the UK and Ireland; and controlling shareholder in the form of family, 
state or widely held corporations in Western EUf(;>pean countries. 
Presence of largest shareholder has been subject of interest in a number of empirical 
studies. The level of stake that shareholder have can significantly affect their behaviour in 
firms that they invest in. Huddart (1993) suggest that large shareholder bears more 
idiosyncratic firm risk as his stake in the firm increases, as such this increase monitoring 
that enhance value. This is consistent with Shleifer and Vishny (1986) who document that 
large shareholders are better monitor given the stake invested in the firms. Further, 
Admati, Pfleiderer and Zechner (1994) develop a model in which they show that largest 
shareholder exert monitoring influence even if when free-riding problem exist. 
On the other hand, large shareholder has incentive to expropriate minority shareholders by 
extracting the private benefit. Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) suggest that monitoring 
is ineffective if it increases threat of expropriation. As result,Noe (2002) suggest that 
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large shareholder may forgo monitoring when there is benefit from information 
asymmetry with other minority shareholders. Consistent with Gibson (2003) finding that 
there is no link between. CEO turnover and firm performance. Investigating takeovers, 
Boehmer (2000) show no value maximisation is achieved for firms with large shareholder 
with control. 
Therefore, whether large shareholders are effective in monitoring or not remains an 
empirical question. Maug (1998) suggest that if monitoring is costly, market liquidity 
provide solution to mitigate the problem that small shareholders free ride on the effort of 
the large shareholder. Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004) indicate that liquidity generates 
information about the firm and the large shareholder's activities as a result increase his 
incentive to enhance value. If .. this is the case, then the' presence of large shareholder 
should improve firm's information environment. I therefore expect publicly traded firms 
.with large shareholder to be more informative as parts of his. actions are more likely to be 
obs~rved. Formally, the first hypothesis is stated as: 
Hypothesis 1: The presence of large shareholder is more likely to make firm more 
informative. 
However, recent studies' show that not all shareholders have similar impact on firms in 
which they invest. Brickley, Lease and Smith Jr (1988) and Almazan, Jay and Laura 
(2005) suggest two types of institutional shareholders; pressure sensitive (passive) and 
pressure insensitive (active) institutions. The former are said~o have close business ties 
with the firm and management which affects their ability to monitor, while the later are 
more participative institutions that invest in monitoring. Chen, Harford and Li (2007) find 
that independent· institutions are . related to post merger performances and make 
withdrawal of bad bids more likely suggesting their effectiveness in monitoring. Further, 
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Ferreira and Matos (2008) suggest independent institution as efficient in collecting 
infonnation. Therefore, I expect that when the large shareholder is independent of finn, 
the degree of infonnation collection for monitoring and trading to increase as a result 
increase finn-specific infonnation. Fonnally, the second hypothesis is stated as: 
Hypothesis 2: Finns in which large shareholder is independent are more likely to be more 
infonnative. 
Further, Barclay and Holderness (1989) suggest that large shareholders may accrue 
private benefits that are unavailable to others depending on the fraction of their 
ownership, in that way expropriate other shareholders. Cheung, Rau and Stouraitis (2006) 
show that finns that undertake connected transactions are more likely to have negative 
abnormal returns when the ownetship of largest shareholder increases. Dyck and Zingales 
(2004) and Doidge, et aI., (2009) propose that expropriation is high in countries that have 
weak institutions. In support of this proposition, Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) show 
that strong and well enforced· outsi~er rights prevent expropriation through proper 
infonnation disclosure. In addition, De Fond, Hung and Trezevant (2007) propose that 
investor protection affects information content of finn's announcement as a result makes 
finn more infonnative. Consistently, Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) show that 
enforcement works best with better legal institutions and improve price infonnativeness. 
These results indicate that better institutions are more likely to curb expropriation and 
hence improve monitoring. When monitoring is effective, there is likelihood that that 
level and quality of infonnation disclosure will be high. Fonnally, the third hypothesis is 
stated as: 
H'ypothesis 3: Th~. effect of large sh~reholder in enhancing finn infonnativeness is more 
likely to be stronger in countries wit~ better institutions 
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6.2.2 Blockholders and stock price synchronicity 
Blockholders have significant role to· play in corporate governance particularly with 
regard to liquidity and information production process. Brockman and Van (2009) 
examine the impact of blockholders on firm's information environment for U.S firms. 
Following Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000), Brockman and Van (2009) use stock price 
synchronicity to proxy for firm-specific information53• They propose that blockholders 
increase amount of firm specific information relative to market and industry-wide 
information. Moreover, Heflin and Shaw (2000) argue that despite blockholders important 
role in monitoring which reduces agency problem, they also have access and/or can 
develop private, value-relevant information. If blockholders are effective in information' 
collection their ability to monitor and/or trade on 'private information is enhanced. 
II . 
Therefore, I expect the amount of firm-specific information incorporated into stock prices 
to increase. Formally, the fourth hypothesis is stated as: 
Hypothesis 4: The presence of blockholders is more likely to make firm more 
informative. 
Because monitoring is .costly, blockholders' ability is very much compromised by the 
free-riding problems. Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) provide a reason for this that active 
shareholders realise a relatively small fraction of the benefits from their monitoring while 
bearing the full cost. They suggest exit as alternative option for shareholders when 
managers fail to act in their interest. In addition, the actions of shareholders are effective 
when in possession of information for their exit to have impact on managers. 
Edmans .. (2009) show that by trading on private information, blockholders monitor the . 
• firm's fundamental value and promote managerial actions that increase shareholders' 
53 They also use probability of informed trading and idiosyncratic volatility. 
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value. However, Edmans and Manso (2010) argue that in order to exert governance 
through trading, large number of blockholders is essential as their activities become 
difficult to coordinate with each seeking trading profit. On the other hand, blockholders 
have resources to gather information about the firm and enhance their monitoring 
(Edmans and Manso (2010)). In addition, Small, Smith and Yildirim (2007) suggest that 
the presence of large number of blockholders is also essential in reducing individual cost 
of free-riding. Thus, I would expect that increasing number of blockholders to enhance 
trading frequency associated with exit and/ or enable blockholders to exert their 
monitoring influence as a result enhance the amount of information impounded into stock 
prices. Formally, the fifth hypothesis is stated as: 
Hypothesis 5: Firms with large number of blockholders is more 'likely I to ,be more 
informative. 
On the other hand, desire to maximise profit through blockholding may have significant 
impact on firms and other shareholders. Barclay, Holderness and Pontiff (1993) show that 
closed-end fund receive large discount to net asset in when blockholders dominate 
ownership. The results suggest that blockholders receive private benefits that do not 
accrue to other shareholders and that they veto open-ending proposals to preserve 
their benefits. In addition, Thomsen, Pedersen and K vist (2006) find a negative 
association between blockholder ownership and firm value or accounting ret~rns in the 
next period for firms in Continental Europe. They suggest existing conflicts of interest 
between blockholders and minority investors. However, in countries with stronger 
institutional structure minority shareholders receive higher levels of protection. Doidge, et 
aI., (2009) suggest that investor friendly-environment reduce benefits derived from 
'"' . 
"'expropriation. Therefore, I would expect that better institution to have significant impact 
" 
on the way blQckholders conduct their affairs. As such the effect of blockholders on firm 
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governance should be strengthened in a positive manner in countries with better 
institutions as a result affect firm's information environment. Formally, the sixth 
hypothesis is stated as: 
Hypothesis 6: The effect of blockholders in enhancing firm informativeness is more 
likely to be stronger in countries with better institutions 
6.3 Data and sample 
6.3.1 Sample 
To select the sample, I start with largest firms by market capitalisation from national 
indixes in eleven (11) countries namely: Belgium (20), Denmark (20), Finland (25), 
France (40), Germany (30), Ireland' (20), Italy (40), the Netherlands (25), Spain (35), 
.. 
Sweden (30), and the United Kingdom (l00). The sample period is from 2003-2007. The 
sample excludes all financial and utility firms. To avoid sample selection bias, several 
criteria have been taken into account. First, firms must be listed for at least a year. 
Second, to alleviate survivorship bias, I retain firms that were available at the beginning 
of the sample period but dropped from the indices during the sample period and remained 
publicly listed. I further require that each firm have at least two years of observations over 
the sample period to allow for application of different econometric specifications. 
Of possible maximum of 1,143 firm-year observations after taking into account missing 
observations following takeovers, cessation of operation, change in listing country and 
exclusion of financial and utilities firms; I remain with 1,065 firm-years with complete 
observations. To ensure the observations are not driven by outlier and possible data errors, 
I winsorise,all variables at the bottom and top 1 % levels. 
,,' 
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The ownership data is hand collected from the firms' annual reports, reference documents 
and the websites. To ensure that data for the largest shareholder, blockholders' ownership 
and number of blockholders is not overstated, I follow Dlugosz, et aI., (2006) data 
cleaning process. I follow up reported shareholding structure to ensure that no direct or 
indirect owner(s) is listed twice as owner of the same firm. To illustrate this consider 
ownership structure of Kazakhmys Pic (UK). The latter has three blockholder with stakes 
exceeding 5%; Cuprum Holding B.V. with.29.1 %, Harper Finance Limited with 21.7% 
and Perry Partners S.A. with 15.6%. The executive chairman holds 100% interest in 
Cuprum Holding B.V. and 50% in Harper Finance Limited making a total ownership of 
39.95% (29.1% + 10.85%). For the purpose of this study I consider Cuprum Holding B.V. 
as the largest single shareholder (and blockholder). As for outside blockholders54, I 
consider Kazakhmys Pic to have none (as all blockholders are controlled by directors .or 
have close ties with the company). To illustrate further, consider Repsol YPF SA (Spain) 
which has three shareholders with stakes above 5%; La Caixa with 10.17%, BBV A with 
8.17% and Repinves with 5.63%. However, La Caixa has a 41.4% holding of Repinves, 
making a total shareholding of 12.50% (10.17% + 2.33%). Therefore, I consider the firm 
r, 
to have two (2) blockhold~.rs instead of 3 and largest single shareholder having 12.50% 
instead of 10.17%. This is important for a number of reasons; first, it allows to get the 
appropriate shareholding of the largest shareholder and identity, that is whether 
independent or grey. Second, it provides conservative approach in determining the 
number of blockholders in the firm and total blockholders' ownership. Dlugosz, et aI., 
(2006) show that using uncorrected data increases bias in the coefficient and hence the 
results.-
,," 
S4 See robustness test 
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6.3.2 Stock price synchronicity measure and variable definitions 
The, main dependent variable in this study is stock price synchronicity measured 
following Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000). I estimate synchronicity by decomposing firm 
specific return from industry and market returns. This allows capturing firm-specific 
information incorporated in the industry and market, wide information. To estimate 
synchronicity, I determine R2 of the following model using monthly stock returns of a 
firm on the corresponding industry and market return: 
Where RE~., is monthly stock return for firm i and month t, using DataStream' s total 
, return index (RI), which includes dividends as well as price changes based on 12 monthly 
observations in the year55. MKTRET and INDRET represent market and industry return 
respectively both collected from the DataStream and c/,t is unspecified error term. 
Consistently with other studies such as Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) and Piotroski and, 
Roulstone (2004) method in determining synchronicity. The latter is therefore calculated 
as follows: 
, (' R2 ) SYNCH = Log --2 
I-R 
Where R2 is the coefficient of determination from the estimation of regression above. 
The log transformation of R2 creates an unbounded continuous variable out of a variable 
originally bounded by 0 and I, yielding a dependent variable with a more normal 
distribution. SYNCH is measured for each firm-year in the sample. 
,,' 
55 For weekly return (used in the robustness test), a total of 52 weekly observations in the year are used. 
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I measure firmi 's institutional ownership in year t. TOPI is defined as the percentage of 
equity held by largest institution in firm i. TOPIID is defined as the identity of largest 
sha'reholder that takes the value of one if the shareholder is categorised as independent 
institution (Ferreira and Matos (2008) define independent institution as those more likely 
to collect information and face less regulatory restrictions or have fewer potential 
business relationships with the corporation they invest in) and zero otherwise. I use 
several data sources including Morningstar and Hemscott to determine the identity of the 
largest owner and ensure that it is consistent with previous studies. I define block 
ownership (BLOCK) following Dlugosz, et aI., (2006) and Chen, Harford and Li (2007), 
as holdings by institutions with at least 5% of shares. Number of block owners 
(NBLOCK) is defined as a number all shareholders with ownership in excess of 5%. In 
the regression models, NBLOCK is given as the logarithm value of one plus the number 
of blockholders. 
The control variables for this study are motivated by Piotroski and Roulstone (2004), 
Chan and Hameed (2006), Ferreira and Laux (2007) and Gul, Kim and Qiu (2010). The 
variables include trading volume (VOL) computed ,as the total number of shares traded in 
a year, divided by the total number of shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year. 
Leverage (LEV) is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets. Firm size (SIZE) 
computed as the log of total assets at the end of the fiscal year. Standard deviation of 
return on assets (STDROA), ROA is calculated as the ratio of net income to the book 
value of total assets. Market-to-book (MB) ratio, computed as the total market value of 
equity, divided by the book value of equity at the end of the fiscal year. The number of 
firms in the industry in which a firm belongs' (INDNUM computed as the natural 
logarit~m value. The total" asset of all sample firms in the industry to which a firm 
belongs (INDSIZE) measured as the natural logarithm value of the total assets. 
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Table 6-1 Descriptive statistics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for each variable. The sample period is from 2003 to 2007. R2 
and SYNCH refer to the R2 statistic and the stock price synchronicity measure given as In(R2/1 - R2) 
. respectively calculated using monthly returns from market model regression. rap 1 refers to ownership by 
the largest single shareholder. raPID refers to identity of the largest single shareholder given as a dummy 
variable that takes value of one if the shareholder is independent institution and zero otherwise. BLOCK is 
the percentage of shares held by the shareholders of the firm with at least 5% of share ownership. NBLOCK 
is the number of blockholders in the firm. VOL is trading volume computed as the total number of shares 
traded in a year, divided by the total number of shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year. SIZE is firm 
size computed as the natural log of total assets in millions at the end of the fiscal year. srDROA is the 
standard deviation of return on assets. LEV is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets. MlB is 
market-to-book ratio, computed as the total market value of equity, divided by the book value of equity at 
the end of the fiscal year. INDNUM is the natural log of number of firms in the industry in which a firm 
belongs. INDSIZE is the natural log of total asset of all sample firms in the industry to which a firm belongs 
in millions. All variables are winsorised at the bottom ~nd top 1 %. 
Std. ,5th 25th 75th 
Variable Mean Dev Pctl Pctl Median Pctl 
R2 . 0.576 0.251 0.150 0.380 0.570 0.770 
. SYNCH 0.288 1.685 -1.735 -0.490 0.282 1.208 
TOPI 0.203 0.172 0.040 0.080 0.130 0.290 
TOPID 0.292 0.455 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000, 
BLOCK 0.275 0.207 0.000 0.100 0.240 0.400 
tI 
NBLOCK 1.827 1.326 0.000 1.000 2.000 2.000 
In{l+NBLOCK) 0.934 0.466 0.000 0.693 1.099 1.099 
VOL 1.313 0.928 . 0.020 0.660 1.200 1.840 
SIZE 22.715 2.179 19.442 20.470 22.742 24.426 
STDROA 0.054 0.045 0.008 0.025 0.043 0.066 
LEV 0.222 1.072 0.000 0.070 0.110 0.170 
MIB 3.785 4.910 1.000 1.720 2.660 4.110 
INDNUM 1.450 0.739 0.000 1.099 1.609 1.946 
INDSIZE 19.89I.. 2.907 16.579 17.834 18.632 22.881 
6.3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 6-1 presents' descriptive statistics on synchronicity, ownership and control 
variables. The mean (median) value of R2 is 0.576 (0.570) significantly higher than 0.193 
(0.148) and 0.454 (0.462) reported by Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) for U.S. and Gul, 
Kim and Qiu (2010) for China that used similar model estimations. The mean (median) 
value of th-e SYNCH is 0.288 (0282) which are also much higher than -1.742 (-1.754) 
,,' 
reported in Piotroski and Roulstone (2004). This suggests that stock returns for firms in 
the sample tend to move together with market and industry return. 
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95th 
Pctl 
0.910 
2.314 
0.550 
1.000 
0.640 
4.000 
1.609 
3.020 
.. 
26.710 
0.146 
0.410 
8.840 
2.639 
24.793 
Table 6-2 Blockholder Ownership 
The table presents the average total blockholders ownership and total largest shareholder ownership by country and year.Blockholders ownership is the sum of holdings 
by owners with at least 5% of the shares. Largest shareholder is the ownership of single largest owner in the firm. The columns titled Average and Average yearly change 
show the average ownership over the sample period and average annual change in ownership in 2003-2007 respectively. Data on ownership is collected from company's 
annual report~, reference documents and websites. All values are in percentage. 
Total Blockholders Ownership Total Largest Shareholder Ownership 
Countries Average Average 
2003 2004· 2005 2006 2007 Average Yearly 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average Yearly 
Change Change 
.~ 
BelgIUm 35.6 35.6 35.1 36.2 36.6 35.8 0.7 29.4 30 28.5 28 31.3 29.4 1.8 
Denmark 46.4 42.7 51.8 47.4 46.4 46.9 0.7 36.9 34.1 41.8 38.3 38.1 37.8 1.5 
Finland 22.2 23.I 20.8 19.3 18.8 20.8 -3.8 .18.5 17.3 15.4 16.8 13.6 16.3 -6.8 
France 26.5 25 21.5 21.6 23.3 23.6 -2.9 
'* 
20.6 17.8 16.1 16.8 17.8 17.8 -3.3 
Gennany· 26.5 27.5 24.9 24.8 25.5 25.8 -0.9 21.3 20.5 19.2 18.7 19.8 19.9 -1.7 
Ireland 36.3 38 31.7 30.4 32.2 33.7 -2.5 24.3 23.3 19.4 19.I 20.9 21.4 -3.2 
Italy 44.3 43.7 39.4 37.8 37.2 40.5 -4.2 ' 43.5 42.8 36.7 35 36.1 38.8 -4.3 
Netherlands 20 20.2 20.3 28.2 29.3 23.6 11.1 16 14.3 13.3 14.6 16 14.8 0.4 
Spain 41.1 48.I 47.6 54.8 54.6 49.2 7.7 24.6 26.7 ·28.4 30.7 30.6 28.2 5.7 
. Sweden 24.8 20.3 18.3 24.6 25 22.6 2.0 17.6 15.3 15.3 16.7 16.9 16.4 -0.6 
United Kingdom 1~ 18.4 19 18.1 21.5 19.0 4.9 13.5 14.5 14.9 14.1 14.3 14.3 1.6 
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Further, both R2 and SYNCH show significant variation in their higher standard 
deviations and inter quartiles. The lower qu~rtile for R2 and SXNCH are 0.380 and -0.490 
while the upper are 0.770 and 1.208 respectively. The standard deviations of and 
SYNCH are 0.251 and 1.685 respectively indicating that there is a big cross-section 
variation especially on the later. This variation can be explained by the cross-country 
differences in the sample which appears to have significant impact on the firm-specific 
information. 
Table 6-1 also provides descriptive statistics institutional ownership. On average, largest 
shareholder holds 20.3% (13%) of shares for firms in the sample. Of these, 29.2% are 
independent institutions with fewer potential business relationships with the firms in 
which they invest in. On average; block "owners have 27.5% «24%) holdings in the 
sample firms and each firm have 1.827 (2) blockholders owning those, shares. The lower 
quartile for TOPI, TOPlID, BLOCK and NBLOCK are 8%, 0, 100/0 and I respectively 
while the upper are 29%, 1,40% and 2 respectively. The mean values of TOP 1, TOPIID 
and BLOCK are higher than the median values, indicating that the distributions of these 
variables are right-skewed. 
Table 6-2 shows statistics of blockholders and largest shareholder ownership by country 
and year. The table shows that on average the ownership of blockholders vary from 19% 
in the UK to 46.9% in Germany. Further, on average blockholders' ownership change 
from -4.2% in the Italy to 11.1 % in Netherlands. As for largest single shareholder, high 
ownership levels exist in continental Europe. For instance, on average there are single 
sharehoJder owning more than 25% of shares in Belgium (29.4%), Denmark (37.8%), 
Italy (38.8%) and Spain (28.2%). Over the sample period, ownership by single 
.. ' 
shareholder show little changes especially in countries with highest ownership. On 
average, si'ngle shareholder ownership varies between -6.8 in Finland and 5.7% in Spain. 
203 
Table 6-3 Frequency of Blockholders 
The table below presents frequency of multiple blockholders for the firms in the sample for the period 2003-
2007. Blockholders are defined as shareholders that hold at least 5% of shares in the firm. Outside 
blockholders are defined as shareholders that hold "at least 5% of shares in the firm excluding families,. 
directors, employees, governments and government institutions. Data is collected from company's annual 
reports, reference documents and websites. 
All blockholders Outside blockholders 
Number of % offirms Number of firms 
firms with N withN withN % of firms with 
N blockholders blockholders blockholders N blockholders 
0 116 11.4 262 25.7 
371 36.4 350 34.4 
2 317 31.1 238 23.4 
3 141 13.9 114 11.2 
4 64 6.3 50 . 4.9 
5 29 2.9 17 1.7 
6 5 0.5 5 0.5 
7 2 0.2 2 0.2 
8 3 0.3 2 0.2. 
10 0.1 0.1 
11 0.1 0.1 
Table 6-3 presents the frequency of multiple blockholders in the Bample. The table shows 
that at least 54% of the firms have multiple blockholders. In addition, 13.9% have at least 
three blockholders. Using a conservative approach in defining outside blockholders, the 
table shows slight changes in the number of mUltiple blockholders. The figure for firms 
with m~Itiple blockholders changes to 42.3% from 55.4%. Further, the table shows that at 
least 11.20/0 of firms have three or more blockholders. For the purpose of this study, I 
define blockholders as shareholders with at least 5% of shares in the firm. 
Other studies such as Faccio and Lang (2002) and Laeven and Levine (2008) define 
blockholders as shareholder. having at least 10% of shares (voting rights). This study 
follows Edmans (2009) and Edmans and Manso (2010), which define blockholder as 
shareholdei..with greater information than the market. As such, they argue that a 
,., . 
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Table 6-4 Stock price synchronicity and ownership 
This table shows results of panel regression of stock return synchronicity on ownership for the period 2003 
to 2007. The dependent variable is stock return synchronicity. The main independent variables are TOP} 
refers to ownership by the largest single shareholder. TOPID refers to identity of the largest single 
shareholder given as a dummy variable that takes value of one if the shareholder is independent institution 
and zero otherwise. BLOCK is the percentage of shares held by the shareholders of the firm with at least 5% 
of share ownership. NBLOCK is the number of block holders in the firm given by the logarithm value of 
one plus the number of block holders. All variables are defined in Appendix 6-2. The table reports results for 
panel regressions with country, industry and year fixed effects and standard errors corrected for firm-level 
clustering. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, * *, * * * indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% levels. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
TOPI -0.254 
( -0.95) 
TOPID -0.164** 
(-2.50) 
BLOCK -0.219** 
(-1.97) 
NBLOCK -0.639** . 
(-2.24) 
VOL 0.099 0.110* 0.097 0.119** 
(1.63) (1.92) (1.59) (2.06) 
SIZE 0.028 0.027 0.027 0.032 
(1.25) (1.21 ) (1.22) (1.41 ) 
LEV 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.005 
(0.14) (0.18) (0.14) (0.23) 
STDROA -0.008** -0.004** -0.016** ~0.088** 
(-2.30) ( -2.35) (-2.34) (-2.32) 
MB -0.0'06** -0.001 * -0.006** -0.001 * 
(-2.01) ( -1.88) (-1.97) (-1.79) 
INDNUM 0.126 0.143 0.138. 0.138 
(0.67) (0.74) (0.73) (0.72) 
INDSIZE 0.038 0.040 0.037 0.033 
(1.20) (1.28) ( 1.19) ( 1.05) 
Constant -1.013** -0.924** -1.030** -0.911 ** 
(-2.35) (-2.13) (-2.38) (-2.06) 
R2 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.38 
N 1,065 1,065 1,065 1,065 
blockholder. has strong incentives to gather costly information about the firm's 
fundamental value. Therefore, the 5% stake is sufficient to gain access to management or 
provide incentive to analyse the firm. Further, Gallagher, Gardner and Swan· (2012) 
suggest that the 5% threshold or bel0"Y is necessary to exert governance through trading .. 
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Table 6-5 Stock price synchronicity and ownership: the role of infrastructure 
This table shows results of panel regression of stock return synchronicity on ownership for the period 2003 
to 2007. The dependent variable is stock return sy~chronicity. The main independent variables are TOP} 
refers to ownership by the largest single shareholder. TOPID refers to identity of the largest single I 
shareholder given as a dummy variable that takes value of one if the shareholder is independent institution 
and zero otherwise. BLOCK is the percentage of shares held by the shareholders of the firm with at least 5% 
of share ownership. DADIR is anti-directors' rights dummy, DEIP is investor protection dummy and DCGI 
is the overall country-level governance index dummy. All variables are defined in Appendix 6-2. The table 
reports results for panel regressions with country, industry and year fixed effects and standard errors 
corrected for firm-level clustering. Robust t-statistics are reported in pa~entheses. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1 % levels. 
(1) (2 (3 
TOPI -0.038 -0.048 ·-0.222 
(-1.09) (-1.14) (-1.60) 
TOPI x DADIR -0.595* 
(-1.90) 
TOPI x DEIP -0.643* 
(-1.92) 
TOPI x DCGl -0.294** 
(-2.20) 
BLOCK -0.219* -0.009* -0.319* 
(-1.97) (-1.93) (-1.90) 
BLOCK x DADIR -0.540** 
(-1.99) 
BLOCK xDEIP -0.511** 
(-2.11) 
BLOCK x DCGI -0.120** 
(-2.40) 
VOL 0.099* 0.102* 0.1 09* 0.097* 0.103* 0.110· 
(1.87) (1.75) (1.87) (1.97) (1.79) (1.91 ) 
SIZE 0.03 0.029 0.029 0.027 0.026 0.027 
(1.32) (1.30) (1.29) (1.23) ( 1.19) (1.21 ) 
LEV 0.004 .. 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 
(0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11 ) (0.13) 
STDROA -0.013** . -0.005** -0.010** -0.020** -0.010** -0.008** 
(-2.09) ( -2.23) (-2.31) (-2.20) (-2.23) (-2.28) 
MB -0.001* -0.001 * -0.001 * -0.001 * -0.001 * -0.001 * 
(-1.81) (-1.79) (-1.90) (-1.92) (-1.72) (-1.88) 
INDNUM 0.134 0.129 0.143 0.152 0.144 0.144 
(0.72) (0.69) (0.74) (0.81) (0.77) (0.75) 
INDSIZE -0.038 -0.037 -0.039 -0.039 -0.037 -0.039 
(-1.20) ( -1.17) ( -1.24) (-1.24) (-1.19) (-1.24) 
Constant -0.889** -0.882** -0.904** -0.934" -0.919** -0.924** 
(-2.06) (-2.04) (-2.10) (-2.18) (-2:14) (-2.1 6) 
R2 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.39 
N 1,065 1,065 1,065 1,065 1,065 1,065 
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6.4 Main Evidence 
In this section, I examine how ownership (blockholders and largest shareholder) and 
shareholder's identity affects stock price synchronicity which proxy firm-specific 
information. Therefore, the main dependent variable is stock price synchronicity 
(SYNCH) which is the log t,ransformation of R2. 
6.4.1 Synchronicity and Institutional Ownership 
To examine the relation between synchronicity and institutional ownership, I employ 
,several ordinary least squares (OLS) panel regressions. All the regression estimates 
account for industry and country dummy variables to control for industry and country 
heteregoneity. I also include year dummy to account for cross sectional dependency 
(Wooldridge (2008)). In addition, I adjust, I-statistics in the panel regressions for 
heteroskedasticity and within-firm correlation using clustered standard errors. 
Table 6-4 presents regression results on the relationship between synchronicity and 
ownership. Column (l) indicates that ownership by single largest shareholder has no 
significant impact on, the synchronicity. (One explanation to this is that largest 
shareholder is closely tied to management as a result reduces the ability to turn private 
information into public by increasing agency costs. Another explanation can be that 
largest shareholders are either in effective in monitoring or due to their large stake they 
are tied to the firm they invest in, making it difficult to exit as this may harm portfolios 
that they hold). Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) show shareholders with large stakes 
have significant effect on corporate policies. This can help explain this finding as 
managers have less incentive to produce high quality disclosure since the largest 
shareholder'knows more about the firm than it would have been expected otherwise. 
n' 
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Column (2) shows the relation between synchronicity and identity of the largest 
shareholder. The coefficient on the identity of largest shareholder is negative and 
significant at 5% with robust t-statistic of -2.50. The results suggest that when the largest 
shareholder is independent of the firm in which she invest (fewer business relation), 
amount of firm-specific information impounded into stock prices increase. This support 
Ferreira and Matos (2008) argument that independent institutions are more likely to 
collect and trade on private information~ Similarly, Chen, Harford and Li (2007) suggest 
that independent institutions benefit from the information generated from their monitoring 
effort and hence adjust their portfolio prior to negative events. (This may indicate that 
through monitoring, institutions generate superior information that allows to trade and 
hence impound more information on stock prices). 
Table 6-4 also highlights the impact of blockholders (ownership and number) on 
synchronicity. Results presented in column (3) show that block owners have a negative 
significant impact on the synchronicity with a coefficient of -0.219 and a robust t-statistic . 
of -1.97. Column (4) indicates the relation between number of blockholders in the firm 
(given as logarithm value of one plus number of blockholders) and synchronicity. The 
.. 
results show that number of blockholders (NBLOCK) has a significant negative relation 
with synchronicity. The coefficient of NBLOCK is -0.639 with a robust t-statistic of -
2.24. These results suggest that ownership by blockholders increase the flow, of firm-
specific information and result into low syncronicity. The results also support the Edmans 
and Manso (2010),s model which suggest that multiple blockholders discipline managers 
through trading which in turn impound information into stock prices. Therefore, the 
coordination difficulties associated with large number of blockholders, is outweighed by 
t~e ~bjlity of multiple blo~kholders to trade 'which move prices towards fundamental 
values. On the other hand, the relationship co'uld mean that blockholders are effective in 
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Table 6-6 Stock price synchronicity and ownership: fixed effects 
This table shows results of panel regression with firm fixed effects of stock return synchronicity on 
ownership for the period 2003 to 2007. The dependent variable is stock return synchronicity. The main 
independent variables are rap 1 refers to ownership by the largest single shareholder. raPID refers to 
identity of the largest single shareholder given as a dummy variable that takes value of one if the 
shareholder is independent institution and zero otherwise. BLOCK is the percentage of shares held by the· 
shareholders of the firm with at least 5% of share ownership. NBLOCK is the number of blockholders in the 
firm given by the logarithm value of one plus the number of blockholders. All variables are defined in 
Appendix 6-2. The table reports standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering. Robust t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. *, * *, * * * indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1 % levels. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
TOPI -0.187 
(-1.46) 
TOPID -0.028* 
(-1.87) 
BLOCK -0.175* 
( -1.83) 
NBLOCK -0.025* 
(-1.67) 
VOL 0.056 0.052 0.056 0.055 
(1.21 ) ( 1.21) (1.23) (1.27) 
SIZE 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.009 
(0.24) (0.23) (0.24) (0.28) 
LEV 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.005 
(0.44) (0.48) (0.42) (0.34) 
STDROA -0.048- -0.050" -0.048- -0.05f· 
(-1.90) (-2.01) (-1.94) (-2.11) 
MB -0.002·" -0.002"· -0.002·" -0.002"· 
(-6.22) (-6.24) (-6.43) (-6.04) 
INDNUM 0.015 0.004 0.015 0.005 
(0.09) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) 
INDSIZE -0.050 -0.049 -0.050 -0.044 
(-1.62) ( -1.57) (-1.62) ( -1.44) 
Constant -0.782"· -0.836·" -0.772·" -0.823··· 
(-2.76) (-3.18) (-2.71) (-3.04) 
R2 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 
N 1,065 1,065 1,065 1,065 
monitoring firms in which they invest given their ability and resources to acquire 
information. The stake that this type of shareholders has also provides access to 
-
management which enable to vOice dissatisfaction. 
" 
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6.4.2 Synchronicity, Institutional Ownership and Role of Infrastructure 
Table 6-5 presents results on the relationship between synchronicity, ownership and 
country's institutions. The main interest in the regressions here is how interactions 
between institutions and ownership affect firm-information environment. Column (l) 
shows no significant relationship between synchronicity and top shareholder. However, 
the interaction between top shareholder and anti-director rights index (DAIR) is 
significant negative with coefficient of -0.595 and I-statistic of -1.90. The result can be 
interpreted to mean that top shareholder has significant impact on firm in countries where 
her powers over corporate directors are protected. In other words, when shareholder 
protections are high the ability of top shareholder to affect firm's information 
environment increase as the ability to monitor and collect private information on firm also 
increases. Column (2) also shows significant negative relation of interaction between top 
shareholder and investor protection dummy (DEIP) with synchronicity. Column (3) 
reports the interaction variable (top shareholder ~nd country-level governance) to be 
negatively related to synchronicity. The coefficient of interaction variable is -0.294 with 
robust I-statistic of -2.20. The results suggest that shareholders investing in firms in 
countries with better institutions are more likely to have significant impact on firm 
information environment. Better institutions allow information flow about firm as degree 
of information asymmetry is minimised. ' · 
Column (4)-(6) of Table 6-5 reports estimates for regressions between interaction of 
blockholder and institutions infrastructure with synchronicity. Column (4) shows the 
results of interaction variable (BLOCK x DADIR) with synchronicity, the coefficient of 
interaction-yariable is significant negative with value -0.540 and robust I-statistic of -1.99. 
o· 
'Ihe result shows that the relation between interaction variable and synchronicity is more 
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Table 6-7 Stock price synchronicity and ownership: lagged ownership variables 
. This table shows results of panel regression of stock return synchronicity on ownership for the period 2003 
to 2007. The dependent variable is stock return synchronicity. The main independent variables are rOPI_I 
refers to ownership by the largest single shareholder lagged by one period. rOPID _I refers to identity of 
the largest single shareholder given as a dummy variable that takes value of one if the shareholder is 
independent institution and zero otherwise. BLOCK_I is the percentage of shares held by the shareholders 
of the firm with at least 5% of share ownership lagged by one period. NBLOCK_I is the number of block 
holders in the firm given by the logarithm value of one plus the number of blockholders lagged by one 
period. DADIR is anti-directors' rights dummy, DEIP is investor protection dummy and DCGI is the overall 
country-level governance index dummy. All variables are defined in Appendix 6-2. Regressions include 
country, industry and year fixed effects and standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering. Robust t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%,5% and 1% levels. 
(1) (2) (3) . (4) 
TOPID..:.1 -0.081-- -0.098" 
( -2.23) (-2.23) 
(5) 
BLOCK_l -0.141 * -0.288* 
(-1.90) . (-1.89) 
NBLOCK_l -0.025** 
(1.97) 
TOPID_l x DCGI 
-
-0.032· 
( -1.94) 
BLOCK_l x DCGCl -0.271·· 
(-2.19) . 
VOL 0.140·· 0.136·· 0.159··· 0.140·· 0.130·· . 
(2.41 ) (2.15) (2.74) (2.40) (2.03) 
SIZE 0.017 0.017 0.023 0.017 0.017 
(0.67) (0.67) (0.88) (0.65) (0.65) 
LEV 0.240 0.210 0.150 0.242 0.203 
(0.73) (0.64) (0.45) (0.74) (0.61 ) 
ROA -0.013" • -0.012· -0.012· -0.013·' -0.0 II' 
..< -1.99) (-1.89) (-1.79) (1.98) (-1.79) 
MB -0.001· ~O.OO I' -0.001· -0.001· -0.001·' 
(-1.82) (-1.95) (-1.67) (-1.83) (-2.05) 
INDNUM 0.503* 0.476* . 0.437 0.500* 0.466* 
(1.76) (1.69) (1.53) (1.77) (1.68) 
INDSIZE -0.025 -0.023 -0.013 -0.025 -0.022 . 
(-0.67) (-0.64) (-0.33) (-0.67) (-0.61) 
Constant -0.702· -0.707· -0.767*· -0.694' . -0.748·· 
(-1.89) (-1.94) (-2.08) ( -1.83) (-2.09) 
R2 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.40 
N 848 848 848 848 848 
pronounced suggesting that the .impact of blockholders is more significant in countries 
with stronger shareholders protection. Leuz, e.t aI., (2003) indicate that in environment 
that protects shareholders, ability of managers to conceal infonnation is reduced. 
211 
Column (5). presents the relation between the interaction variables (BLOCK x DEIP) and 
synchronicity, the coefficient is negative and significant. The interaction variable 
(BLOCK x DCGI) is negative and significant suggesting that country~level governance 
enhances blockholders' influence on the level of firm information environment. DeFond, 
Hung and Trezevant (2007) document that country-level. institutions have significant 
influence on the quality and usefulness of the level of information produced by firms. 
These results indicate that the strength of country-level governance enhances 
~lockholders' collection of information private information that allows them to impound 
more information on stock prices as a result brings about appropriate valuation of the 
firm. 
6.5 Robustness tests 
6.5.1 Endogeneity: omitted variables and reverse causality 
It is possible that institutions ownership and firm-specific information are endogenously 
determined. I address the causality issue by examining two endogeneity-related 
alternative explanations for my empirical findings, that is, reverse causality and spurious 
. . 
correlation. To account for .. reverse causality, I employ OLS panel regression method on 
lagged institution ownership variables. This ensures that the relationship is not caused by 
firm's information environment rather the direction is from institution to firm. Table 6-7 
presents some of the results. I continue to find that blockholders to have significant 
negative relation with synchronicity and the relation is more pronounced in countries with 
better institutions. In addition, the largest shareholder is only significant in countries with 
better institutions. Further, I address the omitted variable problem using fixed effect 
method to 'control for unobserved heterogeneity. I therefore repeat the full regression 
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models in Table 6-4; the analysis yields results presented in Table 6-6 consistent with 
earlier findings56• 
6.5.2 Alternative measure of ownership 
In the main findings I determine' the relation between synchronicity and ownership 
(largest share owner and block owners) using true ownership of shares. I re-examine this 
relationship using uncorrected ownership data. The purpose here is to determine whether 
the results ,offer different outcomes. Dlugosz, et aI., (2006) suggest that uncorrected 
ownership data provide economically significant errors-in-variables. I repeat the analysis 
for blockholders, largest shareholder and number of blockhold~rs (the results not 
presented). The analysis yield results consistent with main findings. Interestingly, the 
results show higher standard errors than presented in the main findings especially for 
blockholders and number of blockholders. This suggests that the approach used in the 
main findings present more conservative estimates. 
6.5.3 Excluding UK firms 
hi this study the sample comprises of around 25% of firms from the UK. This may have 
significant impact on the re~ults. Because the large weight on the UK might have effect in 
the results, I repeat the analysis excluding these firms. The analysis (not tabulated) show I 
consistent results indicating that they are not sensitive to excluding UK firms. 
6.5.4 Alternative measure of stock price synchronicity 
This study uses monthly stock return to calculate stock price synchronici~y. The monthly 
return as alleviates the concern of serial and cross-serial correlation in weekly stock 
returns (Fernandes and Ferreira (2008», as a result might provide b~tter results. to ensure 
that this is not the case, I use weekly return as raw material for determining stock price 
S6 Results not presented in Table 6-6 and 6-7 remain qualitatively unchanged. 
213 
synchronicity and repeat the main analysis. The results (not tabulated) show results 
remain intact indicating that this choice does not affect the results. 
6.6 Conclusion 
In this study, I examine the impact of institutional shareholders on firm's information 
environment in eleven (11) Europen countries. The results show that ownership of shares 
to have different impact on impounding information into stock prices. I find that largest 
shareholder has little influence on firm's information environment. Interestingly, I show 
that the relation to be significant in countries with better institutions. I show that largest 
shareholder affects firm's information environment in countries with strong shareholder 
protection measured by anti-director index, effective investor protection and overall 
country-level governance. I also find that~when the largest shareholder is independent, 
stock prices are more informative. The result is consistent with the view that independent 
institutions are more effective in collecting information and hence monitoring. 
Another contribution to the literature is to show that the block ownership have significant 
negative relationship with synchronicity. Empirical studies suggest that both firm-level 
and' country-level features provide important channel in enhancing firm-specific 
information. I add to this developing line of literature by showing that the effect of 
blockholders is more pronounced in countries with better institutional structure. In 
addition, I examine whether the number of block owners influence firm's information 
environment. I find a significant negative relation between the number of blockholders 
and synchronicity. This finding may suggest that increasing number of blockholders 
enhances governance through exit as' proposed in recent studies (Edmans and Manso 
(2010) and 'Gallagher, Gardner and Swan (2012)). 
n' 
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The findings support the view that size of ownership does not necessarily give 
shareholders initiatives to influence governance within finns. In addition, multiple block 
ownership is essentially important despite the implication on activism as a result of free-
riding problems. It provides shareholders with alternative ways through exit to exert 
influence on finns they invest in. I conclude that strength of country's institutions 
safeguard interest of shareholders and provide platfonn to exercise their important role in 
governance. 
, .. 
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Chapter Seven 
Corporate Governance and Market Value of Informative Firms 
7.1 Introduction 
The impact of corporate governance on firm valuation is well documented in the 
literature. A large strand of literature support that there is significant evidence that better 
governance enhances corporate value. The main difference is gauge for corporate 
governance. While most early studies such as Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Conyon and 
Murphy (2000), Davies, Hillier and McCo,Igan (2005)· and Villalonga and Amit (2006) 
have examined the relationship using one aspect of corporate governance, recent. trend 
provide a more integrated approach. Gompers, Ishii and ·Metrick (2003), Brown and 
Caylor (2006) and Aggarwal, et aI., (2009) among others have all provide better 
understanding of corporate governance and firm value using aggregated measure of 
corporate governance. 
However, the question of whether better governance is reflected into stock prices remains 
ambiguous. Gompers, Ishii. and Metrick (2003) show that" portfolio of better governed 
firms generate abnormal return and hence outperform the market. Further, Drobetz, 
Schillhofer and Zimmermann (2004) document that an investment strategy that bought 
better governed firms and poorly governed firms earned abnormal returns of around 12% 
on an annual basis for the sample of Germany firms. These findings are challenged by 
Cremers and Nair (2005) who find that annualised abnormal return only exist when both 
internal' an? external governance mechanisms are effective. Consistently, Core, Guay and 
Rusticus (2006) indicate nqt support the hyp~thesis that weak governance causes poor 
... 
stock returns. 
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In sharp contrast to previous studies, this study examines how stock price informativeness 
might affect firm value. Stock prices provide information about the firm, at the same time 
managers do learn from the market reaction on the decisions that they undertake (Dow 
and Gorton (1997)). Because insiders are well informed about the firm and investment 
choices available' to them, determining the quality and outcome of their choices is 
difficult. This presence of information asymmetry increase the probability that firm may 
under- or over-invest (Jensen (1986)). 
Durnev, Morck and Yeung (2004) suggest that informative stock prices are more efficient 
in revealing information about the firm by incorporating valuable private information that 
insiders hold. As a result, facilitate more efficient corporate investment. Further, Gul, 
Cheng and Leung (2011) show that quality of financial reporting has significant impact 
on the level of stock price informativeness. They argue that lower quality of financial 
, 
reporting' impedes incorporation of public information, at the same time discourage 
collection and trading on private information. 
In theory, efficient allocation of resources should lead t,o higher firm valuation. However, 
achieving this point in an environment that insiders possess private information is more 
likely to be unattainable. From agency theory, insiders are more likely to extract benefit 
derived from that information at the expense of uninformed parties (Jensen and Meckling 
(1976)). As a result, the extent to which firm-specific information is available is essential. 
On the other hand, information availability on its own does not necessarily provide 
adequate information about the firm. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) suggest that 
disclosure diminishes agency problems by bridging the information asymmetry gap that 
exists betw'een management and shareholders. As such, effective corporate governance is 
,,' 
a'Ssociated with higher quality information. 
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This study examines the effect of stock price informativeness on firm value. Based on the 
notion that informative stock prices enhance allocation of resources, I explore its 
implication to valuation, measured by Tobin's Q. Recent empirical studies provide 
conflicting result on the relation between stock price informativeness and firm value. 
Stowe and Xing (2011) which is closely related to this study show that less informative 
firms have higher valuation suggesting the positive relation as an outcome of liquidity and 
mispricing rather than investment efficiency. ~ontrary, Bakke and Whited (2010) test 
whether mar~et mjspricing or firm-specific information affects corporate investment and 
find that the later explains better. They argue that stock mispricing does not affect 
investment. 
Consistent with theory, I find that firms with informative stock prices as measured by 
logarithmic transformation of the R2 statistic of the market model have higher market 
valuation~ Contrary to Stowe and Xing (2011) who show that stock mispricing have 
impact on firm value, the findings indicate that degree in which private information is' 
incorporated into stock prices affects corporate investment. As such, efficient allocation 
of firm resources increases with firm informativeness. In this study therefore, I support 
proposition that informative stock prices incorporate large amount private information via 
informed trading activities. 
Further, I provide evidence that the measure of corporate governance used in t.his study 
that is comparable across the countries covered in the sample also affects firm value.' I 
show significant and positive relationship between governance and Tobin's Q, suggesting 
that better governed firms receive higher market valuation. The results are robust to . a 
number of 'econometric specifications and appropriately address the endogeneity issues. 
These results are consistent with previous studies such as Klapper and Love (2004), 
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Durnev and Kim (2005) and Aggarwal, et aI., (2009) that measure firm-level governance 
across countries by constructing governance index. 
I also investigate the relationship between informative stock prices and firm value by 
looking at the interaction of various corporate governanc~ mechanisms. My results also 
indicate that corporate governance has significant impact on the relation between stock 
price informativeness and firm value. I find that the relation is stronger for firms with 
better firm-level governance and large proportion of independent non-executive directors. 
In addition, I show that ownership has different implication to the firm value. I find that 
the relation between stock prices informativeness and firm value is stronger for firms with 
higher concentration of block ownership. 
II 
On the other hand, consistent with Stowe and Xing (2011) I find that less informative 
firms receive higher market valuation when significant proportion of ownership is in the 
hands of single largest shareholder. This may suggest that the presence of largest 
shareholder increase information asymmetry as a result reduce flow of information about 
the firm which increase idiosyncratic risk. In general, presence of largest shareholder is 
more likely to reduce efficiency of corporate investment due to misallocation of firm 
resqurces as an outcome 'of expropriation. In addition, I find that the relation between 
informative firms and value is stronger for firms with large number of block holders. 
This study makes three major contributions to the literature. First, it examines the impact 
of stock price informativeness on firm value. While a number of studies h.ave explored the 
informational role of stock prices on investment decision, there is little evidence on the 
direct Impact on firm valuation. For instance, Durnev, Morck and Yeung (2004) indicate 
that when information aboutfirm is quickly and accurately incorporated into stock prices, 
degree of information asymmetry is reduced resulting in efficient allocation· of firm 
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resources. Contrary, Stowe and Xing (2011) suggest firm value increase as the result of 
market mispricing and therefore less informative firms have higher valuation. Second, the 
study investigates important role that corporate governance play in enhancing the 
information of stock prices and firm value. Recent studies such as Karamanou and Vafeas 
(2005) and Ferreira and Laux (2007) sho~ that better governance structure increase 
information flow and quality. This study therefore, explores the effect of corporate 
governance mechanisms on the relation' between amount., of private information 
incorporated into stock prices and firm value. Third, this study shows the relevance of 
firm-level governance in enhancing firm value. In similar spirit to Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick (2003), Brown and Caylor (2006) and Aggarwal, et aI., (2009), this study proxy 
governance as an aggregate measure of several attribute. . 
It 
7.2 Informativeness of Stock Prices and Corporate Investment 
Prior studies have used stock price synchronicity as a measure of level of private 
information incorporated into stock prices. First proposed by Roll (1988), who suggest, 
that public information explain little about firm-specific stock price movement, indicating 
that noise or private information could explain the variation. Morck, Yeung and Yu 
.. 
(2000) develop this concept further and suggest that through informed trading, private 
inf~rmation is collected and impounded into stock prices. As such firms with lower levels 
of stock price synchronicity reflect opposite movement of stock return from the industry 
, . 
'and market wide and therefore are more informative. Using this concept, Durnev, Morck 
and Yeung (2004) provide evidence that information efficiency promote effective 
allocation of resources. Because stock prices are more revealing about insiders' decisions, 
poor decisions are more likely to be incorporated as well. 
,,' 
Extending this concept, Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2007) and Bakke and Whited (2010) 
show that stock prices are sensitive to corporate investment. They interpret their results 
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that managers learn from information derived from stock prices and incorporate into their 
decisions. Therefore, stock prices provide effective feedback on the managerial decisions. 
On the other hand, Goldstein and Guembel (2008) indicate limitation of informational 
role of stock prices. They suggest that the presence of a feedback effect from the financial 
market to the real value of a firm creates an incentive for an uninformed trader to sell the 
firm's stock. When this happens the informativeness of the stock price decreases, and the 
beneficial allocational role of the financial market weakens . 
. Another strand of literature indicates that the relation. between stock prices 
informativeness and investment efficiency can be affected by mispricing issues. Panagea 
(2005) investigate firms' physical investments and speculative overpricing of their 
securities. He shows that firm value in~rease with level of investment even if the 
investment is not value maximizing. The results indicate that firms react from mispricing. 
Similarly, Gilchrist, Himmelberg and Huberman (2005) also show that mispricing can 
influence firm's investment decision. Therefore, increase in stock price variation due to . 
price bubbles should increase real investment as proxy by Tobin's Q. These results are 
consistent with recent study by Stowe and Xing (2011) that show less informative firms 
have higher valuation. 
In general, these two strands of literature are mixed and inconclusive. Despite the role of 
stock prices in releasing/incorporating information, recent studies suggest that quality and . 
amount of information depends on the corporate governance structures. Ferreira and Laux 
(2007) propose t~at bett~r governed· firms display higher levels of private information 
flow, and information about future earnings in stock prices. Therefore effective corp<?rate 
governance'system encourages collection of and trading on private information. Further, 
Chava' and Roberts (2008) show that the threat of creditors intervention decrease capital 
investment. They argue that this is more pronounced for firms in which agency and 
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information problems are' relatively more severe. Therefore, effective corporate 
governance is likely to ensure that both release of quality information that is timely and 
accurate; and monitoring to ensure that resources are allocated efficiently. 
This study is closely related to Stowe· and Xing (2011) who find that low informative 
firms ~eceive higher valuation due to mispricing. However, they show that these firms 
underperform in the long run. This study also is in similar spirit to Durnev, Morek and 
Yeung (2004) and Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2007) which examine the informational 
. role of stock prices on corporate investment. I extend from previous studies by 
investigating direct impact on firm value. In addition, I explore further the role of 
corporate governance mechanism. 
7.3 Ilypothesis 
If stock pri~e informativeness promotes efficiency in corporate investment this should 
lead to high firm valuation as investors learn more about firm future earnings. I therefore 
hypothesize that firm with informative stock have higher market value. The hypothesis 
predicts direct impact of informative stock prices on firm value. Therefore, if this is the 
case then the measure of stock. prices informativeness is given by logarithmic 
transformation of R2 of the market model decomposed from the industry and market-wide 
infornlation should benegatively related to Tobin's Q. 
Further, the extent to which firm is said to be informative depends on the quality and 
quantity of information that encourage informed traders to collect and trade on private 
information. This information also needs to be timely and accurately disclosed: Insiders 
are unlikely to produce this kind of information on their own due to existing agency 
problem; therefore incentive· for informed traders may disappear. Corporate governance is 
said to e~hance transparency and disclosure, as such quality of information should be 
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higher for firms with better governance. Therefore, the relation describe above should be 
more pronounced in firms with better governance structure. 
7.4 Data Description 
7.4.1 Data Sources 
The initial sample consists of firms from eleven Western European countries selected 
based on their market capitalisation. I start with all firms composed in the FTSE 100 
(United Kingdom), CAC40 (France), DAX30 (Germany), BEL 20 (Belgium), MIB30 
(Italy) and AEX (Netherlands) which are obtained from Thomson One Banker database. 
Firms included in the OMXC 20 (Denmark), OMXH25 (Finland), ISEQ20 (Ireland), 
IBEX 35 (Spain) and OMXS30 (Sweden) were obtained .from the database and directly 
It 
from their respective stock exchanges. The sample covers the period between 2003 and 
2007 .. The sample excludes financial and utility firms which have different management 
and governance structures from other firms (Henry (2008». 
To avoid sample selection bias, I follow a number of criteria. First, firms must be listed 
for at least a year. Second, firms that were dropped from any of the indices but remained 
publicly traded, remain in ·the sample. I further require that each firm have at least two 
consecutive years of observations over the sample period. As a result, I therefore remain 
with 1,143 firm-years, an average of 228 firms per year after taking into account the 
exclusion of financial and utility firms, missing observations following takeovers, 
cessation of operation and change in listing country outside Europ~. Of the 1,143 
available firms, I remain with 1,065 firm-year observations with complete data. I· 
winsorize all variables at the bottom and top 1 % levels to mitigate outliers problems7• 
". 
57 The robustness te~t without winsorising the variabl~~ show the results to remain qualitatively similar with 
the exception that standard errors slightly increase. 
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7.4.2 Measuring Tobin's Q, Stock Price Synchronicity and Corporate Governance 
The main dependent variables for this study are Tobin's Q and industry-adjusted Tobin's 
Q. A number of previous studies have used Tobin's Q as the valuation measure. I follow 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Aggarwal, et aI., (2011) computation of Tobin's Q. 
therefore, Tobin's Q is calculated as the total assets plus the market value of equity minus 
the book value of equity, divided by total assets. I define industry-adjusted Tobin's Q as 
the difference between the firm's Tobin's Q and industry-median Tobin's Q. Cremers and 
Nair (2005) indicate that the later provide caution against potential error and/or bias as a 
result of different measurement treatments. 
The main independent variable in this study is stock price synchronicity (SYNCH) which 
proxy for firm-spec.ific information' (firm tllnformativeness). I estimate synchronicity by 
decomposing firm specific return from the market-wide return following previous studies 
such as Durnev, et aI., (2003), Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) and Gul, Kim and Qiu 
(2010). For each firm-year, I construct and regress monthly stock return that includes lag" 
return for both market and industry. Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) and Gul, Kim and 
Qiu (2010) signify the importance of including lag returns as a way to mitigate potential 
.-
non-synchronous trading bias. As such, the following market model is used: 
Where RET;,t is monthly stock return for firm i and montht, using DataStream's total 
return tpdex (RI), which includes dividends as well as price changes based on 12 monthly, 
,,' 
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observations in the year58. MKTRET and INDRET represent market and industry return 
respectively both collected from the DataStream and c j I is unspecified error term. 
Consistently with other studies, I follow Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) and Piotroski and 
Roulstone (2004) method in determining synchronicity. The latter is therefore calculated 
as follows: 
SYNCH = LOg(~) 
I-R 
where" R2 is the coefficient of determination from the estimation of market model equation 
above. The log transformation of R2 creates an unbounded continuous variable out of a 
variable originally bounded by 0 and I, yieJding a dependent variable with a more normal 
distribution. SYNCH is measured for each firm-year in the sample based on 12 monthly 
observations in the year. 
Another variable of interest is corporate governance score (GSCORE) which proxy for 
firm-level governance. The latter is constructed from 24 governance attributes that are 
derived from national corporate governance codes and practices that have been found to 
have impact on firms. For each attribute an indicator variable is coded 1 if the attribute is 
present and/or adhered during the financial year and 0 otherwise. The construction of the 
governance score derive its foundation from Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003)'s method, 
as such it is additive. Although there is no universal method of aggregating governance 
variables, this approach has been the most used in the empirical literatures. In addition, 
which yariables to be included are also not universally accepted, however, Aggarwal, "et 
aI., (2009)"" point out that aggregating governance variables convey useful information 
n" 
about "the firm if it has significant impact. 
58 For weekly return (used in the robustness test), a total of 52 weekly observations i~ the year are used. 
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7.4.3 Control Variables 
I investigate the relation between Tobin ',s Q, Synchronicity and corporate governance 
using a number of variables control for firm variations. I control for firm size (LNT A) and 
risk (VOL) using natural logarithm of total assets and standard deviation of annualised 
daily stock returns over the past one year respectively59. In addition, I include controls for 
growth opportunities (SGROWTH) given by two-year geometric average annual sales 
growth rate in net sales as firms with potential for growth may require financing from the 
market (Klapper and Love (2004». 
Additional controls include firm profitability (EBIT) given as the ratio of earnings before 
interest and taxes to sales (more profitable firms are more likely to have higher valuation), 
investment opportunities such as research, and development (R&D) given as the ratio of 
research and development expenditures to sales; capital expenditure (CAPEX) given as 
the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. PPE is the ratio of property, plant, and 
equipment to sales. CASH is the ratio of cash and short-term investments to total assets.' 
LEV is the ratio of total debt to total assets. LNAGE is the natural logarithm of the 
number of years since inception of the firm. CLOSE is the percentage of shares held by 
.. 
insiders (shareholders who hold 5% or more of the outstanding shares, such as officers, 
directors, and immediate families, other corporations or individuals), as a fraction of the 
number of shares outstanding. 
7.4.4 Descriptive statistics 
Table 7-1 provides descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables used 
throughout the empirical analysis over the sample period. The table shows mean, median, 
,,' 
59 Consistent with other previous studies such as Klock et al (2005), I also measure firm risk as standard 
deviation of the firm's cash flows scaled to long-term debt. The results remain qualitatively similar. The 
same applies to using standard deviation of monthly stock return over the five years. 
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standard deviation and different percentile levels (5th, 25th, 75th and 95th) values for 
variables of interest i.e. Tobin's Q which proxy for firm value, SYNCH which 
.. " 
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Table 7-1. Summary Statistics 
The table proyides summary statistics for the key variables used in the analysis. TOBIN'S Q is computed total assets plus the market value of equity minus the book value 
of equity, ~ivided by total assets. ADJUSTED TOBIN'S Q is the industry-adjusted Tobin's Q calculated as Tobin's Q minus industry-median Tobin's Q in each year. 
S~CH refers to stoCK price, synchronicity measure given as log(R2/1 - R2) calculated using monthly returns from the market model regression. GSCORE is the overall 
corporate governance score constructed from 24 governance attributes. LNT A is the natural logarithm of total assets. SGROWTH is two-year geometric average annual' 
sales growth rate in net sales. R&D is the ratio of research and development expenditures to sales. VOL is volatility (firm risk) measured as the standard deviation of 
annualised daily stock returns over the past one year. CASH is the ratio of cash and short-term investments to total assets. CAPEX is the ratio of capital expenditures to total 
assets. PPE is the ratio of property, plant, and equipment to sales. EBIT is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to sales. LEV is the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
LNAGE is the natural logarithm of the number of years since inception of the firm. CLOSE is the percentage of shares held by insiders (shareholders who hold 5% or more 
of the outstanding shares, such as officers, directors, and immediate families, other corporations or individuals), as a fraction of the number of shares outstanding. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev 5th Pctl 25th Pctl Median- 75th Pctl 95th Pctl 
TOBIN'S Q 1.906 1.l37 1.008 1.239 1.547 2.138 4.049 
ADJUSTED TOBIN'S Q _ 0.163 0.880 -0.664 -0.147 0.090 0.215 1.690 
SYNCH 0.288 1.685 -1.735 -0.490 0.282 1.208 2.314 
GSCORE 0.547 0.144 O.3lO ~0.458 0.542 0.649 0.792 
LNTA 9.178 -1.442 6.846 8.096 9.206 lO.l32 11.633 
SGROWTH 0.080 0.157 -0.090 0.000 0.055 0.125 0.317 
R&D 0.040 0.067 0.000 0.005 0.017 0.042 0.164 
VOL 0.247 0.166 0.101 0.155 0.208 0.286 0.503 
CASH 0.109 0.108 0.015 0.040 0.073 0.l34 0.349 
CAPEX 0.055 0.048 O.OlO 0.028 0.046 0.068 0.132 
PPE 0.675 2.018 0.056 0.147 0.255 0.479 1.7l3 
" 
EBIT 0.155 0.223 0.011- 0.062 0.1l3 0.193 0.451 
DEBT 0.271 0.158 0.027 0.158 0.257 - 0.364 0.554 
AGE 3.892 1.028 1.946 3.091 4.263 4.700 5.030 
CLOSE 0.246 0.211 0.000 0.057 0.2lO 0.373 0.630 
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measures firm informativeness and GSCORE which measure firm-level governance. The 
table also presents descriptive statistics for control variables for the sample of firms. 
The average Tobin's Q and adjusted Tobin's Q for the sample of firms over the period of 
study are 1.906 and 0.163 respectively with the medians of 1.547 and 0.090 respectively. 
The" mean value~ show that on average firms in the sample have significant higher 
valuations compared to the industry-median during the sample periods. Both Tobin's Q 
and adjusted Tobin's Q indicate large variation as depicted by their standard deviation of 
1.137 and 0.880 respectively. The variation is also observed in the lower and upper 
quartile with Tobin's Q having 1.239 and 2.138. The adjusted Tobin's Q also shows even 
higher variation in inter quartiles with lower quartile of -0.147 and 0.215 for upper 
quartile. 
The SYNCH in the sample has a mean of 0.288, a median of 0.282, and a standard 
deviation of 1.685. The later shows that there is a large variation in the sample of firms in 
this study. This variation is also revealed with the lower and upper quartiles of -0.490 and 
1.208 respectively. This indicates that cross-country variation in the ability of firms to 
impound information into .. stock prices exist. A high SYNCH also indicates that stock 
returns of firms in the sample strongly move together with the industry and market 
returns. 
Table 7-1 also shows the mean, median and standard deviation of 0.547, 0.542 and 0.144 
respectively for GSCORE. A high value for the GSCORE indicates ~hat firms in the 
sample have better governance. On average more than 50% of the firms ~ollow at least 
half of the attributes used in constructing the governance score indicating that the sample 
firms are better governed. In addition, the inter quartile differences between the lower and 
upper qu~rtile is slightly higher with 0.458 and 0.649 respectively. This indicates that the 
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Table 7-2 Correlation 1\latrix 
The table ·provides summary statistics for the key variables used in the analysis. Tobin's Q is computed total assets plus the market value of equity minus the book value of 
~quity, di~ided by total assets. SYNCH refers to stock price synchronicity measure given as (log(R2 /1- R2) calculated using monthly returns from the market model 
regression: GSCORE is the overall corporate governance score constructed from 24 governance attributes. LNT A is the natural logarithm of total assets. SGROWTH is two-
year: geometric ayerage annual sales growth rate in net sales. R&D is the ratio of research and development expenditures to sales. CASH is the ratio of cash and short-term 
investments to total assets; CAPEX is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. PPE is the ratio of property, plant, and equipment to sales. EBIT is the ratio of earnings 
before interest and taxes to sales. LEV is the ratio of total deb~ to total assets; AGE is the natural logarithm of the number of years since inception of the firm. CLOSE is the 
percentage of shares held by insiders (shareholders who hold 5% or more of the outstanding shares, such as officers, directors, and immediate families, other corporations or 
individuals), as a fraction of the number of shares outstanding. The labels a, b, and c indicate significance at the 1%,5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
SYNCH 
GSCORE 
TA 
SGROWTH 
R&D 
CASH 
CAPE X 
PPE 
EBIT 
LEV 
AGE 
VOL 
CLOSE 
TOBIN'S Q 
-0.0588 
0.0398 
-0.3218 
0.0828 
0.056c 
0.2698 
0.028 
-0.1358 
0.0998 
-0.1998 
-0.1178 
-0.021 
-0.0828 
SYNCH GSCORE LNTA 
1.000 
-0.0888 
0.2678 
-0.033 
-0.1428 
-0.031 
-0.039 
0.023 
-0.068b 
-0.024 
-0.029 
1.000 
0.1698 
-0.0988 
-0.2428 
0.022 
-0.1 058 
-0.0968 
-0.024 
-0.0888 
-0.045 
-0.037 -0.027 
0.079b . -0.3298 
1.000 
-0.1 088 
-0.2508 
-0.072b 
-0.028 
0.014 
-0.042 
0.1318 
0.0978 
0.1238 
-0.047 
SGROWTH R&D 
1.000 
0.1708 
0.018 
0.089a 
1.000 
0.019 
0.0858 
CASH 
1.000 
0.011 
CAPEX 
1.000 
-0.057c -0.2078 -0.142a. -0.0878 
PPE EBIT 
1.000 
0.1628 
-0.034 
0.1668 0.037 0.106a -0.6778 1.000 
-0.0998 
-0.2138 
-0.1918 
-0.0798 -0.2838 
-0.007 -0.014 
0.081a 
-0.052c 
-0.029 -0.0798 -0.1098 
-0.137a 0.014 -0.173a 
230 
0.2398 -0.1498 
0.009 
0.017 
0.004 
0.037 
0.0988 
-0.1318 
LEV 
1.000 
0.029 
0.038 
0.061 b 
LNAGE VOL 
1.000 
0.074b 
0.063b 
1.000 
0.062b 
gap between firms that are better governed and poor governed is significant. As the 
sample is from different countries, cross-country firm-level governance might be the 
reason for this gap to exist. 
Table 7-2 presents correlation coefficients among the key variables of interest; TOBIN'S 
Q, SYNCH and GSCORE; and control variables. The main purpose of this table is to 
provide early indication of the relationship between the variables. In general correlation 
coefficient between TOBIN'S Q, SYNCH and GSCORE is as predicted in the theory. 
TOBIN'S Q is negatively correlated with SYNCH suggesting that market attach value to 
firm's that are more informative. The correlation between TOBIN'S Q and GSCORE is 
show positively coefficient. Again, this indicates that better governed firms are. higher 
valuation. Table 7-2 also provides av~nue to check for multicollinearity between 
variables. At this point the coefficients show little indication to suggest that, 
multicollinearity may pose significant problem to the analysis. The correlation 
coefficients am,ong the independent variables are 'relatively low with the highest being 
0.329 between GSCORE and CLOSE. It is therefore reasonable to assume that 
multicollinearity is not posing problem to the analysis that follows. 
7.5 Empirical results 
In this section, I document the impact of synchronicity and governance on firm value plus 
firm-specific control variables from 'the panel regression analysis. In the analysis, all 
regression models include country, industry and year dummies (not included 
,., . 
231 
Table 7-3 Tobin's q, stock price synchronicity and corporate governance 
This table shows estimates of panel regressions of firm value on stock price synchronicity and corporate 
governance score for the sample of Western European firms from 2003 to 2007. The main dependent variables 
are Tobin's Q and Industry-adjusted Tobin's Q. All regressions include country, industry and year dummies 
and standard errors are corrected for clustering of observations at the firm- level (t-statistics are in 
parentheses). The labels a, b, and c reflect significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All 
variables are winsorised at 1 % and 99%. 
Tobin's Q Indust!}:-adjusted Q 
Variables {I} {2} {3} {4} 
SYNCH -0.072b -0.065b 
(-2.29) (-2.10) 
GSCORE 0.063b 0.11 b 
(2.20) (2.21 ) 
LNTA -0.2928 -0.2598 -0.2818 -0.2568 
(-4.97) (-4.31) (-4.98) (-4.39) 
SGROWTH 0.638c 0.616c 0.527 0.522 
(1.86) (1.78) (1.56) (1.53) 
R&D 0.246 0.261 0.250 0.258 
(1.49) (1.55) (1.55) (1.57)' 
CASH 2.8378 2.8648 " 2.575 8 2.6088 
(3.43) (3.31) (3.13) (3.04) 
CAPEX 1.768b 1.694c 1.645c 1.581 c 
(2.06) (1.95) (1.93) (1.81 ) 
PPE -0.094c -0.098b -0.089b -0.090b 
(-1.96) (-2.04) (-2.05) (-2.10) 
EBIT 0.745 0.782c 0.783b 0.810b 
(1.63) (1.67) (2.12) (2.14) 
LEV -0.358 ' -0.371 -0.362 -0.366 
(-0.89) (-0.91) ( -0.98) (-0.99) 
LNAGE -0.075 ._ -0.068 -0.074 -0.068 
(-1.47) (-1.33) (-1.46) (-1.33 ) 
VOL -0.536b -0.513b ~0.520b -0.500b 
(-2.11) (-2.21 ) ( -2.06) ( -2.18) 
CLOSE -0.100 -0.141 -0.059 -0.083 
(-0.39) ( -0.56) (-0.24) (-0.34) 
Constant 3.6198 3.4628 2.4078 2.2198 
(5.13) (4.90) (3.49) (3.21) 
R2 0.64 0.64 0.38 0.37 
N 1,065 1,065 1,065 1,065 
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to save space) unless specified otherwise. All standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity using firm-level clustering6o• 
Table 7-3 reports the results from the panel regression of Tobin's Q and industry-adjusted 
Tobin's Q on synchronicity (SYNCH) and corporate "governance measure (GSCORE). 
Columns (1) and (2) report the results on Tobin's Q. The estimated SYNCH coefficient is 
-0.072 with robust (-statistic of -2.29. The result indicates that firm informativeness has 
significant effect on valuation. This result is consistent with the theory that is as more 
firm-specific information is impounded on the stock prices; degree of information" 
asymmetry is reduced as a result resources are allocated efficiently. Efficient allocation of 
resources is more likely to enhance firm value. 
Column (2) estimates the effect of corporate governance on firm value. The results show a . 
positive and significant relation with coefficient of corporate governance measure of 
0.063" with (-statistic of 2.20. Therefore, the results suggest that better governed firms 
receive higher market valuation. For both columns (1) and (2), the explanatory power of 
the model is 64%, which indicate firm value is well explained by the level of firm-specific 
information and corporate .governance. 
Column (3) and (4) presents the results with industry-adjusted Tobin's Q. The. result that 
indicates firm informativeness is associated ~ith higher valuation is also significant as 
that indicated in column (l). Further, the result indicating better governed firm to have 
higher market value in column (2) isalso confirmed in column (4) with industry-adjusted 
Tobin'sQ with the coefficient of GSCORE of 0.11 and (-statistic of2.21. 
.. " 
60 As part of robustness check, I also correct standard errors for country-cluster given the possibility that 
corporate governance may be correlated within firms (see Aggarwal, et aI., (2011). Results are not tabulated 
remain qualitatively similar to the main findings. . 
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Table 7-4lobin's q, stock price synchronicity and interaction variables 
This table shows estimates of panel regressions of finn value on stock price synchronicity and interaction variables for the sample of Western European finns from 2003 to 
2007. The main dependent variables are Tobin's Q and Industry-adjusted Tobin's Q. presented in columns I to 5 and 6 to 10 respectively. The main independent variables 
are SYNCH is the stock price synchronicity, GScore dum is a dummy that takes the value of one if a finn has a governance score above the median, Top I dum is a dummy 
that takes the value of one if a finn has largest shareholder with holding above the median, Block dum is a dummy that takes the value of one if a finn has block ownership 
above the median'(block owners are shareholders who hold 5% or more excluding officers, directors, and immediate families, and government or government institutions), 
NBlock dum is a dummy that takes the value of one if a finn has number of block owners above the median. Outders dum is a dummy that which takes the value of one if a 
finn has proportion of independent non-executive directors above the median. Regressions include the constant and control variables (coefficients not tabulated). All 
regressions include country, industry and year dummies and standard errors are corrected for clustering of observations at the finn-level (t-statistics are in parentheses). The 
labels a, b, 'and c indicate significance at the 1%,5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are winsorised at 1% and 99%. 
, Tobin's Q Industry-adjusted Q 
Variables (1) (2). (3) . (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
SYNCH· -- - -':-0.079b -0.023b -0.035b -0.055c :O.049b -0.066c -0.018b -0.004b 
(-2.22) (-2.18) (-2.03) (-1~88) (-2.16) (-1.93) (-2.26) (-2.17) 
SYNCH x GSCORE DUM -0.02I a -0.0 lOa 
(-3.17) (-2.92) 
SYNCH x TOPI DUM 0.091 c 0.088c 
(1.90) (1.84) 
SYNCH x BLOCK DUM -0.1l2a -0.144a 
(-3.30) (-2.77) 
SYNcI-i x NBLOCK DUM -0.0 lOa 
(-2.84) 
SYNCH x OUTDER DUM . -O.047a 
(-3.20) 
GSCOREDUM O.l49c O.l69a 
(1.87) (2.76) 
TOPI DUM -0.124b -O.l45c 
(-1.96) (-1.69) 
BLOCK DUM 0.314a 0.344a 
(3048) (2.96) 
NBLOCKDUM 0.029b 
(2.33) , 
OUTDERDUM 0.173c 
(1.88) 
If '0.65 . 0.65 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.38 0.38 0040 
N 1,065 1,065 1,065 1,065 1,065 1,065 1,065 1,065 
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(9) 
-0.062c 
(-1.84) 
-0.004a 
(-3.01) 
0.034b 
(2.26) 
0.38 
1,065 
(10) 
-0.040c 
(-1.87) 
-0.039a 
(-2.89) 
0.141c 
(1.92) 
0.38 
1,065 
Table 7-4 presents the results of firm vahle, stock price synchronicity and interaction 
variables. The main purpose here is to determine how different governance mechanisms 
affect the relationship between firm value and informativeness. This allows considering 
all three main variables of interest simultaneously. In addition, it provides for 
investig'ation of additional features that helps release of information impounded into stock 
prices. 
The regressions presented in Table 7-4 include control variables (coefficient not 
tabulated) with similar signs to those presented in Table 7-3. Column (1) o~ Table 7-4 
reports the results for SYNCH, SYNCH x GSCORE DUM and GSCORE DUM. 
GSCORE DUM takes the value of one (1) if a firm has a governance score ab~ve the 
median. The results show that SYNCH C<1efficient remains negative and significant. The 
interaction variable coefficient has a coefficient of -0.021 with a (-statistic of -3.17 
suggesting that informative firms with better governance have higher market valuation 
than those with ,poor governance. The evidence is strengthened by the fact that corporate 
governance enhances disclosure and provides mechanisms to ensure that managerial 
opportunism is minimised. If this is the case, then it is more likely that value is attached 
. on the choice of projects that managers undertake. In addition, the coefficient of 
GSCORE DUM is significant positive. 
Column 2 of Table 7-4 examines the effect of SYNCH by interacting with ownership 
variable. Column (2) shows the coefficient of interaction variable between SYNCH and 
TOPI DUM (SYNCH x T9PI DUM) which proxy for ownership of the largest 
shareholder as positive and significant. The interpretation of this result is that acquisition 
.. 
of value enhancing firm-specific information is difficult to obtain due to the presence of 
"'largest shareholder. Doidge, et aI., (2009) document that largest shareholder can either 
influence governance through monitoring or accrue private benefit of control 
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Table 7-5 Tobin's q, stock price synchronicity and corporate governance: firm fixed effects and lagged 
variables 
This table shows estimates of panel regressions of firm value on stock price synchronicity and corporate 
governance score using alternative estimation methods. The sample consists of Western European firms from 
2003 to 2007. Columns 1 to 3 present estimates of panel regressions with firm fixed effects and year dumm ies. 
Column 4 to 6 presents estimation of regression using lagged synch and governance variables with country, 
industry and year dummies. The main dependent variables are Tobin's Q and Industry-adjusted Tobin's Q. 
Standard errors are corrected for clustering of observations at the firm-.ievel (t-statistics are in parentheses). 
The labels a, b, and c indicate significance at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are 
winsorised at 1 % and 99%. 
Fixed effect Lagged SYNCH and GSCORE 
Tobin's Q Adjusted Q Tobin's Q Adjusted Q 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SYNCH -0.0718 -0.024c -0.076b -0.059c 
(-2.99) ( -1.82) (-2.26) (-1.74) 
GSCORE 0.253c 0.053c 
( 1.88) (1.92) 
LNTA -0.4008 -0.4108 -0.3078 -0.3088 -0.2728 -0.2938 
(-2.80) (-2.79) (-3.78) (-4.80) (-4.23) . (-4.76) 
SGROWTH 0.954b 0.92b 0.294 0.958b 0.939b 0.881 c 
" (2.61) (2.49) (1.23) (2.18) (2.11 ) (1.97) 
R&D 0.216c 0.884c 0.550c 0.331 c 0.347c 0.331 c 
(1.92) (1.80) (1.88) (1.83) (1.88) (1.86) 
CASH 0.49 0.527 0.031 2.9568 2.9428 2.6948 
(1.66) (1.70) (0.09) (3.29) (3.14) (3.00) 
CAPEX 1.596b 1.500b 0.718 2.031 b 2.066b 2.0818 
(2.38) (2.26) (1.15) (2.36) (2.40) (2.66) 
PPE -0.447 -0.401 -0.003 -0.093c -0.098c -0.094c 
(-1.51 ) (-1.33) (-0.1l) (-1.67) (-1.79) (-1.73) 
EBIT 0.578 0.551 0.012 0.722 0.713 0.756c 
(1.51) , (1.42) (0.08) (1.56) (1.49) (1.84) 
LEV -0.161 -0.158 -0.085 -0.475 -0.480 -0.439 
(-0.37) (-0.36 ) (-0.36) . (-1.13) (-1.13) (-1.10) 
LNAGE -0.044 -0.021 -0.247 -0.062 -0.054 -0.061 
(-0.11) ( -0.05) (-1.18) ( -1.08) (-0.95) ( -1.07) 
VOL -0.077c -0.055 -0.055c -0.573b -0.555b -0.552c 
(-1.97) (-1.31 ) ( -1.88) (-1.98) (-2.13) (-1.92) 
CLOSE -0.366 -0.415 -0.092 -0.'131 -0.144 -0.099 
( -1.37) (-1.46) (-0.55) (-0.49) (-0.56) (-0.39) 
Constant 5.5848 5.5328 3.8718 -0.3108 -0.1608 -0.3408 
(2.83) (2.73) (3.50) (-4.63) (-4.35) (-3.03) 
If- 0.25 0.23 0.15 0.66 0.65 0.40 
N 1,065 " 1,065 1,065 848 848 848 
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against minority shareholders. If the latter is the case, then quality and quantity of firm-
specific information is reduced and hence promote misallocation of resources that benefit" 
the largest shareholder. As such, the possession of information is more likely to be in the 
hands of managers and largest shareholder. The effect of largest shareholder on firm value 
is also indicated in the coefficient which shows negative "and significant relation. This 
suggests that largest shareholder do not add value to the firm, rather have detrimental 
effect. 
Column (3) and (4) of Table 7-4 present the impact of block ownership and number of 
block owners on the relationship between firm value and SYNCH respectively. The 
results show the coefficient of b~th SYNCH and the interaction (SYNCH x B,LOCK 
DUM) to be negative and significant with values of -0.035 and -0.112 with I-statistics of -
2.03 and -3.30 respectively. In column (4), the interaction variable (SYNCH x NBLOCK 
DUM) is negative and statistically significant with coefficient of -0.010 and I-statistic of -
2.84. These results indicate that informative firms with higher block ownership" 
concentration and large number of block owners create more value. The results also show 
that the relation is more pronounced with interaction variable indicating that the presence 
of blockholders and number of block owners effectively mitigates the agency problems by 
enhancing degree of information impounded into stock prices. As such, governance 
mechanisms induce more information into stock prices that ensure that managerial 
decisions are optimised to maximise value of the firm. 
Column (5) of Table 7-4 presents the effect of the interaction variable (SYNCH x 
OUTDER DUM) on the firm valuation." The results show negative and significant 
coefficient"'of -0.047 with I-statistic of -3.20. In addition, the SYNCH coefficient remains 
,~ . 
negative and statistically significant with value of -0.049 and I-statistic of -2.16. This 
means that informative firms that comprise of large proportion of outsiders on the 
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corporate board are more likely to enhance value than otherwise. Outsiders are referees, 
monitor the actions of managers and provide inputs on the firm's strategies that are more 
likely to increase firm value (Fama and Jensen (1983)). Further, the quality of information 
that available is more likely to convey the direction that firm undertake in allocation of 
resources. If this is the case, then market is more likely to" react positively on the firm's 
prospects. 
Columns (6) to (10) of Table 7-4 replicate the results using industry-adjusted Tobin's Q. 
agains, the control variables are used in the regre"ssions but their coefficients are not 
tabulated. The results remain consistently similar to the earlier findings using Tobin's Q. 
The interaction variables signs and significance are also similar to the earlier 
interpretation indicating that those informative firms with better governance mechanisms 
are likely to have higher valuation. 
7.6 Robustness Testing 
To examine whether the results outlined earlier are driven by model misspecification, 
omitted variables or definition of some variables I perform several tests that address these 
issues. In this section I show that the primary findings are robust to different measures, as 
such provide consistent interpretations. In the robustness tests that follows, I reports 
selected regression results. However, similar test have been conducted for all the models. 
7.6.1 Endogeneity and Causality Issues 
The main issue in this study is likeliness that the relation between synchronicity, firm 
" . 
value and governance practices are endogenously determined. Results that informative 
firms have higher valuation can be derived in either direction; that is firms 
,," 
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Table 7-6 Tobin's q, stock price synchronicity and interaction variables: Additional variables and 
. alternative measures 
This table shows estimates of panel regressions of ~rm .value on stock price synchronicity with additional 
control variables and alternative measures. The sample consists of Western European firms from 2003 to 2007. 
The main dependent variables are Tobin's Q and Industry-adjusted Tobin's Q. SYNCH is the stock price 
synchronicity calculated using monthly stock returns. SYNCHw is the stock price synchronicity calculated 
using weekly stock returns. GOV41 DUM is the Aggarwal, et al., (2011),s governance index based on 41 firm-
level attributes from RiskMetrics and takes the value of 1 if a firm has a governance index above the median. 
INSTOWN is the ownership of five (5) largest shareholders. LAGGED Q_l is the Tobin's Q lagged by one 
period. ADJUSTED Q_l is the industry-adjusted Tobin's Q lagged by one period. All regressions include 
country, industry and year dummies and standard errors are corrected for clustering of observations at the firm-
level (t-statistics are in parentheses). The labels a, b, and c indicate significance at the 1%,5%, and 10% levels, 
respectivel~ . 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged Lagged Weekly' 
Tobin's Q adjusted Q OwnershiE Returns GOV41 
SYNCH -0.017b -0.008c -0.0858 
-0.072b 
(-2.42) (-1.72) (-2.61) (-2.55) 
SYNCHw -0.0628 
(-2.86) 
SYNCH x GOV 41 
-0.5738 DUM 
(-3.52) 
GOV41DUM 0.243b 
(1.96) 
LNTA -0.1038 -0.1018 -0.3288 -0.2938 -0.199b 
( -4.33) (-4.02) (-5.51 ) (-4.99) (-2.21) 
SGROWTH 0.060 0.089 0.639c 0.644c 0.418b 
(0.35) (0.47) . (1.89) (1.87) (2.52) 
R&D 0.095 0.124c 0.246 0.243 0.740c 
(1.50) (1.91) (1.53) (1.46) (1.73) 
CASH 0.785b 0.779b 2.9398 2.8508 1.3928 . 
(2.39) (2.16) (3.51 ) (3.46) (3.10) 
CAPEX 0:467c 0.455c 1.647b 1.854b 0.4628 
(1.69) (1.82) (2.00) (2.15) (2.95) 
PPE -0.002 -0.014 -0.08c -0.100b -0.149 
(-0.10) ( ~0.68) (-1.66) ( -2.18) (-1.42) 
EBIT 0.006 0.090 0.737 0.798c 0.291 b 
(0.02) (0.43) (1.60) (1.77) (2.29) 
LEV . -0.382c -0.187 -0.193 -0.406 -0.599c 
(-1.69) (-0.97) (-0.48) (-1.02) (-1.78) 
LNAGE -0.008 . -0.007 -0.1 07b -0.089c -0.685b 
(-0.39) (-0.35) (-2.12) (-1.77) (-2.31) 
VOL -0.091 -0.078 -0~543b -0.577b -0.121 8 
(-0.90) (-0.74) ( -2.20) (-2.27) (-3.20) 
CLOSE -0.085 -0.081 -1.134c -0.136 -0.642 
.. 
" ( -1.09) ( -1.07) (-0.99) ( -1.68) (-0.54) 
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Table 7-6 continued (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged Lagged Weekly 
Tobin's Q adjusted Q Ownership Returns GOV41 
(CLOSE)2 -0.676 
(-0.76) 
LAGGEDQ_I 0.8098 
(17.58) 
ADJUSTED Q_I 0.7888 
(14.49) 
INSTOWN 1.0988 
(3.41 ) 
Constant 1.0528 0.708b · 4.1428 3.6468 1.7828 
(3.71) (2.46) (5.97) (5.25) (4.55) 
R2 0.89 0.77 0.65 0.65 0.71 
N 848 848 1,065 1,065 720 
with higher valuation attract market attention and hence increase following by interested 
parties as a result increase firm-specific lnformation. Another issue is that the relation 
could be as an outcome of omitted variables. To address these key issues I use fixed effect 
panel data and lagged variables of interest. Firm fixed effect allows controlling for 
omitted variables and results are presented in columns (l) to (3) of Table 7-5. The model 
show consistent outcome to primary findings presented in Table 7-3. 
To address possible causal direction of the relation I include lag of main variables of 
interest i.e. SYNCH and GSCORE by one year. Here the intention is to determine 
whether firm value is causing firm informativeness and better governance or vice versa. 
In columns (4) to (6) of Table 7-5, I regress Tobin's Q and industry-adjusted Tobin's 'Q 
on lagged SYNCH and GSCORE. The results confirm early findings that the variables of 
interest remain negative and significant. In addition, to explore further I follow Chung and 
Zhang "(20) 1) and repeat the regression using lagged dependent variable by one year as 
additional control variable ... Column (1) and (2) of Table 7-6 report the results that the 
240 
coefficient of SYNCH remains negative and significant. The results also hold for 
GSCORE and interactions variable which remain qualitatively unchanged (not tabulated). 
7.6.2 Alternative Measures for Corporate Governance 
Construction of governance measures as the aggregate value of several variables is not 
universally consistent. A number of ways are used and variable included also varies, as 
such meth?d used in this study might influence the results. To check' the results are not 
driven by the bias in governance measure I use alternative available corporate governance 
index. I employ Aggarwal, et aI., (2011)'s firm-level governance index based on 23 
countries, which of these II are in my sample61 • However, their study covers the 2004-
2008 sample periods. To ensure that the study is comparable, I ,estimate regression using 
firms that are in both samples and use 2004-2007 sample periods62• From the governance 
index I develop a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm has index value 
above median. Column (5) of Table 7-6 presents the results of the interaction variable, 
(SYNCH x GOV 41) with negative and statistically significant value. 
I addition, I re-estimate main regressions in Table 7-3 using alternative measure of 
ownership. In the main r.~gression, blockholders include both insiders and outsiders. I 
follow Cremers, Nair and Wei (2007) notion that external shareholders are effective in 
monitoring firm insides, as such exclude blockholders who are firm insiders. Again, I 
develop dummy variables that take the value of one if a firm has blockholders and number 
of block holders value above median respectively. The'results (not shown) yield consistent 
findings to the main regressions. 
'f· 
61 Available at http://facuJty.msb.edu/aggarwal/gov.xls 
62 Results "using GSCORE for sample of 720 firm-year (not tabulated) that are available in Aggarwal, et aI., 
(2011),s study yield qualitatively similar results to full sample 
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Table 7-7 .Tobin's q, stock price synchronicity and corporate governance: changes in variable 
This table shows estimates of panel regressions of changes in firm value on changes in stock price synchronicity and changes in corporate governance score for the sample 
of Western ,European firms from 2003 to 2007.11 denotes change in the variables. The main dependent variables are I1Tobin's Q in column I to 4 and I1Industry-adjusted Q 
in'column 5 to 8. I1SYNCH and I1SYNCH_I are changes in stock price synchronicity from I-I to I and from 1-2 to I-I respectively. All regressions include country, industry 
and year dummies ,and standard errors are corrected for clustering of observations at the firm-, level (t-statistics are in parentheses). The labels a, b, and c indicate 
significance at the' 1%,5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are winsorised at I % and 99%. 
I1GSCORE_I 
&NTA 
I1SGROWTH 
M&D 
I1CASH 
, I1CAPEX 
LWPE 
I1EBIT 
&EV 
&NAGE 
I1VOL 
I1CLOSE 
I1Tobin's Q _I1Industry-adjusted Q 
(I) (2) (3) (1)(5) _. _(6) (7) (8) 
O.Ollb 0.043b 0.206c 1.926c 
(2.44) (2.01) (1.89) (1.75) 
0.038 0.564 
(0.60) (1.35) 
-2.8283 -2.536b -2.8593 -2.38Ic -16.318c -0.696c . -15.572c -2.133 
(-3.33) (-2.13) (-3.32) (-1.86) (-1.75) (-1.71) (-1.69) (-1.44) 
0.002c 0.001 0.002c 0.001 ~ 0.1773 0.1623 0.1773 , 0.1603 
(1.74) (0.43) (1.83) (0.73) (5.96) (7.59) (6.04) (7.78) 
0.014 0.029 0.021 0.032 4.995 4.507 4.946 4.442 
(0.26) (0.42) (0.39) (0.46) (1.07) (0.96) (1.06) (0.93) 
0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.473 0.022 0.49 0.012 
(0.31) (0.21) (0.38) (0.18) (0.93) (0.31) (0.96) (0.17) 
0.007 0.004 0.01 0.007 0.321 0.126 0.317 0.127 
(0.89) (0.01) (0.88) (0.56) (1.31) (0.82) (1.38) , (0.95) 
-0.06 ... 0.073 -0.056 -0.06 -1.245 -0.258 -1.23 0.389 
(-1.12) (-0.99) (-1.06) (~0.86) (-0.93) (-0.38) (-0.92) (-0.53) 
0.0 lOb 0.0033 0.008b 0.008 0.503c 0.198 0.481c 0.234 
(2.22) (1.73) (2.30) (1.63) , (1.69) (0.74) (1.69) (0.96) 
-0.033 -0.002c -0.057 -0.031 -0.043 -0.005 -0.038 -0.001 
(-0.57) (-1.92) (-0.03) (-0.62) (-1.19) (-0.22) (-1.07) (-0.07) 
-1.7373 -1.675 -1.5843 -1.703 -6.374 -16.06 -7.878 -20.11 
(-3.34) (-1.46) (-2.95) (-1.30) (-0.18) (-0.56) (-0.22) (-0.66) 
-0.067b -0.0813 -0.068c -0.098b -0.309 -0.043 -0.249 -0.656 
(-2.04) (-2.83) (-1.74) (-2.62) (-0.14) (-0.02) (-0.11) (-0.28) 
-0.002 -0.0043 -0.002 -0.0043 0.028 -0.019 0.028 -0.026 
(-1.39) (-4.17) (-1.41) (-5.95) (-0.91) (-0.34) " (-0.91) (-0.53) 
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Constant 
• 
If 
N: 
0.2058 
(3.76) 
0.46 
787 
0.1858 
( 4.19) 
0.53 
521 
0.1768 
(3.37) 
0.44 
780 
0.2008 
(3.04) 
0.49 
532 
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1.557 
(1.09) 
0.51 
787 
-0.104 
(0.05) 
0.58 
521 
-1.698 
(1.05) 
0.51 
780 
0.955 
(0.43) 
0.58 
532 
Column (3) of Table 7-6 presents the results with the inclusion of additional ownership 
variables. Following Stowe and Xing (2011) which closely related to this study, I include 
similar ownership variables to investigate whether the main results are not driven by 
omitted variables. The results remain robust to the inclusion of additional ownership 
variable. 
7.6.3 Alternative Measures for Firm Informativeness 
A number of previous studies have used daily and/or weekly returns in estimating firm-
specific information (firm informativeness), contrary this study is based on the monthly 
returns. The latter are more likely to encounter correlation problem, as a result drive the 
findings of this study. To mitigate that possibility I re-estimate main finding~ using 
weekly stock returns. Column (4) of TAble 7-6 presents the negative and significant 
results consistent with the main findings. 
In addition, I perform additional test with alternative proxy of firm-specific information; 
idiosyncratic volatility measured as the standard deviation of the error term (cit) from the 
market model. Although this measure is related to synchronicity, Brockman and Van 
(2009) suggest that they capture different aspects of firm-specific information63, if this is 
the case there is a possibility that it may lead to different result. The results (not tabulated) 
provide consistent finding to the main regression indicating positive relation with Tobin's 
Q and industry-adjusted Tobin's Q. 
7.6.4 Changes in Variables 
To further check the robustness of the findings, I re-estimate main regression using 
change in the dependent and independent variables. Chung, Elder and Kim (2010) suggest 
" . 
.. that ·this method is more likely to provide better estimates than using level variables. 
63 They suggest idiosyncratic volatility as a measure of firm-specific risk, while synchronicity measures the 
relation between firm-specific variation and total variation. 
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Apart from addressing potential endogeneity, it provides estimate whether change in level 
of firm-specific information and governance is related to changes in firm value. Following 
Chung, Elder and Kim (2010), I include both change in variable of interest and lagged by 
one year changes. Table 7-7 present the results for the relation between changes in firm 
value and changes in explanatory variables (SYNCH and GSCORE). The main results are 
similar to those reported in Table 7-7. They are also robust to inclusion of lagged change 
in SYNCH and GSCORE. 
7.6.5 Excluding UK Firms 
In the main regression, the sample constitutes a large weight of firms from the UK than 
from other countries. As a result, the main findings might be driven by existence <?f large 
number of firms from a single countr),. I repeat the main regressions with sample 
excluding UK firms. The results (not reported) remain qualitatively similar to the main 
regressions. 
7.7 Conclusion 
The primary purpose of this study is to examine the effect of informational role of stock 
prices on firm value. Pre~ious studies have shown that when stock prices are informative, 
the probability of effective allocation of firm resources increases. If this is the case then 
firms with informative stock prices should have higher value. Consistent with this theory 
and findings from studies in this area, I add to the strand of literature by sh~wing that 
there is direct impact on firm value. I find that informative firms have higher market value 
as a result of efficient investment. 
I also c~!1tribute to the literature by investigating the important role that corporate 
gove,rnance play in enhancing the information of stock prices and firm value. I find that 
the relation between informative firms and value is stronger for firms with better firm-
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level governance and large proportion of independent non-executive directors. This shows 
that effective governance encourages release of quality information that promote 
collection of and trading on private information. As a result, increases flow of firm-
specific information. 
In addition, I show that ownership has different implication on the relation with the 
valuation of informative firms.. I find that the relation between stock prices 
informativeness and firm value is stronger for firms with higher concentration of block 
ownership. On the other hand, consistent with Stowe and Xing (2011) I find that less 
informative firms receive higher market valuation when significant proportion of 
ownership is in the hands of single largest shareholder. This may suggest that the presence 
of . largest shareholder increase inform~tion asymmetry as a result reduce flow of 
information about the firm which increase idiosyncratic risk due to the probability of 
consumption of private benefits. In addition, I find that the relation between informative 
firms and value is stronger for firms with large number of blockholders. 
To conclude, this study support the proposition that stock prices play important 
informational role that e!lable managers to learn about their decisions. If managerial 
decisions are likely to enhance value, stock prices will reflect this information. However, 
to achieve this role it is essential that corporate governan~e structure is optimum in order 
to ensure that informed trading is not impaired by manipulated information. 
". 
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Appendix 7-1: Firm-level Corporate Governance Provisions 
The Table below provide list of corporate governance provisions (attributes) used in the construction of the 
corporate governance score. 
Board: Describes Board policies, structure and composition 
1. Split: CEO and Chairperson positions are separated 
2. Board Independence: Board with large number of independent non-executive directors 
3. Non-executives Meeting: Non-executive directors meet without chairman of the board and executives 
present . 
4. Chairman-Non-executives Meeting: Chairman of the board and Non-executi~e directors meet without 
executive directors present 
5. Training Policy: Training programmes for new and existing directors exist and are conducted once a 
year 
6. Board Evaluation: Formal system of evaluating board performance, procedures and effectiveness is in 
place, and conducted yearly 
7. Evaluation Process: The Board of Directors engages external evaluation parties to perform assessment 
reviews its performance. 
8. Multiple Directorships: Less than 50% of independent outsiders have commitment in two or more 
. outside boards. 
Disclosure and Audit: Provide information affecting performance criteria, issues related to working of and 
compensation for external auditors and audit committee. 
9. Auditor Fees: Consulting fees paid to auditor is less than audit fee paid to the auditor 
10. Auditor Independence: External auditor offer written confirmation that it considers itself independent, 
and information is disclosed in the annual report 
11. Audit Committee: Audit committee composed of at least two-third independent outsiders 
12. Audit Committee Expertise: Audit committee comprise of at least a member clearly identified as an 
i~dependent financial expert. 
13. External Auditor Meeting: External auditor meet with the Audit Committee without executive present 
14. ~eer Group: Disclosure of'peers (comparators) groups/companies for performance benchmark exist. 
15. Related Party: Disclose details of transactions with its subsidiary undertakings a:nd other rehited parties 
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Shareholder rights: Describes shareholders rights in voting and company's responsibilities towards their· 
shareholders 
16. Proxy vote: Proxy voting is possible and technology to support voting exist 
17. Call Poll: Right for all shareholders' resolutions to be decided on a poll 
18. Vote Withheld: Disclosure of the voting outcome on each resolution, including votes withheld' 
(abstained) 
19. Chairmen Attendance: Chairmen of the board committees attend the Annual General Meeting and are 
available to answer questions from shareholders 
20. Voting Power: All shareholders have similar voting rights (No shares carry special rights) 
Compensation Policy and Process: Address issues related to remuneration committees and policies 
21. Stock compensation: Directors are subject to establish and maintain a minimum personal shareholding 
22. Committee Independence: Remuneration committee composed of at least two-third independent 
outsiders 
II 
23. Performance target: Specific numerical performance target 
24. Remuneration Policy: Presence of a clear outlined policy on setting remuneration in the annual report 
,., . 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion, Recommendations and Scope for Future Research 
8.1 Introduction 
The thesis presented three main research questions that are addressed through empirical 
analysis. The research investigates 'ho\\:' corporate governance affects stock price 
synchronicity', 'the effect of ownership on firm's information environment' and 'the 
implication of stock price informativeness on firm valuation'. Previous studies have 
drawn attention on how to measure the level of information about firm i.e. firm':'specific 
information in a number of ways. This thesis derive the definition based on early study by 
II 
Roll (1988), which suggest that public information explain l.ittle about firm-specific stock 
price movement, proposing that noise or private information could explain the variation. 
Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) extend further and show that through informed trading, 
private information is collected and impounded into stock prices. As such stock returns 
that closely move with the industry and market return reflect less firm-specific 
information. 
In this chapter, a number of issues are discussed in summary .. The main objective of 
chapter is to discuss the key findings of this study, their implications and." 
recommendations. In addition, limitation of the thesis and direction· of future research is 
presented here. As such the sections that follow are organised as foll.ows. Section 8.2 
provides the summary of the main research findings, including the main contributions of . 
the thesis. Section 8.3 highlights limitations of the study and scope for future research. 
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8.2 Summary of Research and Main Findings 
The thesis is motivated by the recent strands of literature that examine the informativeness 
of stock prices. The key paper here is Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) which propose R-
square as a measure of information efficiency which' inversely relate to the rate of 
information incorporation. They find that. as the speed of information incorporated into 
stock prices increase, the idiosyncratic risk is reduced. Based on this intuition, recent 
studies have provided a number of interesting empirical findings. However little has been 
covered in linking information efficiency and corporate governance. The thesis explores 
further this area of research. The unique set of hand collected firm-level corporate 
governance data allows me to investigate a number of unanswered research questions and 
provide robust contribution to the existing literature. Therefore, the objective of this 
. II 
research is to investigate how corporate governance affects informativeness of stock 
prices. To accomplish this eight chapters have been covered including this. 
The first chapter provide the setting for the work that is covered in the thesis. It provides 
the motivation and objective of the 'study, key contribution of the thesis and overall 
structure and direction. Chapter 2 offers general literature reviews on agency issues which 
act as the main foundation of corporate governance. Chapter 3 discusses an overview of 
institutional structures that exist in the Continental European countries, the United 
Kingdom (UK) and the United States by looking at key features that make each unique 
and recent development. Chapter 4 describes the data sources, collection process and 
definition of corporate governance provisions. Further the chapter provides more detailed 
,steps !n the construction of corporate governance scores at firm-level and country-level. 
To tackle' key research questions, three empirical' chapters are investigated (Chapter 5 -
,", . 
. . 
..chapter 7). The empirical results documented in Chapter 5 to Chapter 7 are summari~ed 
here as follows. 
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Building on the construction of the firm-level and country-level corporate governance 
scores in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 investigate the how corporate governance affects firm's 
information environment. Motivated by Ferreira and Laux (2007) and Fernandes and 
Ferreira (2009); the chapter sheds light on the relevance of firm-level governance in 
Europe. If corporate governance is said to enhance transparency and disclosure, then the 
amount of firm-specific information should be widely available or at least encourage 
collection of and trading on private inforn1ation. As such reduce the risk that informed 
traders' bears i.e. idiosyncratic risk. On the other hand, increase in opacity encourages 
informed traders to depend on industry and market wide information as a result increase 
synchronicity (Veldkamp (2006)). Consistent with the theo,retical predictions, I find that 
well governed firms have less synchronous stock returns indicating that firm specific 
" 
information is 'impounded into stock prices on timely basis. The implication of this result 
is that firm-level governance reduces the cost of collecting and trading on private 
information. 
Further Chapter 5 also examines the effect of country's institution on firm's information 
environment. Previous studies suggest that country characteristics to have direct impact 
on firm governance and transparency (for example, Doidge, Karol~i and Stulz (2007). 
The Chapter shows that country institutions play major role in enhancing firm's 
information environment. The study suggests that stocks prices are more informative 
when country's institutions are stronger. It also indicates that firms in countries with 
stronger anti-director rights, effective legal system and in common law countries to be 
more informative. These documented results imply that country-level governance reduces 
insiders' ability to expropriate. ' 
,,' 
·Chapter 6 examines the impact of owners,hip particularly large shareholders on firm's 
information environment. I investigate the role of largest shareholder and blockholders in 
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reducing information asymmetry within firms. Theory suggests that institutions have 
different impact ori firms. For instance, because of the size of their investment and 
resources available to them then there is incentive to monitor. On the other hand, size of 
the shareholding may encourage large shareholder to extract private benefit at the expense 
of the minority shareholder. The chapter addresses these conflicting theories with respect 
to firm information environment. Further, monitoring involves cost that shareholders are 
unwilling to incur as such encourage free-riding especially when the size of the 
shareholding is no as large. However, recent studies suggest alternative way that 
governance can. be exercised through exit. The chapter therefore examine whether the 
number of blockholders affects incorporation of firm-specific information. 
The results show a significant negati~e relation between largest shareholder· and 
synchronicity. Interestingly, the chapter show the relation to be significant in countries 
with better institutions and insignificant without introducing country-level governance. 
The results also indicate that largest shareholder affects firm's information environment in 
countries with ~trong shareholder protection measured by anti-director index, effective 
investor protection and overall country-level governance. To explore further the effect of 
the largest shareholder, the chapter investigate the type of largest shareholder based on the 
business relation with the firm. It shows that when the largest shareholder is independent, 
stock prices are more informative. The result is consistent with the view that independent 
institutions are more effective in collecting information and hence monitoring. 
The chapter 6 also show that the blockholders have significant negative relationship with 
synchronicity. This supports previous findings that blockholders have significant impact 
on firm-specific informatiqn. Previous empirical studies such as Durnev and Kim (2005) 
~nd Doidge, et aI., (2007) provide· evidet:tce on the effect of country institutions ·on 
governance. The chapter adds to this developing line of literature by showing that the 
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effect of blockholders is more pronounced in countries with better institutional structure. 
Further, the number of block owners show significant negative relation with 
synchronicity. One explanation for this finding is that increasing number of blockholders 
enhances the ability and amount of information collected that increase trading on private 
information as results improve stock price informativeness. 
The effect of stock price informativeness on firm value is investigated in Chapter 7. Based 
on the notion that informative stock prices enhance allocation of resources, the chapter 
explores its implication to valuation, measured by Tobin's Q.' Theoretical and empirical 
literatures suggest that informative stock prices promote efficiency in corporate 
investment. As such managers learn of their decision through information prod~ced by 
those prices. Further, extent to which firnt is said to be informative depends on the quality 
and quantity of information that encourage informed traders to collect and trade on private 
information. This information also needs to be timely and accurately disclosed. Insiders 
are unlikely to produce this kind of information' on their own due to existing agency 
problem; therefore incentive for informed traders is more likely to disappear. Corporate 
governance is said to enhance transparency and disclosure, as such quality of information 
should be higher for firms with better governance. This chapter investigate these 
theoretical arguments by looking at how efficiency in corporate investment has direct 
implication on firm value. In addition, examine what role firm-level governance play in 
enhancing the impact of informative stock prices on firm valuation. 
Consistent with theory, my results show those firms with informative stock prices as 
measured by logarithmic transformation of the R2 statistic of the market model, have 
higher market valuation." My results also indicate that corporate governance has 
significant impact on the relation between stock price informativeness and firm value., The 
chapter show that the relation is stronger for firms with 'petter firm-level governance and 
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large proportion of independent non-executive directors. In addition, it shows that 
ownership has different implication to the firm value. On one hand, my results suggest 
that the relation between stock prices informativeness and firm value is stronger for firms 
with higher concentration of block ownership. On the other hand, my results tell that less 
informative firms receive higher market valuation when significant' proportion of 
ownership is in the hands of single largest shareholder. This may suggest that the presence 
of largest shareholder increase information asymmetry as a result of reduced information 
flow about the firm which increase idiosyncratic risk. As such, industry and market wide 
information dominate making it difficult to determine quality of firm investment leading 
to overpricing. 
In general, the empirical chapters underli~ the essence of firms having better governance. 
Because the firm-level governance derives its foundation on the national corporate 
governance codes, my results provide important implications for firms and policy makers. 
First, from firm's point'of view investing in better governance ensures that investors are 
protected and welfare of shareholders is served well. Better governance enhances 
transparency and disclosure which are essential ingredients in encouraging collection of 
and trading on private information. As such, better governed firms are expected to have 
higher levels of financial reporting which is equipped in terms of quality and quantity of 
information. This ensures that rapid incorporation into stock prices. 
Further, recent global financial crisis and well-documented corporate scandals indicate 
that. even countries with better legal protections are not immune. Therefore devotion 
towards further development of corporate governance principles that promote stronger 
internal governance is encpuraged. My results shows that firm with large proportion of 
the independent non-executive directors. are more informative. The' relevance . of 
independent directors' is not new in corporate governance studies. However, in a number 
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of cases firms disclose that they overlook independence for directors' knowledge64• This 
is striking as the c·orporate governance codes provide for regular training of directors; this 
should encourage increased number of independent element within boards. Therefore, the 
findings in this thesis should provide ammunition for regulators and policy makers. 
Another interesting finding that has major implication is on the role of institutional 
ownership. My results show that block ownership (defined as shareholders who hold at 
least 5% of shares) is inversely related to synchronicity. The role of institutions as 
governance mechanism is threatened by free-riding problem,· as a results these findings 
indicate that shareholders· with substantial holding are effective. The result could be 
interpreted in two ways; first, block owners ensures efficient allocation of firm r~sources 
and second, release of timely and quality information is enhanced. The implication of 
these results to policy makers is that apart from internal governance, encouraging 
shareholders to build a certain threshold of shares could be important. Further, it can also 
be important to set requirement that bind shareholders especially those with a certain level 
to vote and/or get involved with firm affairs. 
8.3 Limitation of the Th~sis and Suggestions for Future Research 
This thesis has been developed within context of information efficiency as measured by 
logarithmic transformation of the R2 statistic of the market model. As such this form the 
main component in the analysis provided in this study. Complimented with a number of 
theoretical and empirical support which extend into broader array in corporate finance 
literatures the contribution of this study is vast and therefore adds to the· existing 
literature and provide practical implication. Nonetheless,· the thesis is by no means 
complete; several limitati.ons should be taken into account in interpreting the results and 
arriving at conclusions. These also offer ~pportunities to conduct future researches that 
64 Particularly common in French firms 
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• 
can address some of the limitation. This section therefore provides a summary discussion 
of the limitations and direction for future research. 
First, this study builds its foundation on the construction of the corporate governance 
score based on' the number of provisions. The main fact in its construction is the 
. assumption that ''firms can only make change to their governance structures through 
public disclosure", as such non-disclosure reflect non-implementation of the provision(s). 
This is a strong assumption, as in some cases firms may have implement the provision 
without communicating publicly. Therefore, a study that can address this issue may 
provide better understanding and robust governance score. 
Second, the sample used in this study is based on largest Europ~an firms from major 
economies within European Union (EU). As such the sample is biased towards large 
firn1s. Given the size and resources of these firms, one might expect that these firms 
should have better disclosure practices and governance structure. Therefore, caveat 
should be taken in interpreting the result especially for policy implementation. Further 
studies that cover a broad spectrum of firms may be warranted. 
Third, as observed in Table 6-3 of Chapter 6; over 50% of the firms in the sample have 
blockholders. Given the fact that in some firms multiple voting exists, further 
in'vestigation on how different voting and cash flow right influence firm information 
environment could have provided a clear picture. In addition, my results indicate 
synchronicity is higher with respect to ownership by largest shareholder. It is possible 
that further examination on how the cash flows are distributed among the two largest 
sharehol~ers could have provided a different outcome. Data availability limits this 
inve,stigation. Future research can provide useful insight in this area. 
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